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Summary 
Factors that determine the level and variation in disclosure have been a matter of considerable 
interest and importance to policy makers and the financial reporting community. Existing studies 
have not well established the impact of institutions on corporate disclosure because of their 
macro-level analysis. This thesis investigates the association between firm-level institutional 
factors and the level of mandatory disclosure in annual reports of Nigerian listed companies. It 
argues that accounting standards provide the definition of legitimate methods for use in 
presenting financial statements, and the level of mandatory disclosure reveals organisational 
commitment to these standards. The thesis uses the Oliver (1991) and Greenwood et al. (2011) 
institutional framework to identify factors that determine the level and variation in mandatory 
disclosure.   
The thesis sampled 100 firm-years across eight industries over three regulatory regimes. The 
self-constructed measure of mandatory disclosure is based on the Nigerian national accounting 
standards, which provide guidance for presenting financial statements prior to 2012, and on the 
IFRS, for first time adopters of IFRS with a financial year-end of 2012/2013. Based on Oliver’s 
framework, the result indicate that the level of mandatory disclosure is significantly and 
positively influenced by legitimacy, legal coercion, and voluntary diffusion, however, it is 
significantly and negatively influenced by economic efficiency, uncertainty, interconnectedness 
and dependence. These results suggest that Nigerian listed companies confront greater number of 
factors that encouraged resistance to disclosure in annual reports.  
Based on the Greenwood et al.’s framework the result indicate that strong regulatory regimes 
significantly and negatively influenced variation in the level of mandatory disclosure while 
organisational field, organisation structure, ownership and identities significantly and positively 
influenced variation. These results suggest strong regulatory regimes reduced variation in 
disclosure while organisation structure, ownership and identities increased variation in 
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1.1.  Introduction 
Mandatory disclosure is the minimum items of information about important aspects of corporate 
activities required for disclosure in corporate annual reports (Wallace and Naser, 1995). These 
are information that is relevant to decision-making of individual readers of these financial 
reports. The demand for financial reporting and disclosure arises from information asymmetry 
(‘lemons’ problem) and agency conflicts (agency problem) between managers and outside 
investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001, p.406). Inadequate attention to these problems results in 
adverse selection and misevaluations of firms (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Although contractual 
obligations between entrepreneurs and investors are proposed as a solution to these problems, 
and to provide an incentive for full disclosures, Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that a variety of 
economic and institutional factors determine the effectiveness of these contracts including the 
ability to write and enforce them.   
This thesis provides evidence on the impact of institutions on the level of mandatory disclosure 
in the annual reports of Nigerian listed companies. Existing studies on the determinants of the 
level of mandatory disclosure have predominantly focused on economic factors but have 
neglected institutional factors. Consequently, existing studies have predominantly used 
economic-based theory as Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) to provide an explanation on the 
determinants of the level of disclosure in corporate annual reports. These PAT-based studies 
assumed that accounting is part of the contract between a principal and an agent. It further 
assumed that the separation between the agent and the principal is so extensive that the discretion 
of making accounting choice is assigned solely to the agent (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). In 
addition, the PAT-based predictions suggest that the observed level of corporate disclosure is the 
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result of the coalition of actors maximising their utility (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1990). It 
also assumed that the unit of analysis should be an individual firm, without consideration to the 
firm’s external environment (Mezias, 1990).  
However, Fields et al. (2001) argue that financial reporting is crucial to the interest of all parties 
in a network of relationship between managers, owners, financial institutions, security analysts 
and rating agencies. Consequently, accounting standards are designed to provide the definition of 
legitimate methods for use in presenting financial statements (Mezias, 1990). The definition of 
these legitimate methods reduced the discretion of a firm’s management when preparing the 
annual reports; therefore, corporate organisations have to follow a narrowly defined set of 
legitimate alternatives when preparing their annual reports (Scott, 1995).  
These disclosure standards act as a normative pressure on corporate managers. Corporate 
organisations and their actors tend to internalise the viewpoints expressed in these standards 
making them evident instead of subject to choice (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The foregoing 
suggests that the expectations of the relational and exchange networks do not only shape the 
preferences of actors in the organisation but also direct their interactions with them.  In other 
words, the preferences and the cognition of individual actors in corporate organisations are 
influenced by their institutional contexts (Granovetter, 1985).  Among the reasons for 
organisations’ engagement in activities aimed at creating legitimacy is to facilitate exchanges 
(Davis and Robins, 2005; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1987) and signal trustworthiness 
(Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002).  
Based on the foregoing, this thesis argues that the level of mandatory disclosure in corporate 
annual report reveals organisational commitment to rational behaviour as expected by their 
relational networks (Touron, 2005). Therefore, an organisation complies with the disclosure 
requirements of accounting standards to gain legitimacy for using acceptable business practice 
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rather than solely for economic benefits (Chua and Taylor, 2008; Irvine, 2008; Mir and Rahman, 
2005; Rodriques and Craig, 2007). To this end, organisational leadership will direct effort to 
ensuring that the financial reporting practice of the organisation conforms to accounting 
standards (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Additionally, the corporate leadership will identify the 
prevailing accounting disclosure requirements and ensure that the reporting practices of their 
organisations are consistent with these requirements (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, Meyer and Scott, 
1983). This alignment of corporate actions to the expectations of relevant audiences in the 
financial reporting environment forms the basis for receiving endorsement (Deephouse, 1999). In 
addition, corporate leaders will consider reasonable and rational means that will enable them to 
satisfy the requirements of accounting standards (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990) when preparing 
corporate annual reports.  
Based on this legitimate perspective, this thesis provides answers to three empirical questions. 
First, what is the level of mandatory disclosure in corporate annual reports of Nigerian listed 
companies? Second, what factors can explain the level of mandatory disclosure in annual reports 
of Nigerian listed companies? Third, what factors can explain intra-industry variation in the level 
of mandatory disclosure in annual reports of Nigerian listed companies? 
Although some studies have recognised the impact of institutions on corporate reporting 
practices, most of these studies are cross-country studies that provide a limited explanatory 
power of the impact of institutions on the level of disclosure (Bushee and Leuz, 2005; Leuz and 
Wysocki, 2008). Holthausen (2003) argues that within-country studies are necessary to evaluate 
the impact of specific institutional regimes on the level of corporate disclosure.  
Furthermore, although some financial accounting studies have used institutional theory to 
provide an explanation on corporate financial reporting practice (Mezias, 1990; Collin, 
Tagesson, Anderson, Cato and Hasson, 2009; Rahman, Yammeesri and Perera, 2010; Guerreiro, 
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Rodriques and Craig, 2012), specific institutional contexts may influenced the results of an 
empirical study. This thesis provides a contribution to this growing research in the context of the 
Nigerian financial reporting environment.  
To provide an answer to the first empirical question, this thesis has evaluated the level of the 
researcher-created indices of mandatory information disclosed in the corporate annual reports of 
sampled Nigerian listed companies. To provide an answer to the second empirical question, this 
thesis uses the Oliver (1991) institutional framework to identify factors that determine the level 
of mandatory disclosure in the annual reports of Nigerian listed firms. The characteristics of 
individual firms are emphasised to the extent that they can be used to explain which firms are 
more or less subject to pressure from their institutional environment to comply with mandatory 
disclosure requirements, which are stated in relevant accounting standards. These characteristics 
are also emphasised to the extent that they enhance the organisation’s ability to acquire or 
maintain legitimacy in the financial reporting environment.  
The Oliver’s model allows for relaxation of the assumption that organisations are institutional 
dopes, and suggests instead that corporate organisations will strategically respond to their 
institutional contexts. The model does however suffer some weaknesses. For example, Pache and 
Santos (2010) argue that it treats organisations as unitary actors as it develops strategic responses 
to outside pressures. The authors argue further that the model merely suggests that when 
organisations find it difficult to acquiesce to what is expected from them, they are highly likely 
to resort to more resistant strategies such as compromise, avoidance, defiance or manipulation. 
The model does not express those conditions under which resistant strategies are likely to be 
mobilised. 
To provide an explanation on the conditions for such resistant strategies, Pache and Santos 
(2010) argue that when social actors agree on the goals that organisations should pursue (such as 
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increased disclosure), but disagree on the means which should be put in place to achieve these 
goals, it poses a mild challenge for organisations. Therefore, such a condition increases the 
likelihood of compromise among corporate organisations. In other words, the existence of non-
specific rules provides an incentive to corporate organisations to exercise discretion in their 
approach to achieving institutional goals while maintaining the legitimacy of their activities 
(Goodrick and Salancik, 1996).  
Based on the foregoing weakness, this thesis uses the Greenwood et al. (2011) institutional 
framework to identify factors that can explain why corporate organisations respond differently to 
mandatory disclosure requirements. Greenwood et al. argue that when corporate organisations 
face multiple and conflicting institutions and their exposure to these institutions are not the same, 
their responses (including mandatory disclosure) are unlikely to be uniform. This forms the basis 
for the third empirical question.  Based on Greenwood et al., factors that explain why corporate 
organisations differ in their level of mandatory disclosure are emphasised to the extent that they 
can help an organisation to acquire or maintain legitimacy. 
Institutional scholars emphasised that application of institutional theory is context-specific 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1983; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1983). 
For this reason, the next section discusses some contextual issues surrounding mandatory 
disclosure in Nigeria. Chapter two discusses the detailed contextual background of this thesis.  
1.2. Problems of corporate disclosure in Nigeria 
Nigeria’s financial reporting environment provides an important context in which to use an 
institutional framework for various reasons. First, Nigeria is a highly import-dependent 
economy. Corporate organisations import virtually everything that they require in the form of 
raw materials, machinery and technical specialists. The high level of import suggests that 
corporate organisations in Nigeria are widely affected by the external environment. For example, 
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the country’s currency relative to other major currencies of the world such as the US dollar and 
the British Pound sterling is very weak (see figure 2 in chapter 2). The persistent depreciation in 
the country’s currency against these currencies increased the cost of business. Since information 
disclosure is costly (Healy and Palepu, 2001), this thesis argues that the additional cost of 
business operations due to currency depreciation is a disincentive to increase the level of 
disclosure (see section 2.2.3 of chapter two for further discussions).  
Second, there is an ongoing reform in the institutional environment for financial reporting since 
Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999. These reforms cause instability in the institutional 
environment that continues to affect corporate financial reporting practice. One example of 
instability is the frequent changes in leadership of institutions, such as that of the Director-
General of the Securities and Exchange Commission. These frequent changes result in 
inconsistent implementation of policies and enforcement actions against corporate organisations. 
This thesis argues that this inconsistency in enforcement action provides an incentive to 
corporate organisations to compromise on the level of mandatory disclosure in their annual 
reports.   
Third, the legitimacy challenge to the enforcement power of the Financial Reporting Council of 
Nigeria (FRCN) would provide an incentive to corporate organisations not to fully comply with 
disclosure requirements. As an evidence of this legitimacy challenge, the FRCN Act 2011 
empowers it to register the chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) of all 
public interest entities. Whilst the FRCN sought to enforce this power to compel the registration 
of the officers of Eko Hotels Limited, the company challenged the Financial Reporting Council 
of Nigeria by instituting an action at the Federal High Court. The court delivered a judgement in 
favour of Eko Hotels Limited in 2014 (PwC, 2014).  This thesis argues that this decision is a 
legitimacy challenge to the FRCN, and constitutes a barrier to increased level of disclosure as it 
provides an incentive to corporate organisations to violate financial reporting requirements.  
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Furthermore, the tensions between enforcement mechanisms for financial reporting in Nigeria 
are a barrier to disclosure. For example, the FRCN sought to impose sanctions on Stanbic IBTC 
bank in 2015 because it engaged in unapproved transactions with its foreign technical partners 
(Nairametrics, 2015a).  In the process of this enforcement action, the executive secretary and 
CEO of the FRCN stated that the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) took ‘calculated’ steps to 
embarrass the FRCN while attempting to resolve the issue of alleged irregularities in the 
financial statements of Stanbic IBTC (Nairametrics, 2015b). This thesis argues that the tension 
between regulators is an indication of a lack of consensus on the means of achieving regulatory 
goals; therefore, it provides an incentive to corporate organisations to deviate from full 
compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements (Goodrick and Salancik, 1996).  
Furthermore, despite the many regulations that could enhance the level of mandatory disclosure 
compliance
1
 in Nigeria, the provisions of some of these regulations are open-ended and lack 
specificity. For example, Ariyo (2007) found that the Nigeria Stock Exchange Rule 53(2) and 
Rule 55(2)(c) required companies to avoid withholding material information from potential 
investors, but that these rules failed to provide a clear definition of what constitutes material 
information. This thesis argues that in the absence of a clear financial and reporting rule, 
corporate managers would subjectively determine the level of information disclosure, and it 
would therefore be difficult to objectively, bring companies to account for violations.  
In addition, although the Nigerian government uses legislative instruments such as CAMA 
(1990) to mandate compliance with financial reporting standards, this legislation assumes that 
the set of financial reporting standards is applicable to all firms irrespective of their nature of 
business and operations. The use of legislation to enforce compliance also assumes that firms 
have sufficient resources to comply with these requirements. This study argues that inadequate 
                                                     
 
1
 Details of these regulations are discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis 
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resources would limit the ability of corporate organisations to comply with the disclosure 
requirements (Oliver, 1991).  
Furthermore, prior empirical studies in Nigeria suggest compliance gaps with national 
accounting standards (World Bank ROSC, 2004, 2011). Similarly, Oghuma and Iyoha (2006) 
found that the level of compliance with 11 relevant standards by 15 of the 25 listed insurance 
companies was very low. This study argues that persistence violation of disclosure requirements 
is detrimental to the users of annual financial reports in Nigeria. 
These issues with corporate reporting practice suggest serious problems, whether existing or 
potential, to investors and policy-makers. Therefore, identification of factors shaping the level of 
mandatory disclosure in the annual reports of Nigerian listed companies deserves the attention of 
stakeholders such as regulators, investors and corporate officers. Unpacking these problems 
would help investors avoid potential adverse selection when making investment decisions. It 
would also help policy makers and other stakeholders devise appropriate disclosure regulation, 
and to find an enduring solution to the problems of compliance gaps in Nigeria.  
Furthermore, Nigeria adopted the IFRS from 1
st
 January 2012. An understanding of the level of 
disclosure prior to the adoption of IFRS and of the level of disclosure in the first year of IFRS 
adoption will give an insight to the adequacy of disclosure by listed Nigerian companies.  In 
addition, the level of disclosure by listed companies affects capital markets efficiency (Akerlof, 
1970; Gonedes, 1978).  Earlier empirical evidence suggests that efficiency of the equity market 
in Nigeria is weak (Akintola-Bello, 2004). Given the weak form efficiency, this study would aid 
investors’ understanding of the level of disclosure and therefore reduce uncertainty in share price 
movement.  
In addition, knowledge of the relationship between the level of disclosure and institutional 
factors is useful to regulators, and provides an insight into whether one-size disclosure standards 
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fit all corporations. It also enables regulators to consider the question on whether the imposition 
of an additional reporting standard would potentially put some firms at a disadvantage (Wallace 
and Naser, 1995). Based on the discussion in this section, the next section states the objectives of 
this thesis. 
1.3. Objectives of the study 
This thesis investigates: 
i. the level of mandatory disclosure by listed Nigerian companies 
ii. factors that explain the level of mandatory disclosure by listed Nigerian companies 
iii. factors that explain intra-industry variations in the level of mandatory disclosure by listed 
Nigerian companies 
To achieve the above objectives, this thesis sampled 100 firm-years across eight industry 
classifications, over three regulatory regimes. The sample consisted of 57 listed companies and a 
self-constructed index was used to measure the level of disclosure. The index was based on 
Nigerian national accounting standards that were issued by the NASB prior to the adoption of 
IFRS in 2012. The study also computed an index to measure the level of disclosure in the first 
year of IFRS adoption for companies with the financial year-end 2012/2013.  
The results of the first research objective show a significant difference exists in the levels of 
mandatory disclosure. Differences in the observed level of mandatory disclosure suggest that 
corporate organisations adopt different strategic approaches to acquiring or maintaining 
legitimacy (Deephouse, 1999; Suchman, 1995). The difference also suggests that some Nigerian 
listed companies have become so powerful as to deviate from mandated disclosure requirements 
despite the enforcement of compliance from relevant institutions (Perrow, 1986). In addition, 
differences in the levels of mandatory disclosure in corporate annual reports are the result of 
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differences in the level of exposure of these corporate organisations to their institutional contexts 
(Greenwood et al., 2011).  
The results of the empirical analysis for the second research objective show that seven out of the 
ten institutional factors identified in the Oliver (1991) model had significant impact on the level 
of disclosure in corporate annual reports. The results indicate that the level of mandatory 
disclosure in corporate annual reports of Nigerian listed companies is significantly and positively 
influenced by legitimacy, legal coercion, and voluntary diffusion.  
In addition, the result indicates that the level of disclosure is significantly and negatively 
influenced by economic efficiency, uncertainty, interconnectedness and dependence. This thesis 
finds no evidence of significant association between the level of disclosure and multiplicity of 
constituents, consistency of institutional requirements with firm’s goals and discretionary 
constraints. Overall, these results suggest that Nigerian listed companies are confront  with more 
factors that provide incentives to resist increasing the level of disclosure than factors that provide 
an incentive for increased level of disclosure.  
The results of the third set of hypotheses show that six out of the nine factors based on the 
Greenwood et al. (2011) framework had a significant impact on intra-industry variations in the 
level of mandatory disclosure. The results indicate that strong regulatory regimes significantly 
and negatively influenced variation in disclosure and that organisational field, organisation 
structure, organisation ownership and organisation identities significantly and positively 
influenced variation in disclosure. These results suggest that variation in disclosure is reduced 
during strong regulatory regimes; however, several other corporate attributes increased variation 
in disclosure. This suggests that regulators of corporate financial reporting in Nigeria will 
continue to face a challenge of ensuring a uniform financial reporting practice.  
P a g e  | 11 
 
Although it could be argued that the variables used in this thesis are not different from those 
commonly used for PAT or Agency theory-based studies, institutional theory perspective gives a 
different theoretical explanation of how these variables impact the level of disclosure. While the 
underlying motivations for the relationship of these variables with the level of mandatory 
disclosure is utility maximisation for both PAT and agency theories, that of institutional theory is 
organisational legitimacy.  
Furthermore, Eisenhardt (1988) states that the measurement of institutional variables and the resulting 
hypotheses are closely tied to the given empirical setting. Similarly, DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.148) 
noted that the institutional field ‘cannot be defined a priori, but must be defined on the basis of empirical 
investigations’. Therefore, institutional hypotheses are necessarily context-specific; while a PAT or 
agency-based hypotheses may predict positive direction on variable, institutional based hypotheses may 
predict a negative direction (Eisenhardt, 1988). However, Collin et al. (2009) argue that institutional 
theory offers an alternative explanation to PAT, and in certain respects, provides a complementary 
explanation. Therefore, many hypotheses in institutional theory are the same as those supporting PAT. 
1.4. Contributions of the study 
This study makes empirical, theoretical and policy contributions, to the research areas, as 
discussed in detail in chapter nine of this thesis. 
1.4.1. Theoretical contribution 
The results show that in addition to studies that confine the application of the Oliver (1991) 
framework to organisations such as hospitals, universities and other state-owned organisations 
(Jamali, 2010; Modell, 2001; Milliken, Martins and Morgan, 1998; Abernethy and Chua, 1996; 
Ingram and Simons, 1995; Goodstein, 1994), the framework can be applied to financial 
accounting research. Additionally, this study contributes, at least in part, to a call by Carpenter 
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and Feroz (2001, p.593) for research that ‘might be fruitfully directed to investigating Oliver’s 
strategic response model’.   
1.4.2. Empirical contribution 
Cross-country studies on corporate disclosure practice suggest that a country’s legal and 
institutional environment can affect a firm’s financial reporting incentives and hence influence 
the quality of information reported to outside investors (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000; Hung, 
2001; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003). However, Holthausen (2003) calls for a within country 
studies, to aid an understanding of the impact of specific institutional regimes on the level of 
disclosure. This thesis contributes to this request by providing evidence on the impact of 
institutional factors on the level of mandatory disclosure in Nigeria.   
Furthermore, very few studies have applied the Oliver (1991) framework to financial accounting 
research. Among these few studies is that by Guerreiro et al. (2012). Although their study used 
the Oliver (1991) model to provide an explanation on the voluntary adoption of IFRS by large 
unlisted companies in Portugal, this thesis focuses on mandatory disclosure compliance. 
Corporate organisations that have adopted accounting standards may not fully comply with the 
requirements of the adopted standards (Street, Gray and Bryant, 1999), therefore, this study 
contributes to empirical financial research by using the Oliver’s framework to provide 
explanation on the level of mandatory disclosure in annual reports.  
In addition, the study by Guerreiro et al. (2012) focuses on unlisted companies in Portugal while 
for this thesis the focus is on listed companies. The pressures face by listed companies from their 
institutional environment is significantly different to those of unlisted companies. Additionally, 
Guerreiro et al. (2012) used survey data, which may have suffered from response bias (Groves et 
al., 2004). This study has used archival data, which allows for the repetition of the methodology 
in different institutional settings.  
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Furthermore, some studies have used the sociological institutional theory to provide an 
explanation on corporate financial reporting practices (Mezias, 1990; Collin et al., 2009). This 
thesis makes an additional contribution to financial accounting research. Mezias’ (1990) study 
provides explanation for the financial reporting practice of US based Fortune 200 companies. 
The US institutional environment for financial reporting is relatively stable, and this might have 
made the impact of institution significant on corporate reporting practice. Unlike the US, the 
institutional environment for financial reporting in Nigeria is unstable; this would lead to 
differences in empirical results, on the impacts of institutions on corporate financial reporting.  
In addition, the study by Collin et al. focuses on the choice of accounting standards by municipal 
corporations, which faced different institutional pressures when compared to for-profit listed 
organisations. Besides, their study focuses on choice from two alternative accounting standards, 
which is similar to studies that focus on adoption of standards, while this thesis focuses on the 
level of disclosure in corporate annual reports. It thus gives a better understanding of corporate 
reporting practice within their institutional context. The measurements of variables for the 
hypotheses are present in section 6.41 of chapter six, and the implications of the findings are 
discussed in chapters seven, eight and nine of this thesis.  
1.4.3. Policy contribution 
This study identifies important factors that would help policy makers in Nigeria formulate 
effective financial reporting regulations. The results suggest that irrespective of the strength of 
regulatory institutions for financial reporting, non-uniform disclosure will continue to exist 
among the listed companies in Nigeria. Furthermore, the result shows that accounting standards 
alone are not sufficient to enhance a uniform financial reporting. Therefore, enforcement 
mechanisms in Nigeria will continue to face the challenge of enhancing uniform disclosure by 
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corporate organisations.  The result also suggests the need to have an evidence-based regulation 
for financial reporting in Nigeria.  
This study makes the following recommendations. First, there is a need for cooperation among 
institutional agents. For example, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) should collaborate with 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Accounting 
professional bodies, and representatives of industry (such as the Manufacturing Association of 
Nigeria). This collaboration should define the role of each members of the alliance with a focus 
on helping organisations to increase the level of disclosure.  
In addition, the results suggest various strategic responses a corporate manager might adopt 
when assessing the likely impacts of regulatory requirements. For example, a manager that needs 
additional fund would need to evaluate whether it is preferable to source the needed funds 
internally and thus avoid increasing the level of information disclosure. Alternatively, managers 
of organisations with sufficient slack resources could increase the level of information 
disclosure. Such corporate managers might benefit from increased disclosure in form of 
enhanced reputation. Similarly, an efficient organisation might reduce the level of disclosure and 
maintain legitimacy, since such organisation could justify that, they efficiently utilised the 
resources provided to them by relevant institutional audience.  
In addition, significant variation in the level of disclosure across industries suggests the need for 
an industry-specific regulation for financial reporting.  For example, the average level of 
disclosure for firms in the agriculture sector is significantly lower than the average levels of 
disclosure in other industries. One factor that might account for this is the lack of industry-
specific accounting standards for agriculture sector.  Similarly, the service industry has low level 
of disclosure relative to overall average disclosure. By their nature, some of the generic 
disclosure requirements are not applicable to firms in the service industry.  
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 Furthermore, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) of Nigeria should provide necessary 
supports to ease compliance, such as the provision of workshops, trainings and technical notes. 
Although the FRC has taken steps in this direction by the establishment of the FRC academy, the 
FRC should provide information that would increase the level of awareness of the existence and 
services offered by the academy to all who are involved in the preparation of financial reports.  
In addition, the results indicate that the ‘big four’ audit firms, which are used to proxy voluntary 
diffusion of institutional pressures significantly impact the level of disclosure. On this basis, the 
FRC should encourage formal collaboration between the members of the accounting professions 
(ICAN/ANAN) and the big four audit firms. The FRC should formalise this collaboration by 
memoranda of agreement with practising members of the professional body who are not part of 
the big four. The focus of the collaboration should be for the big four to conduct a review of 
financial statement of companies audited by other smaller audit firms. The goal of such review 
should be to enhance the quality of financial statements of companies audited by the non-big 
audit firms. This arrangement should include a mechanism for exchanging confidential 
information to enhance effective monitoring and enforcement of financial reporting 
requirements.  
1.5. Structure of the study 
The remaining parts of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter two reviews the institutional 
frameworks for financial reporting in Nigeria. Chapter three discusses the theoretical framework. 
Chapter four outlines the literature review. Chapter five presents the hypothesis. Chapter six 
presents the research strategy and methodology. Chapters seven presents the empirical evidence 
on the impact of firm-level institutions on the level of mandatory disclosure and differences in 
the levels of disclosure among the sampled companies, across regulatory periods, and accounting 
standards. Chapter eight presents evidence on the relationship between inter-industry variation in 
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the level of mandatory disclosure and institutional factors. Chapter nine presents the conclusion 
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Chapter Two 
The institutional environment of financial reporting in Nigeria 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses what institutions shape financial reporting in Nigeria and provides the 
contextual background for this thesis. The chapter focuses on government enforcement agencies, 
the interaction among these agencies and corporate organisations. The chapter discusses the 
instability of the institutional environment for financial reporting in Nigeria, and argues that the 
weaknesses in the Nigerian institutional environment are a hindrance to effective monitoring and 
enforcement activities of these agencies. 
Section 2 discusses the socio-political background of Nigeria. Section 3 discusses regulatory 
framework for financial reporting in Nigeria. Section 4 discusses the interaction among the 
regulatory framework and corporate organisations in Nigeria. Section 5 discusses the limitations 
in the operations of the regulatory institutions for financial reporting in Nigeria. Section 6 
discusses the conclusion of the chapter.  
2.2.  The socio-political background of Nigeria 
Previous studies suggest that international differences in reporting and disclosure adequacy relate 
to differences in the economic, political, demographic, and culture of each country (Belkaoui, 
1983; Gray, 1988).  Other country specific factors that influence disclosure include the degree of 
public accountability (Kauffmann et al., 2010) and the legal environment (Hope, 2003b; 
Soderstrom and Sun, 2007). This section discusses the socio-political background of Nigeria and 
examines the impact these factors could have on corporate financial reporting. 
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2.2.1 Nigeria’s political background 
At independence in 1960, HM Elizabeth II appointed Dr Nnamdi Azkiwe (from southeastern 
Nigeria) as Governor-General who represented Nigeria until it became a Republic on 1
st
 October 
1963. The first post-independence government was formed by a northern-based political party 
under the leadership of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as prime minister. The public accused the 
party of utilising its control of the federal centre to alter the balance of power in its favour; this 
escalated the problems that led to the first military coup in 1966. Although military officers that 
were loyal to the Prime Minister were able to foil the coup attempt, the council of ministers 
decided to hand over to a military officer-General Aguiyi Ironsi (from southeastern Nigeria)- as 
a result of a general loss of control of public order.  
Six months later, a successful coup placed Colonel Yakubu Gowon (from northern Nigeria) in 
command. In 1975, Major General Murtala Muhammed deposed the regime of General Gowon. 
Murtala Muhammed was assassinated in a failed coup attempt in 1976, then Lieutenant General 
Olusegun Obasanjo (from southwestern Nigeria) took over the leadership of Murtala’s regime 
and presided over the transfer of power to an elected civilian administration headed by 
northerner Shehu Shagari under the 1979 Nigerian constitution. 
Shagari was elected for a second term in October 1983 but was deposed by Major General 
Buhari (North) in December 1983. Again, Buhari was deposed in August 1985 in a bloodless 
coup led by Major General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida, a northerner. Babangida promised a 
return to civilian rule under the 1989 constitution of Nigeria. Legislative elections were held in 
1992 and the presidential election in June 1993. However, Babangida annulled the result of the 
presidential election believed to have been won by MKO Abiola who was from southwestern 
Nigeria. Babangida intended to carry on as military president of Nigeria but public anger forced 
him to step aside in August 1993.  
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Enerst Shonekan from southwestern Nigeria was appointed the leader of an interim civilian 
government. However, General Sanni Abacha, a northerner, ousted Shonekan in November 
1993. Abacha promised elections in 1998 but sought subsequently to succeed himself as a 
civilian president. He died unexpectedly in June 1998 and was succeeded by General Abubakar a 
northerner. Abubakar’s regime organised a nationwide election that returned former retired 
Military General, Olusegun Obasanjo from southwest Nigeria as the president in May 1999. 
Obasanjo won the election for a second term in May 2003 and attempted to contest for a third 
term in 2007; however, public pressure made him support Musa Yar’Adua a northerner who was 
declared the winner of the May 2007 election. Yar’Adua died of illness on 5 May 2010 and his 
Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan from the southeast Nigeria was appointed to succeed him. 
Jonathan contested and won the Presidential election of May 2011 and became the elected 
president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria until May 2015. Another general election was held 
in 2015 that ushered in retired General Mohammadu Buhari in May 2015 as the president.  
Whilst extremely detailed, the above demonstrates the degree to which Nigeria has witnessed 
significant political and governance instability over the last 50 years, and also illustrates the 
localised geographical significance and dynamics. This instability had a dramatic impact on 
policy implementation in general, and on accounting regulation in particular. The instability in 
itself makes the state less accountable to the populace (Uche, 2002). In addition, unlike 
developed economies such as the US and UK where the rules governing the methodology and 
timing of control and change in governance are well established, such regulation is lacking in 
Nigeria. Although the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria laid down the fundamental 
principles for governance, the constitution itself has been frequently changed. Furthermore, 
significant lack of freedom of speech has contributed to an unaccountability of governmental 
institutions and political office holders.  
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This thesis argues that the high level of instability in the Nigerian institutional environment can 
provide incentives for corporations to deviate from mandatory disclosure requirements. 
Regulatory agencies might not detect these deviations from disclosure requirements because 
agency management and leadership shift with changes in government, which can therefore result 
in inconsistent implementation of enforcement policy. In addition, the legitimacy of these 
enforcement mechanisms are frequently challenged by corporate organisation in the law courts, 
which can inhibit their enforcement powers.  
2.2.2 Education within Nigeria 
Belkaoui (1983) argues that the number of people pursuing accounting as a profession and the 
quality of accounting and reporting practices depend on the size of the country’s population. 
Nigeria had an estimated population of 170 million in 2015, and the population size suggests a 
high level of economic activity, which would in turn influence the demand for accounting 
information. The higher the demand for accounting information the greater the requirement for 
capacity building in order to develop the skills needed for the production of useful accounting 
information.  
However, the quality of education in Nigeria has declined since the mid 1980s due to corruption, 
poor funding, extensive closure of educational institutions and industrial action by staff unions 
(Babalola, 2006). Higher educational institutions are beleaguered by favouritism, ‘cultism’, 
examination malpractice and other issues, which in turn have an effect on graduate’s educational 
attainment. A lack of employability skills in graduates therefore leads to an increased rate of 
unemployment. The few graduates who are able to find employment do so through nepotism, 
political patronage or business connections (El-Rufai, 2003). These go on to observe an endemic 
culture of rule-breaking,  circumventing of established procedures and avoidance of internal 
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control systems or ignoring codes of conduct, yet whistle-blowing is not an option for fear of 
repercussions including losing their jobs. 
Thus evolves a workforce accustomed to unethical conduct and corrupt practice as  perpetrated 
by their mentors (Saliu and Aremu, 2004; Bello-Imam, 2004). In addition, some accountants 
report that in instances where they attempt to whistle-blow for corrupt practices in corporate 
organisations, they often become the victims of oppression instead of being protected and 
rewarded (ICAN, 2008). This suggests that despite the increased demand for accounting 
information, the likelihood of Nigerian listed companies producing this are questionable, which 
merits an in-depth study on the level of disclosure in their annual reports.  
Furthermore, the World Bank Report on Observance and Compliance (ROSC) (2004) found that 
some regulators such as the Corporate Affairs Commission lacked the required skills to enhance 
their effectiveness. Similarly, some practitioners such as local audit firms, Chief Financial 
Officers and company accountants were not familiar with existing accounting standards (World 
Bank, 2004). This also suggests that the level of disclosure in the annual reports of Nigerian 
listed companies could be very poor, and a study into disclosure is merited.  
2.2.3 Nigeria’s economic policies 
Nigeria embarked on several economic development plans following independence. The 
objectives of these have included an increase in per capita income, to reduce unemployment, to 
increase the supply of a high-level work force, and to diversify the economy and indigenisation 
of economic activities (Alapiki, 2004). However, Obiemaka and Obi (2004) argue that the 
political leadership has generally lacked the experience for proper implementation of these plans, 
compounded by issues of corruption, greed, and lack of a skilled work force.  
Figure 1 shows the contribution to GDP by sectors, which is a reflection of the performance of 
the successive administration’s economic policies. 
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Figure 1 Contributions to Nigerian GDP by sectors 
 
Computed from Central Bank of Nigeria, Statistical Bulletin Golden Jubilee Edition, 2008; Statistical Bulletin, 2011 
At independence, agriculture contributed over 60 percent of total GDP while crude petroleum 
and natural gas contributed less than 5 percent of GDP. By 1974, the end of the second national 
development plan, there was a significant reduction in the agricultural contribution, as it fell to 
just a little over 20 percent of GDP while the crude petroleum contribution rose significantly.  
During the period of the third national development plan (1975-1980), there was an appreciable 
increase in the contribution of wholesale and retail trade to about 20 percent of GDP.  However, 
since after 1980, the wholesale and retail contribution to GDP have fallen dramatically.  
The contribution of each sector to the GDP indicates the economic significance of these sectors. 
The significance of each sector would influence the demand for accounting information by 
potential investors. For example, due to the significant contribution of the crude petroleum and 
natural gas sector to the GDP, there could be an assumption by the investing public that this 
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would result in different pressures and demands for accounting information and the disclosure of 
accounting information. It is therefore important to investigate the level of disclosure in annual 
reports of each company in each of the sectors, which will give an indication of how these 
companies have responded to the demand for accounting information. 
During the Structural Adjustments Programme (SAP) that commenced in 1986, Babangida (a 
military ruler and dictator from 1985 and 1993) devalued the county’s currency exchange rate by 
more than 500 percent taking it from under one Naira per US dollar to five Naira per dollar. The 
value of the currency against the dollar has consistently depreciated since then. The extent of 
devaluation of the Naira against the dollar is show in figure 2.  
Figure 2  Nigeria’s official exchange rate to US Dollars 
 
Computed from Central Bank of Nigeria, Statistical Bulletin Golden Jubilee Edition, 2008;  Statistical Bulletin, 
2011 
The value of the Naira continued to depreciate, making it difficult to attain an economic balance 
of trade. By the end of 2010, the official exchange rate of the Naira to the US dollar was more 
than N150. The depreciation in Nigerian currency has generally increased business operating 
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Since Nigeria imports a range input materials for business operations, exchange rate volatility 
would affect almost every company.  The unfavourable volatility in exchange rates would have a 
negative impact on available resources that corporate organisations could have used to enhance 
the level of disclosure in the annual reports. In addition, Nigeria suffers from inadequate basic 
infrastructure such as electricity, communication networks, roads network and security. Most 
corporate organisations therefore have to provide this basic infrastructure themselves, which 
increased business costs and which arguably affect ability to invest in other facilities such as 
those, which would improve disclosure in annual reports. 
Successive governments have established regulatory institutions as a strategy to achieve its 
policy objectives for corporate reporting. These regulatory institutions are backed by enabling 
statutes, and their structure and enforcement mechanisms are discussed in the next sections. 
2.3. Regulatory framework for financial reporting in Nigeria  
Puxty et al. (1987) cited in Cooke and Wallace (1990) theorised that there are three modes of 
accounting regulation: market, state and the accounting profession. They argue that where 
market forces predominate, the regulatory atmosphere is liberalised and the market is allowed to 
determine disclosure practice. In other words, there would be no systematic regulation of 
accounting disclosure. On the other hand, where the state principles prevail, the state dominates 
the regulation of accounting reporting.  
However, Cooke and Wallace (1990) observe that neither market nor state principles exist in a 
pure form; therefore, three modes of accounting regulation coexist in all countries. Such 
coexistence is described as “community” by Puxty et al. Cooke and Wallace (1990) argue that 
the two essentially dominant scenarios of “community” regulations are “associationism” (a 
situation in which market forces and the accounting profession influence accounting regulation) 
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and “corporatism” (a situation of greater cooperation between the state and accounting 
profession.  
This thesis argues that Nigeria has experimented with three forms of accounting regulation since 
independence. Firstly, the market was allowed to determine disclosure practice between 
independence in 1960 and 1965. During this period, there was no systematic regulation of 
accounting disclosure.  
Secondly, this thesis argues that the “corporatism” form of regulation dominated the regulatory 
space between 1965 and 1990. During this period, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Nigeria (ICAN) was established in 1965 by the ICAN Act (1965), and the Company Act 1968 
provided the regulatory framework for financial reporting. However, branches of foreign audit 
firms dominated the audit market in Nigeria during this period, and most of the listed companies 
were branches of multinational corporations (Uche, 2002). Although the Nigerian Accounting 
Standards Boards (NASB) was established in 1982 to issue accounting standards for use in the 
preparation of corporate annual reports, the NASB was housed in the ICAN secretariat. 
Consequently, the NASB depended on the cooperation of the accounting profession, industry 
associations and other government institutions such as the NSE and SEC to enforce corporate 
compliance with accounting standards disclosure requirements.  
The state began to play a dominant role in the regulation of financial reporting and disclosure in 
1990, with the enactment of the Companies and Allied Matters Decree (CAMD) 1990 by the 
military. However, this Decree was change to an act of parliament, known as the Companies and 
Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990.  
CAMA 1990 (s.359 (2)) required that financial statements audited by qualified professional 
accountants were countersigned by legal practitioners. Okike (2004) argues that this provision of 
the Act was a legitimacy challenge of the dominating influence of the accounting profession on 
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financial reporting matters. This provision of the decree was removed by the Nigerian National 
Assembly after contention and public debates by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Nigeria.  
The CAMA governs the formation of limited liability companies and registration of businesses 
(CAMA 1990, s.54). The Act specifies the formats for the preparation of financial statements; 
appointment of audit committees for each company to oversee the internal control system; the 
appointments of external auditors; the appointment of directors and officers of the company, and 
the procedure to evaluate the affairs of the company through annual general meetings (CAMA 
1990, s. 63).  
This thesis focuses on three distinctive disclosure regimes in Nigeria, since the CAMA 1990 
became a key instrument used by the state to provide the framework for financial reporting in 
Nigeria. These three disclosure regimes potentially suggest three business environments; these 
are 2000 to 2003, 2004 to 2011 and 2012 (the first year of mandatory IFRS adoption in Nigeria).  
The period 2000-2003 signals the first wave of regulatory reforms. Among the reforms that had 
an impact on business during this period was the 25 percent increase in minimum wage between 
2000 and 2002. This increase in workers’ wages had potentially two impacts on organisations’ 
financial reporting; firstly, in terms of an increase in consumer purchasing power thereby 
affecting reported revenues, secondly, in terms of higher labour costs, which would affect 
reported profit and put pressures on organisations to downsize in response to market exigencies 
(Greenwood et al., 2009).  
The period 2000 to 2003 also marked the beginning of the second phase of the government’s 
privatisation and commercialisation programme. The privatisation programme had a significant 
impact on the structure of business ownership in Nigeria, it also affected corporate governance in 
the instances where new owners appoint new corporate officers, whom they felt might be able to 
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manage the privatised organisations for higher returns. Arguably, these shifts in corporate 
governance could also affect corporate disclosure (Abdelsalam and Weetman, 2007). 
Furthermore, the privatisation exercise resulted in significant retrenchment and downsizing of 
workforce in the privatised enterprises. Most of the sectors of the economy downsized during the 
privatisation period, which could have had a dampening effect on the level of aggregate demand 
and hence the reported turnover of business organisations. 
The second business environment covered in this study is the period mid 2004 to 2011. During 
this period, Nigerian government enacted the Nigerian Accounting Standards Boards (NASB) 
Act 2003.  The act was an instrument used to enforce compliance with national accounting 
standards; however, the NASB Act was ineffective in achieving its objectives (FRC, 2012). 
Other reforms during this period included the SEC code of corporate governance in 2003, the 
banking reforms of 2004 to 2005, the CBN code of corporate governance for banks in 2006 and 
the Investment and Securities Act (ISA) of 2007. Furthermore, the government made a 
significant attempt to combat corruption by establishing the Economic and Financial Crime 
Commission (EFCC) via the EFCC Act of 2004.  
The global financial crisis of 2008 to 2010 motivated the Nigerian government to embark on 
additional reforms that affected corporate financial reporting. Among these were the enhanced 
Investment and Securities Act (ISA) 2009, the SEC Code of corporate governance 2011, and the 
Financial Reporting Council Act 2011, which effectively established the FRC and repealed the 
NASB Act of 2003. This reforms culminated to a third business environment when Nigeria 
mandatorily adopted the IFRS for financial reporting effective from 1
st
 January 2012. Figure 3 
shows an overview of the agencies that were established by statutes to enhance the level of 
disclosure by corporate organisations in Nigeria. The figure also depicts the interaction among 
these enforcement agencies and the governance institutions that enacted the statutes.  
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Figure 3 Interactions among the regulatory institutions for financial reporting in Nigeria 
Regimes  Political   Regulations/Agencies   Corporation  Corporate               Accounting  
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Figure 3 is based on the political structure during civilian regimes, and shows the government 
institutions creating the regulations and policies that affect corporate financial reporting. The 
constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides the basis for governance during civilian 
regimes. The constitution recognises three tiers of government, federal, state and local 
government. The constitution further regulates the distribution of legislative business between 
the National Assembly, which has the power to make laws for the federation and the House of 
Assembly for each state of the federation. There have been changes and amendments to the 
provisions of Nigerian constitutions since independence in 1960, with the current one being the 
1999 constitution. The change in constitution was intended to reflect the needs of Nigerian 
society as well as enhance the desired level of economic development. 
2.4.  Interactions among the institutional frameworks in Nigeria 
The system of government in the Federal Republic of Nigeria is modelled after the American 
presidential system with three arms of government the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary. During civilian regime, the national assembly is responsible for enactment of relevant 
laws. The executive arms implement these laws by establishing the governance bodies of the 
relevant agencies to pursue the realisation of the goal of each law. The judiciary interprets the 
law and ensure rule of law among relevant societal agents. 
In addition to the arms of government, there are institutions or government agencies, which are 
the creation of statutes. These institutions such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Corporate Affairs Commission, and Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria are allowed to make 
rules, regulations and directives pursuant to their enabling Acts. These institutions are also 
empowered to establish various committees as necessary in carrying out their duties.  
The President or a representative appoints the members of the governing council of enforcement 
agencies, such as the Director General of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Chief 
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Commissioner for the Corporate Affairs Commission and other agencies. In most cases the 
members of the accounting profession, particularly the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Nigeria (ICAN) are members of the council of these regulatory agencies. 
Members of corporate associations, such as the Manufacturing Associations of Nigeria (MAN) 
and Chambers of Commerce and Industry are also council members of these regulatory agencies, 
including the Corporate Affairs Commission and the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria. 
This suggests that both the accounting professional bodies and corporate organisations may 
indirectly influence regulatory agency enforcement actions and decisions.   
Furthermore, although these agencies are supposed to be autonomous and independent, 
occasionally the decision of the Minister may override the decision of agencies such as the SEC 
and the CAC. The judiciary may set aside the enforcement decisions of any of these regulatory 
agencies should any organisation take legal action against the regulatory agencies. Table 1 shows 
the governance structure and mission of each of these agencies.  
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Table 1  Overview of regulatory framework for financial reporting in Nigeria. 
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climate and attract foreign 
investors to the country; to 
ensure adequate protection of 
securities and to register all 
securities dealers; to maintain 
proper standards of conduct and 
professionalism in securities 
business; SEC to enforce 
compliance w ith accounting 
to issue Statement of
Accounting Standards
(Nigeria GAAP) in line






responsibilities for the 






Regulates the Audit 
Profession; 









Chairman appointed by 
President; representative 
of MAN; NACCIMA; ICAN; 
NBA; SEC; Federal 
Ministries: Justice, Finance, 
Trade and Investments
Six members w ith 
equal number of directors and 
shareholders
Appointed President of 
the NSE; Vice 
presidents; CEO; 
Dealing members of the 
Exchange; Ordinary 
Members of the 
Exchange; Operates 


















Election of Council 
members annually
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Table 1 (Continues) Overview of Regulatory Framework for Financial Reporting in Nigeria. 


















Autonomy Autonomous Not completely 
autonomous body; 
could be influenced by 
the Federal Ministry of 
Finance; appointment 
of Board members 
could be influenced by 
political aff liations
Appointments could 




body subject to 




Not completely autonomy 
subject to control by Federal Ministry 
of Finance; appointment of Director-
General could be influenced by politics
Not autonomous subject 
to 
control by the Federal 




control by the Federal 
Ministry of Trade and 
Industry; appointment 
of Director-General 
could be influenced by 
politics
Self regulatory prior to 
2011; 
Subject to FRC control and 









Ministry of Finance; 







compliance w ith 
CAMA; Corporate 
entities f iles annual 
returns to include duly 
certif ied audited 
f inancial statements; 
Annual returns to be 
f iled  immediately 
42days after the 
annual AGM; 
Increased penalties for 
late f iling of annual 
returns; Provisions of 
"Companies 
Regulations" detailing 
requirements for pre 









that fails to meet 
listing 
requirements; 
Whistle blow ing; 
Monitors listed 
companies 
compliance w ith 
CAMA (1990) 
provisions
Issued SEC Codes of Corporate 
Governance 1999; 2003; 2009; 2011;
On-site inspections to verify 
compliance w ith the requirements 
relating to Collective Investment 
Scheme (CIS);
It uses f inancial analysis tools to detect 
cases of f inancial statement 
manipulations; 
Direct company to restate misstated 
accounts and to pay penalties; 
Institute an investigation w here a case 
of f inancial statement manipulation is 
brought to it’s attention; 
Suspend managers or directors of the 
company that are involve in false 
f inancial reporting from being employed 
in the capital market or holding any 
directorship position in any Nigerian 
company;  
Referred any person involve in the 
production of misleading f inancial 
reports to the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC) for 
investigation and prosecution; 
Provision of Whistle-blow ing platform
Inspectorate Division 
monitors compliance 
w ith accounting body; 
issued penalty on 
corporation that fails to 
comply w ith accounting 
standard; 
members to influence 
compliance of the 






Disciplinary pow ers on 
erring members 







Fees for business 
registration 
and f iling of annual 
reports







fees from issued 
securities
Funding from sanctions imposed n 
corporate organisations; Funding 
support from World Bank for IFRS 
implementation;
Lack adequate human capability 
but has tried to address its capacity 
problems by outsourcing several 




no adequate capacity to 
monitor compliance; 
f inancial contribution by 
members of the 
accounting profession
The FRC is self-
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Table 1 (Continues) Overview of Regulatory Framework for Financial Reporting in Nigeria. 





















The Act is available




Gives some times to 
create aw areness 
before any 





All companies are 
required
 to submit audited 
f inancial report w ith 42 
days after the AGM;
Annual audit committee 
reports 






Subject to SEC 
monitoring
Transparent enforcement procedure; 
Monitoring and Investigations 
Department; 
Enforcement and Compliance 
Department; 
Executive Commissioner Legal and 
Enforcement; Director General; 
Administrative Proceedings Committee;
 Investments and Securities Tribunal; 
Federal Ministry of Finance
Exposure draft as f irst 
process for issuing 
accounting standards; 
Subject to control by 
Federal Ministries
standard setting and 
interpretation process 
designed
 to be undertaken in 
cooperation w ith all 
the relevant 
stakeholders
Prior to FRC the ICAN has 
Investigating Panel;
The panel is charge w ith 
the duties of conducting 
preliminary investigations 
into any case w here it is 
alleged that a member has 
misbehaved in his 
capacity as an 
accountant;   Referred 







Federal Law  Courts 
in Nigeria
Federal Law  Courts 
in Nigeria
Members may challenge 
corporate decisions at 
Annual General 
Meetings
Subject to SEC 
monitoring 
and reporting to 
SEC
Cases may be referred to 
Investment and Securities Tribunal and 
Federal Courts of Appeal
Any conflict betw een 
a Nigerian accounting 
standard andIFRS 
w ould be resolved in 
favour of the Nigerian 
standard
Members pow er to appeal 
the decisions of the 
Disciplinary Tribunal by 
follow ing an appeal 










formats for f inancial 
statements; provide 
framew ork for 
corporate 
governance
Corporate f iles annual 
returns 
w ith the CAC
Remain perfunctury, 
mainly rubber stamped 




reports on listed 
companies
In most cases enforcement tools 
are primarily used to tackle minor 
issues, mostly delays in f iling 
mandatory reports, rather than major 
violations of securities law  and rules; 
There is no proper audit trail of all the 
cases that the various SEC 
departments have investigated; Onsite 
inspections are not done on a routine 
basis;
There have been severe delays in the 




gaps among corporate 
organisations
Lack of adequate 
capacity to 
prepare IFRS-based 
financial statement by 
Nigerian corporate 
entities; 
the system for 
enforcing compliance 
w ith accounting 
standards does not 
yet seem to be fully 
operational
 Source: Author’s own tabulation, 2014 
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2.5.  Statutory responsibilities of regulatory agencies for financial reporting  
2.5.1. Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC)  
The CAMA 1990 established the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) CAMA 1990 (s.1) to 
monitor compliance with the provisions of the Act. The CAC is an autonomous body that 
maintains a register of companies in all states of the federation and undertakes investigations into 
the affairs of the company if the interests of shareholders and the public so demand. All 
companies are required to submit their audited financial statements to the CAC within 42 days of 
the annual general meeting. The CAC is empowered to impose penalties for late filing of annual 
returns. The annual return is required to include audited financial statements signed by two 
directors and certified by a chartered accountant where applicable. The registrar of companies at 
the CAC monitors compliance with the requirements of the Act and evaluates the extent of non-
compliance by companies and their officers. In addition to the requirements of CAMA 1990,  
since 2012, the CAC issues rules to corporate organisations and these rules cover different 
aspects of corporate reporting and disclosure.  
The CAMA 1990 makes significant provisions on corporate governance that affects corporate 
financial reporting. For example, CAMA 1990 requires the AGM to play a significant role in 
evaluating the quality of annual reports (CAMA 1990, s.63). The directors are liable for the debt 
of the company where the company carries on business for more than 60 days with fewer than 
two directors on board (CAMA 1990, s.93). Shareholders have a one-share-one-voting rights 
(CAMA 1990, s.116), and directors are liable for misuse of corporate resources (CAMA 1990, 
s.290). Shareholders have the right to seek redress on the grounds of unfairly prejudicial and 
oppressive conduct by the company (CAMA 1990, s.310-312).  
The CAC has the power to appoint investigators to investigate companies’ affairs if an 
application supported by evidence (CAMA 1990, s.314). All companies including those that are 
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100% foreign owned are required to keep accounting records, which sufficiently show and 
explain the transactions of the company and which disclose with reasonable accuracy the 
financial position of the company (CAMA 1990, s.331). The directors could be penalised by the 
CAC for presenting a faulty financial statement before any meeting of shareholders (CAMA 
1990, s.348).  
The Act requires every company to have Audit Committees of six members with an equal 
number of directors and shareholders (CAMA 1990, s.359 (6)). It specifies the penalties for 
directors for falsification of company books (CAMA 1990, s.503) and for directors for 
committing fraud (CAMA 1990, s.504), and their liability for keeping improper accounts 
(CAMA 1990, s.505). The law court has power to assess damages against delinquent directors 
(CAMA 1990, s.507) as well as members of the company (CAMA 1990, s.508).  
The Act requires that every company must appoint a qualified external auditors who must make 
a report to all the members of the company (CAMA 1990, s.357), and it specifies the 
qualifications required of auditors (CAMA 1990, s.358). The Act requires auditors to make a 
report to the audit committee (CAMA 1990, s.358 (3)) and empowers company officers and 
shareholders to sue auditors for negligence (CAMA 1990, s.368). Additionally, the Act requires 
that the compensation of directors and those employees remunerated at higher rates be made 
public (CAMA 1990, schedule 3 part V and VI). The aforementioned argument suggests an 
enormous responsibility is placed on the CAC to enforce compliance with all the provisions of 
CAMA 1990. This thesis argues that in the absence of skilful and qualified personnel, and 
financial resources, the CAC would not be able to effectively discharge these responsibilities and 
therefore, the level of corporate disclosure would depend on the commitment of individual 
corporations to the provisions of the law. 
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2.5.2. The Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) 
The NSE has its own listing and financial reporting requirements for listed firms, these are stated 
in “The Green Book”. The NSE requires corporate organisations seeking to list on the Exchange 
to comply with the Exchange rules. In addition, such companies must comply with the relevant 
provisions of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990, the Investment and Securities Act and 
other relevant statutory requirements (NSE Green Book, p.2). Prior to listing on the Exchange, 
the NSE requires a written undertaking by the company accepting compliance with post-listing 
requirements and the signing of a statement of compliance in the form to be suggested by the 
NSE from time to time.  The NSE publishes an X-compliance report, which provides 
information including released financials, early filers of audited accounts, companies that breach 
listing rules, delinquent filers of audited accounts and companies that are operating below listing 
standards. The NSE X-compliance report for 2012 and 2013 are set out in table 2. The reports 
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Table 2  NSE X-compliance reports 
 
Issues   Description     2012   2013 
Frequency  Frequency 
 
Awaiting Regulatory  Insufficient financial information resulting  01  04 
 Approval  (ARA) in non-approval of financials 
by primary regulator 
Below Listing   Non-compliance with post listing rules  36  51 
Standards (BLS)  e.g. late submission of financial statements,  
unauthorised publication, etc 
Delisting in Process (DIP) Notification of voluntary/ regulatory  12  03 
delisting due to non-compliance  
to post-listing rules 
Total number of Non-compliant companies     49  58 
Total number of listed companies     189  186 
Percentage of non-compliant companies (computed)   26%  31% 
 
Source: Computed from NSE X-Compliance report, 2012, 2013 
 
2.5.3.  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the highest regulatory body of the Nigerian 
capital market. The SEC was established by Decree No 71 of 1979, which took effect 
retrospectively from 1
st
 April 1978. The SEC has issued various codes of corporate governance 
(SEC Codes, 1999; 2003; 2009; 2011). The assumption is that sound corporate governance 
should enhance the quality of financial reporting. The SEC 2011 code requires institutional 
shareholders to demand compliance with codes and standards, or seek explanations for non-
compliance. 
In addition, the SEC uses financial analysis tools to detect cases of financial statement 
manipulations, and where financial statements are unreliable and misleading, a company may be 
required to restate financial reports and pay penalties. The company would be asked to make a 
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public statement about the matter so that its shareholders would be informed and the individuals 
involved in the production of the misleading accounts would be sanctioned. The SEC may 
institute an investigation where a case of financial statement manipulation was brought to its 
attention either through a report by any regulatory body such as the NASB, Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN), or even through news media or a specific complaint made by any individual. 
The SEC is empowered to levy a fine of N100,000 in the first instance on any company found 
guilty of false financial reporting. In addition, a further fine of N5,000 per day covering the 
entire period when the false financial statements were published, up to the day the company was 
found guilty or such penalty as the Commission may deem fit (ISA, 2007). Sanctions may also 
be imposed by the Commission on any officers, managers or directors of the company that were 
involved in the false financial reporting, such sanctions could be in the form of their suspension 
from employment in the capital market or from holding any directorship in any Nigerian 
company or as the Commission may deem fit. Any accountancy firm that conspires with the 
company or conceals false financial reporting could be sanctioned and issued a penalty as the 
Commission deems fit, its registration with the SEC would also be cancelled. Furthermore, the 
SEC would refer individuals involved in the production of misleading financial to the EFCC for 
investigation and prosecution. The foregoing suggests that Nigeria has many regulations to 
enhance the level of disclosure in corporate annual reports; however, compliance with these rules 
would depend on corporate incentives and commitment to transparent reporting.  
The data in table 3 shows the number of listed companies on the Main Board of the NSE and the 
cases of misstated or manipulated financial statements detected by the SEC from 2003 to 2010. 
Table 3 shows that of the 184 listed equities on the Main Board of the NSE in 2003, the SEC 
detected 12 companies with manipulated or misstated financial statements. By 2010 the SEC 
detected 23 companies of the listed 201 companies as having misstated their financial 
statements. Overall, the proportion of detection by SEC is 13%, indicating that the SEC’s 
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detection mechanism is poor. Due to this detection rate, SEC enforcement via administrative 
sanctions and civil penalties may not be adequate to deter non-compliance with disclosure 
requirements. Additionally, there are occasional conflicts between the SEC and the Stock 
Exchange with respect to the authority to discipline companies (eStandards Forum, 2009). 
Table 3  Listed equities and cases of manipulated financial statements in Nigeria 
 
Year  Listed Equity*  Cases of ** 
NSE Main Board  Misstatement 
 
2003  184   12 
2004  191   21 
2005  198   26 
2006  186   18 
2007  196   37 
2008  198   22 
2009  200   42 
2010  201   23 
Total  1554   201 
Source: *SEC Statistical Bulletin, 2012;  
**Cases of misstatement was cited from Angahar (2012, pg.056)  
 
As part of the SEC’s enforcement actions, investigations are conducted by the Monitoring and 
Investigations Department, after which cases are transferred to the Enforcement and Compliance 
Department. This conducts a review of cases in order to confirm possible violations of ISA or 
SEC Rules and Codes. However, the SEC Board’s decision can be appealed with the 
Investments and Securities Tribunal (IST), a body of 10 people appointed by the Minister of 
Finance to review material actions of the SEC (ISA 2007, s.289).  
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Furthermore, the Minister of Finance has the power to give directives to the SEC, to modify or 
rescind the rules proposed by the SEC, and to exempt certain people from the application of the 
ISA after consultation with the SEC. They can therefore single-handedly override the SEC 
enforcement decisions. The SEC also depends on the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF) for 
funding, suggesting that the ISA does not provide the SEC with full independence, and that the 
SEC’s enforcement powers are mere legal provisions as they are not transparently exercised 
(IMF Country Report on Nigeria, 2013). This lack of full independence could have a significant 
influence on the level of corporate disclosure in annual reports.  
2.5.4.  The Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) 
The EFCC Act 2004 established the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to 
combat financial and economic crimes, which in this context includes the production of 
misleading financial reports. The Commission has the power to investigate, prevent, prosecute 
and penalise financial and economic crimes (Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010). The SEC, NSE and the 
EFCC work in collaboration to prosecute any officers of corporate organisations that are 
involved in the production of misleading financial reports. Although this collaboration could 
increase enforcement actions, its effectiveness depends on the ability of these enforcement 
agencies to detect lack of compliance by corporate organisations. 
2.5.5. The Nigerian Accounting Standard Boards (NASB) 
The Nigerian Accounting Standards Board (NASB) was established on 9 September 1982 as the 
only recognised independent body in Nigeria that developed and issued Statements of 
Accounting Standards (SAS) for users and preparers of financial statements, investors, 
commercial enterprises and regulatory agencies of government (FRC 2012). The NASB issued 
Statements of Accounting Standards (SAS) in line with the provisions of CAMA 1990. CAMA 
1990 (s.335(1)) gave legal backing to the operations of the NASB by requiring that the financial 
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statements prepared under the Act should comply with the accounting standards laid down in the 
SAS. The NASB had issued thirty SASs prior to the establishment of the FRCN in 2011.  Table 
4 summarises those standards issued by the NASB. 
Table 4  Statements of Accounting Standards issued by the NASB 
SAS No Title       Effective Date IAS Equivalent 
 
SAS 1 Disclosure of Accounting Policies    Jan 1, 1985  IAS 1 
SAS 2 Information to be disclosed in Financial Statement  Jan 1, 1985  IAS 5 
SAS 3  Accounting for Property, Plant and Equipment   Jan 1, 1985  IAS 16 
SAS 4 On Stocks      Jan 1, 1987  IAS 2 
 SAS 5 On Construction Contracts     Jan 1, 1988  IAS 11 
SAS 6 On Extra-ordinary items and Prior year adjustments  Jan 1, 1988  IAS 8 
SAS 7 On foreign currency conversions and translation   June1, 1988  IAS 21 
SAS 8 On Accounting for employees retirement benefits   Jan 1, 1991  IAS 19 
SAS 9 Accounting for depreciation     Jan 1, 1990  IAS 4 
SAS 10 Banks and Non-bank financial Institutions Part 1   Dec31, 1990  IAS 30 
SAS 11 On Leases      Dec31, 1992  IAS 17 
SAS 12 On Accounting for deferred  Taxes    Jan 1, 1993  IAS 12 
SAS 13 On Accounting for investments    Jan 1, 1994  IAS 25 
SAS 14 Petroleum Industry: Upstream Activities    Jan 1, 1994  Local, no IAS  
SAS 15  Banks and Non-bank Financial Institutions, Part 11  Jan 1, 1997  IAS 30 
SAS 16 Accounting for Insurance Business    Jan 1, 1998  Local, no IAS  
SAS 17 Petroleum Industry: Downstream Activities   Jan 1, 1998  Local, no IAS  
SAS 18 On statement of Cash flows     Jan 1, 1998  IAS 7 
SAS 19 Accounting for Taxes     Jan. 1, 2001  IAS 12 
SAS 20 Abridge Financial Statements     Jan 1, 2002  Local, no IAS  
SAS 21 On Earnings Per Share     Jan 1, 2002  IAS 33 
SAS 22 On Research and Development costs    Dec31, 2006  IAS 38 
SAS 23 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets  Dec31, 2006  IAS 37 
SAS 24 On segment reporting     Jan 1, 2007  IAS 14 
SAS 25 On Telecommunication Activities    Jan 1, 2008  Local, no IAS  
SAS 26 On Business combinations     Jan 1, 2008  IFRS 3 
SAS 27 On consolidated and separate financial statements  Jan 1, 2008  IAS 27 
SAS 28 On investments in Associates     Jan 1, 2008  IAS 28 
SAS 29 On Interests in Joint Ventures    Jan 1, 2008  IAS 31 
SAS 30 On interim Financial Reporting    Jan 1, 2008  IAS 34 
Source: Compiled by Author from NASB Accounting Standards Handbook 2008/2009 edition 
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In July 2003, the government enacted the NASB Act to give legal backing to the operations of 
the NASB and to enable it to enforce compliance with the accounting standards issued by it. The 
Act established an Inspectorate Division for the NASB, which monitors and enforces compliance 
with accounting standards. The primary role of the NASB Act 2003 was to ensure that published 
financial statements are uniform in content and format, and that they are clear and precise. 
Additionally, the Act was to promote and enforce compliance with the standards developed or 
reviewed by the NASB, and to narrow areas of differences in practices so that financial 
statements presented to users would be meaningful. The NASB is required to receive notices of 
non-compliance with the standards from the preparer, users or company’s auditor from time to 
time, and to introduce measures that will enhance the reliability and validity of reported 
information in financial statements.   
However, the NASB was inefficient in its operations. For example, despite the NASB Act 2003 
there was a reported case of financial statement fraud by Cadbury Nigeria plc in its 2005 and 
2006 financial statements, which led to significant loss to investors, the sacking of Cadbury’s 
Nigeria CEO and his replacement by a non-national CEO. The ineffectiveness of the NASB Act 
2003 is evident by several other cases of fraud in corporate financial reporting, which led to the 
repeal of the NASB Act 2003 in 2011 and eventually the closure of the NASB.  
Several reasons account for the ineffectiveness of the NASB, and among these is the dependence 
of the NASB on corporate organisations and individuals for funding. For example, the Act 
allows the NASB to charge not less than N500 annually from every practising member of ICAN, 
ANAN, and CITN in addition to receipt of grants and subventions from the Federal government. 
All publicly quoted companies in Nigeria must also pay an annual subscription sum of not less 
than N100,000 to the NASB while other non-public registered companies are required to pay not 
less than N1,000 annually. This situation suggests that the enforcement powers of the NASB 
could be compromised due to its dependence for funding on these sources which it regulates.  
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2.5.6. The Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRC) 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) was established by the Financial Reporting Council of 
Nigeria Act 2011 to replace the NASB. The FRC now has responsibility for the oversight of the 
regulation of financial reporting. The 2011 Act requires that the FRC should ‘promote 
compliance with the adopted standards issued by the International Federation of Accountants and 
International Accounting Standards Board’. The FRC Act also empowers the FRC to oversee the 
quality and implementation of auditing, independence and ethical standards, including the 
quality control environments in which auditors operate. The Act requires Auditors to be qualified 
and competent, to possess minimum requirements before being licensed to perform audits, and to 
maintain professional competency.  
Furthermore, all accountants duly recognised and entitled to practice as such are required to 
register with the FRC. The two professional accountancy bodies operating in Nigeria, ICAN and 
ANAN, which were established by the Acts of 1965 and 1993 respectively, continue to exist and 
are members of the Board of the FRC. However, their previous role as self-regulators of the 
accounting profession has now been given to the FRC as a public regulator. The FRC also 
establishes a process for performing regular reviews of audit procedures and practices of firms in 
order to ensure that audited financial statements are of a high quality. The FRC can initiate and 
carry out disciplinary proceedings, impose sanctions on auditors and audit firms as appropriate. 
Since the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Nigeria on 1 
January 2012, the IFRS are required for used for the preparation of financial statements of all 
public interest entities. These public interest entities are defined to include both quoted and 
unquoted companies,  governments, government organisations, and not-for-profit entities that are 
required by law to file returns with regulatory authorities.  
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This thesis argues that despite the IFRS adoption, the orientation and strength of prevailing 
accounting infrastructure is important to the implementation of the adopted standards (Ball, 
2001).  Furthermore, this thesis argues that the prevailing accounting infrastructure in Nigeria is 
not able to enhance uniform disclosure by corporate organisations. For example, the FRC states 
on its website that any conflict between a Nigerian accounting standard (the Statement of 
Accounting Standard) and an International Accounting Standard/International Financial 
Reporting Standard would be resolved in favour of the Nigerian standard. The FRC further 
argues that the pronouncements of each national accounting standard-setting body determine 
accounting principles and practices to be used in the country (FRC, 2012).  
2.5.7.  The Accounting Profession 
The accountancy profession includes the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) 
established by the Parliament Act (1965) and the Association of National Accountants of Nigeria 
(ANAN) established by National Assembly Act (1993), both of which are self-regulated via an 
elected Governing Council. There is no separate statutory regulator of the audit profession. 
ICAN acts as both an examining body for awarding Chartered Accountants Certifications and the 
licensing authority for members engaged in public auditing practice.  
ICAN is a member of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and it has strong 
international foundation relationships. ICAN was founded by Nigerian members of the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, the Chartered Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Chartered Institute 
of Public Finance and Accountancy. ICAN members are recognised under the Companies and 
Allied Matters Act (1990) as the sole auditors of company accounts. 
The ICAN Act 1965 (s.11(3)) provides for the establishment of an Investigating Panel consisting 
of two ICAN council members and one chartered accountant who is not a member of council. 
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The panel is charged with the duties of conducting preliminary investigations into any case 
where it is alleged that a member has acted with misconduct in his or her capacity as an 
accountant, and decides whether the case should be referred to the Disciplinary Tribunal. The 
ICAN Act provides that the Disciplinary Tribunal shall be charged with the duty of considering 
and determining any case referred to it by the panel, and re-examines the case before taking any 
disciplinary measure against an erring member. The Tribunal consists of seven members of 
Council with the ICAN President as the Chairman and has the power of a Federal High Court. 
Consequently, appeals on its decisions lie with the Federal Court of Appeal and thereafter to the 
Supreme Court.  
The ICAN professional code of conduct requires that every member must conform to technical 
standards issued by relevant bodies such as the Statements of Accounting Standards (Nigerian 
GAAP) issued by the NASB, the National Standards on Auditing (NSA) issued by the Institute 
and the IAS/IFRS. To facilitate maintenance of professional and technical competence, a 
Continuing Professional Education (CPE) programme was introduced in 1982, and from 1996 it 
became compulsory for all members of ICAN to attain 30 credit hours annually.  
ICAN also set up different faculties for its members; these are designed to equip them with 
current developments in various accounting areas and disciplines. Forums are organised by the 
faculties to deliberate on current developments within the profession. Despite these provisions, 
Bakre (2007) reported cases of professional misconduct by members of the Institute, which 
brings into question the effectiveness of the ICAN Act in enforcing compliance with standards 
and codes among the members of the Institute. ANAN members work mostly in the civil service. 
Although ANAN requires its members to comply with its professional code of ethics, the code 
needs complete revision, as it is not in line with IFAC requirements (World Bank ROSC, 2004).  
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2.5.8.  Enforcement methods 
Consistent with the practice in other developing countries, two types of enforcement mechanisms 
are commonly used by these agencies, preventive and punitive (Craig and Diga, 1996; 
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Table 5  Overview of enforcement mechanisms in Nigeria 
Type of Measure   Institution Imposing the Measure 
Preventive  
Licensing of Auditors   The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) 
     Association of National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN) 
Registration of Audit Firms  Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) 
     Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRC) 
Audit of Financial Statements  
by External Auditor   The Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990 
Audit Committees Requirements  The Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990 
Independent Directors on Board  Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Nigeria 
Review of Audited Financial Statements  Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) 
     Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Nigeria 
     Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRC) 
     Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) 
Inspection of Corporate Organisations Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Nigeria 
     Nigerian Accounting Standards Board (NASB) 
      Inspectorate Division 
Whistle Blowing    Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Nigeria 
Punitive  
Impose fines on Corporation  Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Nigeria 
     Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) 
     Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) 
Suspension or delisting from   Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) 
trading on Stock Exchange   
Fines and Imprisonment of   Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
guilty Corporate Officers   
Prevention of Guilty Officer from   Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Nigeria 
holding Directorship position in  
any other Corporation  
Judicial Action against Auditors  The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Nigeria 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
 
Source: Complied by Author from various regulations, 2014 
The enforcement methods among the regulatory agencies overlap. However, there are inherent 
limitations, which hinder the effectiveness of these methods.  
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2.6.  Limitations of existing enforcement mechanisms 
Nigeria adopted the IFRS for financial reporting from January 2012. Prior to that, the 
development of the Nigerian national accounting standards was based on the relevant 
International Accounting Standards (IAS). Both the IFRSs and ISAs were developed in a 
common-law country that operates market oriented economy system (Ball, 2001). 
Despite Nigeria’s legal origin affiliation to market-oriented systems, that is, the UK, in practice, 
Nigeria has adopted a planning economic model, which is common with code law countries 
(Osabuohien, Efobi and Salami, 2012). The implication is that there is a mismatch between the 
economic objectives and the mode of accounting regulation. This structural imbalance 
contradicts the regulatory principles of coherence (Department for Business Innovation and 
Skills (BIS), 2011) which requires a regulatory framework to form a logical part of the 
government’s broader policy context, in order for it to be consistent with established priorities 
and enable cross-sector delivery of policy goals.  
In addition, better regulation requires that regulators must justify enforcement decisions and be 
subject to public scrutiny (Better Regulation Task Force, 2005), which suggests that enforcement 
agencies must be accountable. Unfortunately, accountability has become evasive in Nigeria 
(Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010). Some commentators have argued that while the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange requires a timely submission of listed companies’ annual reports, the NSE itself fails 
to publish its annual reports until five months after the end of its financial year (The 
Neighbourhood, 2012). This thesis argues that this lack of accountability could encourage 
corporate organisations to disregard disclosure requirements. Furthermore, Nigeria is known for 
institutionalised corruption, where bribery and assets expropriation are common business 
practice. Ball (2001) argues that bribery and fraud at the level of individual transactions reduce 
the reliability of the financial reports that are based on an aggregation of transactions.  
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Furthermore, although CAMA 1990 allows corporate members to sue auditors for failing to 
effectively scrutinise transactions that entered the firm’s accounting system, the perceived cost of 
litigation and an inefficient judicial system may prevent Nigerian shareholders from bringing an 
action against corporate officers and external auditors. For example, the World Bank Doing 
Business Report (2015) noted that it takes an average of 510 days in Nigeria to resolve a dispute 
from the moment a plaintiff files the lawsuit in court until payment, and there is an average 40 
procedures to enforce a contract, and bring a commercial dispute before the relevant court. These 
figures are significantly higher than that of the UK where it takes 437 days and involves 29 
procedures respectively. This lengthy and involved procedure could affect minority investors’ 
protection, and corporate managers might therefore disregard transparent reporting. Similarly, 
while shareholder associations are in a position to take legal action against corporate officers for 
fraudulent financial reporting, Uche and Atkins (2015) argue that intense competition among the 
numerous associations, and the desire to be appointed to the company’s audit committee, have 
resulted in these associations seeking a private advantage.  
Furthermore, although the EFCC was set up to prosecute those accused of financial crimes 
(Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010), the actions of the EFCC are reactive rather than proactive. While 
the EFCC has achieved some enforcement success, Aiyede (2006, p.37) argues that these 
successes are not without misgivings. Some individuals are not comfortable with the 
Commission’s mode of operations because it has focused principally on state chief executives 
probably because they are politically significant and control considerable resources, and that this 
has been at the cost of other areas where corruption that affects the general population is 
entrenched (Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010). This thesis argues that the prosecution of corporate 
officers by the EFCC could result in a backlash from other companies, who may view the actions 
of the EFCC as heavy-handed and unfair (Simpson, 2002). 
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Additionally, EFCC enforcement is reactionary, which can result in ‘hydraulic’ behaviour of 
corporate organisations (Issacharof and Karlan, 1999; Manne, 2007). Enforcement against a 
particular organisation can arguably encourage other firms to obfuscate or conceal useful 
information in order to avoid the associated cost of sanctions. This may become detrimental to 
users of financial statements (Easterbrook and Fischel 1983).   
Additionally, although the ISA 2011 provides the SEC with comprehensive enforcement powers; 
however, a lack of full independence could hinder the SEC’s effectiveness. Furthermore, the 
SEC lacks effective communication and coordination of the activities of its departments that are 
responsible for inspections, investigations and enforcement, which affects its ability to take 
prompt enforcement action (IMF Country Report on Nigeria, 2013). This lack of prompt action 
has affected public confidence in the Nigerian securities markets and the SEC. The is evidenced 
by the prices of listed stocks on the Nigeria Stock Exchange which by 2015 after the adoption of 
IFRS still trades at a significantly lower prices than the pre 2008 stock market prices. The lack of 
investing public confidence in the stock market can provide an incentive to corporate 
organisations to be less transparent in their financial reporting.  
Furthermore, the composition of the SEC’s Administrative Proceeding Committees (APC) poses 
potential challenges to the SEC’s enforcement power. The APC members among others include 
the representatives of trade associations such as the Manufacturing Association of Nigeria. The 
mere presence of a member of a trade association in the APC meetings, although without voting 
right, could create potential conflicts of interest. This is because the APC is expected to take 
enforcement action against corporate organisations who appoint representatives to these trade 
associations.  
Additionally, inadequate capability has led to enforcement cases remaining outstanding. Besides, 
the SEC´s resources have been used to tackle minor violations when they should have been 
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addressing violations that are more serious. To address the current lack of capability, the SEC 
has outsourced the enforcement of important cases to a Joint Task Force of the SEC, the CBN, 
private law firms and audit firms (IMF Country Report on Nigeria, 2013). Unfortunately, the 
audit firms that provide audit services to corporate organisations against whom the SEC brings 
enforcement actions are members of this Joint Task Force, which could bias the outcome, since 
these consultants may have professional allegiance to their clients. 
Furthermore, the SEC lacks appropriate procedures to govern the processes, monitoring or keep 
proper control of the progress of enforcement cases (IMF Country Report on Nigeria, 2013). In 
addition, the SEC codes on corporate governance, which is intended to enhance corporate 
governance practice and therefore quality of disclosure, is based on the principles of comply or 
explain. A company could explain the reasons for non-compliance with the requirements of the 
codes, which would ultimately affect the quality of disclosure in annual reports. 
Furthermore, the absence of competition in the audit market which results from a deliberate limit 
to the number of qualified accountants by the professional accounting body (Uche, 2002), 
provides the opportunity for existing qualified members of the professional accounting body to 
take on multiple audit assignment from the same clients. This situation affects auditor 
independence with a potential negative consequence on the quality of audited financial 
statements.  
Additionally, the government fails to provide efficient system to protect individual ‘whistle-
blowers’. For example, Randle (2004a) argues that there have been instances of Nigerian 
professional accountants reporting corporate financial abuse which without the protection of the 
law has in some extreme cases led to their assassination. This presents a serious challenge to 
both insiders who intend to whistle-blow on corporate misreporting as well as to external 
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auditors reporting corporate misstatements. This underlying threat of serious repercussions could 
enable corporate corruption and fraud and hence continued fraudulent reporting. 
In addition, the ownership structure of those corporate entities in which oligarchic families with 
political connections are in control affects the quality of corporate governance. This gives room 
for collusion between corporate directors and politicians to maintain their public legitimacy (Su, 
Xu and Phan, 2008). This business alliance between the politicians and corporate officers fuels 
the degree of corruption at the level of individual business transactions, which are aggregated in 
the financial reports (Ball, 2001). Finally, differences in the level of commitment to transparent 
disclosure by corporate organisations (Gibbins et al., 1990), affects their perception, treatment 
and classification of transactions that are aggregated in the financial report.  
2.7. Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the institutional environment for financial reporting in Nigeria. It also 
discusses the reforms that affect corporate financial reporting; the most recent is the move away 
from the use of national accounting standards to the adoption of the IFRS. This chapter identified 
some limitations in existing institutional arrangements for financial reporting in Nigeria, and 
gave some studies that identified compliance gaps in corporate financial reporting (World Bank 
ROSC, 2004, 2011; Oghuma and Iyoha, 2006). When these compliance gaps are viewed in light 
of the identified weaknesses in the institutional arrangement for financial reporting, it is 
necessary to unravel the factors shaping corporate disclosure behaviour.  
Furthermore, the discussion in this chapter suggests that corporate organisations in Nigeria face a 
multidimensional institutional complexity, which can impact in different ways on corporate 
financial reporting. This therefore present significant challenges to the enforcement mechanisms 
in devising appropriate enforcement method. 
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Based on the aforementioned discussion in this thesis argues that whether or not Nigeria enjoys 
the benefits of its numerous legislations and codes remains an empirical question. In this regard, 
it is plausible that institutional theory can be an appropriate framework to explain the level of 



























Fields et al. (2001) argue that in the absence of theory researchers limit their inquiries to less 
frequent use of accounting and disregard the significant role of accounting in everyday 
situations. Their argument suggests that one needs a comprehensive theory to support the 
investigation of the complete role of accounting at micro and macro level in a world with market 
imperfections.  
This thesis seeks to explain the level of mandatory disclosure in the annual reports of listed 
companies in Nigeria, and need to make a choice from alternative theories. The positive 
accounting theory (PAT) is commonly used in financial accounting literature, which derives 
prediction about accounting choice from the wealth effects the choice has on important 
stakeholders (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). It emphasise agency conflicts because of the self-
interest of these stakeholders. According to Watts and Zimmerman (1979, p.300) “…the only 
accounting theory that will provide a set of predictions  that are consistent with observed 
phenomena is one based on self-interest”. Although previous studies have proved the validity of 
the PAT framework, they disregard other external factors that influenced corporate disclosure. 
PAT assumes the external business environment is irrelevant when evaluating factors that 
influenced corporate disclosure compliance. 
Botosan (1997) extends on studies using the PAT framework and found that managers who 
choose higher levels of disclosure experience lower costs of capital. However, Fields et al. 
(2001) argue that if disclosure lowers cost of capital then it follows that all firms should strive 
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for higher disclosure levels. Both the PAT based studies and Botosan’s research disregard the 
influence of external institutions as moderating factors on corporate disclosure. 
However, Healy and Palepu (2001, p. 410) argue a variety of economic and institutional factors 
determine the effectiveness and ability to write and enforce optimal contracts, which are aimed at 
minimising agency problems. This suggests that the strength of institutional factors influences 
the ability to write and enforce optimal contracts among contracting parties. Similarly, Goodrick 
and Salancik (1996) argue that political stability and institutional frameworks affect corporate 
behaviour including disclosure. 
The absence of attention to the influence of state in previous disclosure studies is partly because 
the data used for most of these studies are from corporate organisations that operate in laissez-
fare economies such as the US and UK, which obscures the role of the state in the functioning of 
the market (Dobbin and Dowd, 1997). For example, the relative stability of the state in these 
economies acts to conceal their role. By placing corporate disclosure in the context of the 
Nigerian reporting environment, discussed in chapter two, the role of the state becomes apparent 
in shaping the contractual relationship among market participants. Therefore, a more robust 
investigation of corporate disclosure would result from a study that emphasises not only 
economic factors but also institutional factors.  
3.2. The applicability of institutional theory to disclosure study 
Institutional theory offers several unique insights into organisation-environment relations and the 
ways in which organisations react to institutional processes (Oliver, 1991). It draws attention to 
the causal impact of institutional pressures on organisational behaviour and to societal and 
cultural pressures as opposed to market forces and resource scarcity. It shows the effects of 
history, rules, and consensual understandings on organisational conformity to environmental 
constraints. Drawing on the open systems theory, institutional theory emphasises that 
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organisations are more than a means to produce goods and services but that they are also 
arguably symbolic social and cultural entities (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
Institutional theory assumes that organisations and organisational actors do not only seek to 
compete for resources but also ultimately seek legitimacy and social acceptance (Oliver, 1991; 
Suchman, 1995). Therefore, corporate organisations follow a set of ‘logics’ when engaging in 
contractual relationships. These ‘logics’ are defined as “the formal and informal rules of action, 
interaction and interpretation that guide and constrain decision maker” (Thornton and Ocasio, 
1999, p. 804).  Logics underpin the appropriateness of organisational practices in a given setting 
and at particular historical moments (Greenwood et al., 2009). Failure to use practices 
legitimated by an extant logic can have adverse consequences. For example, Zajac and Westphal 
(2004) found that using an unfashionable rationale for corporate practices produced adverse 
share price reactions.  
The applicability of institutional theory to financial reporting is based on a network of complex 
relationships at work in the inter-organisational field in which disclosures decisions are made. 
Exchanges between internal and external constituencies of corporate organisations put financial 
reporting practices at the centre of an ideological struggle (Mezias, 1990). The participants in 
this struggle includes organisational constituents such as management, owners, financial 
institutions lending to the organisations, security analysts and rating agencies who are interested 
in equity investment. Accounting provides an avenue through which managers disseminate 
privately held information to this network of actors in the exchange relationship (Fields et al. 
2001).  
Since financial reporting is crucial to the interests of all parties in relationship networks, an 
important outcome has been the definition of legitimate methods for use in financial statements 
(Mezias, 1990). These legitimate methods include generally accepted accounting principles and 
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accounting standards. These reporting standards are codified by independent agencies who serve 
as central co-ordinating agency of the complex relational networks among corporate 
organisations and its external constituents. These accounting standards are designed to reduce the 
discretion of firm’s management in the preparation of financial statements. This suggests that the 
perceptions and choices of organisational financial reporting are shaped, mediated and 
channelled by these accounting standards. 
Based on the legitimacy perspective, this thesis applies Oliver’s institutional model to identify 
factors that can be used to explain the level of mandatory disclosure in the annual reports of 
listed companies in Nigeria. The characteristics of individual firms are emphasised only to the 
extent that they can be used to explain which firms are more or less subject to pressure from their 
institutional environment to comply with accounting standards disclosure requirements (Oliver, 
1991).  
However, the impact of the external environment on corporate disclosure will depend in part on 
the degree of collective organisation of the environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983) and the degree to which individual organisations are exposed to their 
institutional logics (Greenwood et al., 2011). On the one hand, the degree of collective 
organisation of the environment serves to both reinforce and constrain the definition of 
legitimacy in the relational networks. Furthermore, the degree of exposure of individual 
organisations to their institutional logics will influence the degree of discretion that corporate 
management exercise in their financial reporting and disclosure decisions. Therefore, this thesis 
applies the Greenwood et al. institutional framework to identify factors that can explain intra-
industry variation in the level of mandatory disclosure in the annual reports of listed companies 
in Nigeria.  
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3.3. The Oliver (1991) institutional framework 
Oliver (1991) draws on resource dependence and organisational institutional arguments to 
develop a model of organisational response to institutional factors. Oliver argues that 
organisational responses may vary from passive conformity to active resistance. Her framework 
captures a full repertoire of potential strategic responses including acquiescence, compromise, 
avoidance, deviance and manipulation (table 6). The main conclusion of Oliver’s framework is 
that conformity or resistance to institutional pressures are strategic choices that are affected by 
organisational interests. 
Table 6 Strategic response to institutional processes (Oliver, 1991, p. 152) 
 
Strategies   Tactics Examples 
Acquiesce  Habit  Following invisible, taken-for-granted norms 
   Imitate  Mimicking institutional models 
   Comply Obeying rules and accepting norms 
 
Compromise  Balance Balancing the expectations of multiple constituents 
   Pacify   Placating and accommodating institutional elements 
   Bargain Negotiating with institutional stakeholders 
 
Avoid   Conceal  Disguising nonconformity 
   Buffer  Loosening institutional attachments 
   Escape  Changing goals, activities or domains 
 
Defy    Dismiss Ignoring explicit norms and values 
   Challenge Contesting rules and requirements 
   Attack  Assaulting the source of institutional pressure 
 
Manipulate  Co-op  Importing influential constituents 
   Influence Shaping values and criteria 
   Control  Dominating institutional constituents and processes 
 
Oliver (1991) proposes five types of strategic response: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, 
defiance and manipulation. She argues that these responses vary from active response to passive 
response. Acquiescence or conformity (entails habit, imitation, or compliance) is the response 
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that has received the majority of attention from institutional theorists (Scott, 2008). However, 
table 6 shows that other responses are possible. First, an organisation may compromise (a variety 
of responses that include the balancing, placating, and negotiating of institutional demands). 
Second, an organisation may adopt avoidance strategy, which entails concealment efforts and 
attempts to buffer some parts of the organisation from the necessity of conformity. Third, an 
organisation may become defiance, which entails not only dismissing institutional pressures but 
also defying them in a public manner, and finally an organisation may adopt manipulation 
strategy, a purposeful and opportunistic attempts to co-opt, influence or control the environment. 
This thesis focuses on compliance as a tactic of organisational acquiescence to the requirements 
of accounting standards. Oliver defines compliance as a conscious obedience to or incorporation 
of values, norms or institutional requirements. She argues that compliance is more active than 
habit or imitation, to the extent that an organisation consciously and strategically chooses to 
comply with institutional pressures in anticipation of specific self-serving benefits that may 
range from social support for resources to predictability. Compliance may also reduce the 
organisation’s vulnerability to negative assessments of its conducts, products or services. This 
thesis argues that an organisation will choose to comply with disclosure requirements to avoid 
negative assessment of its conducts by regulatory institutions and actors in the capital market, 
and to gain continued access to resources from relevant stockholders. Therefore, disclosure will 
in this sense, validate the legitimacy of the organisation among its relational networks.  
Oliver further argues that organisational acquiescence depends on the organisation’s conscious 
intent to conform, its degree of awareness of institutional processes and its expectations that 
conformity will be self-serving to organisational interests. She argues that the theoretical 
rationale underlying conformity or resistance to institutional rules and expectations depends on 
both the willingness and ability of organisations to conform to these rules. Where the 
organisation is sceptical about the legitimacy or validity of the institutional status quo, or where 
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the organisation wants to retain control, or where the institutional objectives are at cross-purpose 
with organisational goals, these will limit the willingness of the organisation to conform to 
institutional requirements. These boundaries on the willingness and ability of organisations to 
conform drive the predictive dimensions of the framework. 
Based on the discussion in the preceding paragraph, Oliver asked questions of ‘why, who, what, 
how and where’ concerning the conditions under which it was more likely that a company would 
conform to these pressures. These factors are grouped under “cause”, “constituents”, “contents”, 
“control” and “context”. These factors address the characteristics of institutional pressures that 
are believed to predispose organisations to adopt a particular strategic response (see table 7 for 
summary). 
Table 7 Institutional antecedents and predicted strategic response 
Acquiesce Compromise Avoid Defy Manipulation
Cause
Legitimacy H L L L L
Efficiency H L L L L
Constituents
Multiplicity L H H H H
Dependence H H M L L
Content
Consistency H M M L L
Constraints L M H H H
Control
Coercion H M M L L
Diffusion H H M L L
Context
Uncertainty H H H L L
Interconnectedness H H M L L
Key: H = High; L =Low; M= Moderate
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3.3.1 Cause of institutional pressures  
The cause of institutional pressures refers to the rationale, set of expectations, or intended 
objectives that underlie external pressures for conformity. Oliver (1991) identified two reasons 
first, pressure may be used to make a company fit in socially or secondly, to make a company 
conform to a desired practice by forcing it to be economically accountable. 
The perspective of this thesis is that disclosure requirements are intended to make an 
organisation more transparent in financial reporting. This in turn will promote the confidence of 
investors in the capital market. When an organisation anticipates that conformity with these 
disclosure requirements would enhance its social and economic fitness, that is, they are of 
benefit in terms of reduction in cost of capital or an increased analyst following, the organisation 
will probably be more likely to comply. However, organisational scepticisms about the social 
legitimacy or strategic utility of conformity, and the perception that institutional objectives are at 
cross-purpose with organisational interests may result in resistance to these institutional 
requirements. Hence, the choice between acquiescence and more resistant strategies will depend 
on the degree to which the organisation agrees with and values the intentions or objectives of 
institutional constituents in pressuring the organisation to be more socially or economically 
accountable. Furthermore, the type of response to institutional requirements also depends on the 
particular type of organisation, for example, a large organisation may be more willing to 
conform than a small organisation.  
3.3.2 Constituents of institutional pressures  
Oliver (1991) argues that organisations sometimes confront institutional constituents who pose 
conflicting pressures. She categorised these constituents into multiplicity and dependence. She 
defined multiplicity as “the degree of multiple conflicting expectations exerted on an 
organisation that bound its ability to conform” (Oliver, 1991, p.162). She argues that passive 
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acquiesce to institutional demands is difficult to achieve when acquiescence to one constituent 
precludes the ability to conform to alternative constituents with conflicting expectations.  
Organisations are likely to attempt avoidance strategies in the face of multiple conflicting 
pressures from constituents. For example, an oil company may attempt to conceal the 
extensiveness of an oil spill to avoid the kind of costly clean-up that displeases its shareholders 
but is demanded by the public. Hence, organisations are not only made more aware of 
institutional expectations from multiple constituents, they are also driven by their own interests 
to reduce uncertainty, conflict and instability that multiplicity generates.  
Furthermore, Oliver argues that pressures may come from the very source on which an 
organisation is dependent. Consistent with resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978), she argues that an organisation will be less likely to resist external pressures when it is 
dependent on the sources of these pressures. However, she reasons that an organisation may also 
compromise when dependence is high because organisations typically have interests they wish to 
protect or promote and dependence is rarely unidirectional. For example, an organisation may 
bargain with regulatory agencies on terms of compliance by supplying their own personnel to 
regulatory agencies as advisors, and take advantage of the fact that the cooperation of 
organisations in an industry is necessary for the regulatory agency to do its job.  
3.3.3 Content of institutional pressures  
Oliver (1991) focuses on two dimensions of content: “consistency” and “constraint”. On 
consistency, Oliver argues that organisations will be more willing to acquiesce to external 
pressures when these pressures or expectations are compatible with internal goals. Therefore, the 
willingness and ability of organisations to accept and conform to institutional rules or 
expectations may be circumscribed by lack of consistency with internal goals. Oliver reasoned 
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that inconsistency reflects organisational interests at cross-purposes with institutional objectives 
and provokes organisational doubts about the validity or legitimacy of institutional expectations.  
On constraint, Oliver argues that there is a likelihood of resistance to pressures when there is the 
potential loss of discretion. For example, Oliver argues that organisations might lack the capacity 
to conform such as having inadequate working capital to bring current production processes into 
conformity with a new regulatory requirement. Organisational motives to retain control over 
processes and outputs will impose limits on the willingness of organisation to conform, and 
therefore they can be expected to acquiesce more readily to pressures that do not constraint 
substantive organisational decisions. As autonomy begins to be threatened, organisations may 
move to compromise or negotiate on their extent of permitted discretion. However, organisations 
will be expected to trade off autonomy or discretion in return for greater legitimacy or economic 
viability. 
3.3.4 Control by institutions  
Oliver (1991) argues that institutional control describes the means by which pressures are 
imposed on organisations. She argues that there are two processes by which pressures are 
exerted. The first is legal coercion (via sanctions) and the second is voluntary diffusion.  When 
the force of law or government mandate reinforces cultural expectations, organisations are made 
more aware of public interest and will be less likely to respond defiantly because the 
consequence of noncompliance are more tangible and often more severe.  
When the degree of institutional enforcement, vigilance and sanctions for noncompliance are 
more moderate, organisations often seek compromise on the scope and timing of compliance. 
Organisations can attempt to avoid institutional rules and requirements by reducing the degree to 
which they are scrutinised by regulatory agencies (that is, buffering), or by establishing ritualistic 
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procedures to promote the appearance of compliance to specified rules and requirements (that is, 
concealment). 
Oliver argues that institutional pressures and expectations may occur not only by legal coercion 
but also by means of voluntary diffusion. The extent to which institutional expectations or 
practice have already diffused or spread voluntarily through an organisational field will tend to 
predict the likelihood of conformity to institutional expectations. A company is more likely to 
submit to pressure if there is a high possibility that a demand can be voluntarily diffused. 
However, because organisations are less likely to be aware of incipient or narrowly diffused 
values and practices, they may be unable to conform. Organisations will also tend to be more 
sceptical and therefore unwilling to conform when values and practices are not broadly diffused 
or widely validated. 
3.3.5 Context of institutional pressures  
Oliver (1991) describes the context of institutional pressures in terms of environmental 
uncertainty and interconnectedness among institutional factors. Consistent with Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978, p.170) Oliver defined environmental uncertainty as ‘the degree to which future 
states of the world cannot be anticipated and accurately predicted’ and interconnectedness as ‘the 
density of inter-organisational relations among occupants of an organisational field’.   
Oliver predicted that acquiescence, compromise and avoidance strategies will be most likely to 
occur when environmental uncertainty is high. Acquiescence because uncertainty causes 
organisation to mimic one another (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), compromise because the 
organisation negotiates to reduce environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and 
avoidance because organisations attempt to buffer themselves from the vulnerabilities and 
unpredictability of the operating environment (Thompson, 1967). As uncertainty of the 
environment diminishes, the need for security, stability and predictability from the persistence of 
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institutions decreases and organisations grow more confident in their prediction about the 
acquisition of future resources and legitimacy.  
Oliver argues that organisational decision-makers are more likely to accede to the values or 
requirements of the institutional environment when the environment is highly interconnected. 
Interconnectedness facilitates the voluntary diffusion of norms, values and shared information. 
Because highly interconnected environments provide relational channels through which 
institutional norms can be diffused, this tends to create more implicit coordination and 
collectivisation in a given environment, more consensus on diffused norms and greater ubiquity 
of institutional effects. In other words, relational networks serve to elaborate collective myths 
and values and this elaboration leads to conformity with institutional elements (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977).  
Environments that are highly fragmented or purely competitive impede the spread of institutional 
consensus and conformity. Therefore, organisational defiance and manipulation are more likely 
to occur, the lower the degree of organisational interconnectedness in the institutional 
environment (Oliver, 1991). Furthermore, compromise and avoidance can occur in highly 
interconnected environments because interdependence among organisations requires inter-
organisational coordination and negotiation on the extent and condition of exchange, and the 
establishment of inter-organisational linkages involves a loss of control and discretion that 
organisations attempts to minimise, particularly through efforts to decouple internal 
organisational processes from the influence of external relationships (Oliver, 1990). 
The perspective for using the Oliver framework for this study is that organisation disclosure 
decision represents a strategic response to institutional pressures, and that such a response is 
constrained by broader institutional rationalities. Several studies in accounting literature have 
provided supporting evidence to the framework (for example, Abernethy and Chua, 1996, 
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Carmona and Macias, 2001; Clemens and Douglas, 2005; Etherington and Richardson, 1994; 
Goodstein, 1994; Hyvonen, Jarvinen and Rahko, 2009; Ingram and Simon, 1995).  
However, there have been some critics, for example, Ingram and Simons (1995) argue that most 
applications of Oliver’s model conceptualise the role of agents in the institutional environment in 
a way that embraces an instrumental approach to rationality. In other words, Oliver’s model 
takes the perspective that social actors are seen as ready to take any action that would enhance 
their individual interests, unconstrained by existing institutional arrangements (Goodrick and 
Salancik, 1996; Seo and Creed, 2002). In contrast, recent studies emphasise a more collective 
notion of rationality by assuming that the interests, values and identities of individuals and 
organisations are embedded within prevailing institutional logics that enable and constraint the 
means and ends of their agency (Goodrick and Salancik, 1996; Lounsbury, 2008; Greenwood et 
al., 2011).  
Furthermore, Oliver (1991, p.160) merely suggests that acquiesce, compromise, avoidance, 
defiance or manipulation may be “high” or “low” without discussing how multiple and 
conflicting institutional logics interact to bring about low or high compliance. Therefore, this 
thesis further used the Greenwood et al. (2011) framework to provide an explanation on 
corporate disclosure of corporate organisations that operates in a complex financial reporting 
environment. 
Despite these criticisms, Oliver recognises both the interest of organisational actors and the need 
for legitimacy. She concludes that organisation actors seek to acquire or maintain legitimacy 
while following their interests. The importance of legitimacy and self-interest in the Oliver’s 
framework makes it an appropriate model for the study of corporate disclosure. The next section 
discusses the Greenwood et al. (2011) framework. 
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3.4. The Greenwood et al. (2011) institutional framework 
Recent literature in organisational institutional research has recognised and accommodated the 
existence of multiple institutions or institutional pluralism with conflicting demands on 
organisations, and how these impact upon organisational response (Scott, 2008, Kraatz and 
Block, 2008, Pasche and Santos, 2010, Greenwood et al., 2011). These studies argue that  
organisational fields are characterised by multiple and often conflicting institutional logics 
(Greenwood et al., 2009; D’Aunno et al., 1991; Hoffman, 1999; Reay and Hinnings, 2005), and 
consequently, organisational responses to their contexts are unlikely to be uniform (Greenwood 
et al., 2009). Consistent with this view, this study extends the empirical analysis by using the 
Greenwood et al. (2011) framework to identify the factors that explain intra-industry variation in 
disclosure compliance.   
The Greenwood et al. (2011) framework provides an explanation for the interaction between 
institutions and corporate organisation and figure 4 helps explain this phenomenon.  
































Source: Greenwood et al. (2011, p.324) 
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Figure 4 provides an overview of the Greenwood et al. framework, and shows that when there is 
more than one institutional category (institutional pluralism) making demands on a corporate 
organisation, this creates a complex institutional environment for corporate organisations 
(institutional complexity). However, the complexity experienced by individual corporate 
organisations depends on the structure of the organisational field (field structure). The 
complexity is further moderated by individual organisational attributes. Each component of the 
framework is discussed in the following sections. 
3.4.1.  Institutional logics 
Thornton and Ocasio (1999, p. 804) define institutional logics as “the formal and informal rules 
of action, interaction and interpretation that guide and constrain decision makers.”  Institutional 
logics are hierarchical (Friedland and Alford, 1991) which implies that there are higher and 
lower levels logics that affect an organisation’s decisions and practice. Thornton (2004, p.12) 
puts these hierarchical orders as “the market, the corporation, the professions, the family, the 
religion, and the state”. The prescriptions and proscriptions of these logics are incompatible, or at 
least, appear to be so; therefore, they inevitably generate challenges and tensions for 
organisations that are exposed to them (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Kraatz and Block, 2008).  
Differences in the degree of organisational exposure to institutional logics, and variations in the 
cognitive orientation of corporate managers leads to practice variation (Lounsbury, 2007, 2008). 
Organisations also embark on strategies and practices that reflect the demands of the varying 
audiences in their attempt to gain legitimacy (Greenwood et al., 2010; Reay and Hinnings, 
2005). The aforementioned argument suggests that differences in the degree of exposure to 
institutional logics and in the cognitive orientations of corporate managers would lead to 
variation in corporate disclosure compliance.  
 
P a g e  | 69 
 
3.4.2.  Institutional pluralism 
Institutions are “the rules of the game” that direct and circumscribe organisational behaviour 
(Kraatz and Block, 2008, p.1). An organisation faces the challenge of institutional pluralism 
when it participates in and/or becomes a member of more than one institutional category. For 
example, a subsidiary of a multinational corporation would need to comply with the operational 
manual of the controlling parent company, and at the same time the subsidiary would need to 
comply with the regulatory requirements in the country where it is operating which may be 
different from that of its parent company. Furthermore, the same subsidiary may be a member of 
the trade associations in the country where it is domicile such as being a member of the 
Manufacturing Associations of Nigeria (MAN). This membership of multiple institutional 
categories creates potential for fragmentation, incoherence, conflict, goal-ambiguity and 
organisation instability (Stryker, 2000; Heimer, 1999).  
However, since significant complementarities exists between institutional audiences (Kraatz and 
Block, 2008, p.5), an organisation’s ability to satisfy the demand of one institution enhances its 
ability to satisfy the demand of other institutions. Therefore, at the minimum, an organisation 
may have the ability to; at least placate diverse external constituent groups when confronted with 
pluralistic institutions. Furthermore, institutional pluralism may create significant opportunities 
for organisations to deviate from the demands of some of the institutional hierarchies. An 
organisation’s attributes may further enhance organisational motivation to deviate from the 
demands of these institutional hierarchies (Greenwood et al., 2011). The implication for 
disclosure compliance is that institutional pluralism creates the opportunity for corporate 
organisations to vary their level of disclosure. 
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3.4.3.  Institutional complexity 
Greenwood et al. argue that a pluralistic institutional environment creates institutional 
complexity for organisations. This complexity can be experienced at two levels-at societal level 
and at organisational field level (Scott, 2014). The societal level focuses on the structure of 
institutional hierarchy, that is, “the market, the corporation, the professions, the family, the 
religion, and the state” (Thornton, 2004, p.12). The sources of complexity from these 
institutional hierarchies are potential disagreement over goals, means, appropriate materials or 
the definition of organisational boundaries (Meyer and Scott, 1983).  
At the organisation field level, complexity focuses on the relational structure of the industry 
category in which organisations are embedded (Meyer and Scott, 1983), or on the relational 
structure in a large organisation (Kostova and Roth, 2002) and their interaction with their 
external institutional environment. Institutional complexity at organisational level arises from 
local exchanges among organisations at the local level (Warren, 1967), non-local and vertical 
ties between the organisation and its corporate headquarters and regulatory agencies (Scott and 
Meyer, 1983). For example, a foreign subsidiary of a multinational corporation confronts 
pressures within their MNCs to conform to organisation-based structure and practices in addition 
to the pressures from the institutional environments in their host countries (Kostova and Roth 
2002). Such ties create complexity for the subsidiary company. 
Greenwood et al. (2011, p.334) argue that the number of logics and the degree of compatibility 
between the demands of these institutions influence the extent of institutional complexity. That 
is, the higher the number of logics the greater the complexity facing an organisation and the 
higher the degree of divergence in the institutional prescribed goals and means. These increased 
the degree of complexity for corporate organisation. Furthermore, Greenwood et al. (2011, 
p.334) argue that when logics are ambiguous and lack specificity, organisations are provided 
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with a relatively greater degree of discretion to alleviate the tensions of institutional complexity. 
However, when conflicting logics are highly specific, organisations are faced with a more 
problematic level of complexity. Specificity constrains managerial discretion by making it 
extremely difficult to “mask or distract attention from controversial core activities that are 
acceptable to key constituencies” (Elsbach and Sutton, 1992, p.700). The implication is that 
organisations are able to exercise a high degree of disclosure discretion where disclosure 
requirements are not very specific.  
3.4.4.  Organisational field 
Organisational field is the intermediate level between organisation and society and it is 
instrumental to processes by which socially construed expectations and practices are disseminate 
and reproduced (Greenwood et al., 2002, p.58). Examples of organisation field are “sector” or 
“industry” or industry classifications (Thomson, 2011). Greenwood et al. (2011, p.334) argue 
that the nature and extent of institutional complexity facing organisations is fundamentally 
shaped by the structure of the organisational fields in which they are located, which may be an 
emerging or matured organisational field.  
A matured field is characterised by identifiable patterns of interactions and an articulated 
institutional infrastructure (Greenwood et al., 2011). These institutional infrastructures are 
mechanisms of enforcement such as professional accreditation (Quinn and Washington, 2009, 
Zuckerman, 1999) or state regulation (Dobbin and Dowd, 1997). A matured field has a stable 
and settled organisational practice, because the tensions between competing logics have been 
worked out at field boundary level. This suggests that institutional demands are more predictable 
in matured fields (Dejean, Gond and Leca, 2004; Garud, Jain and Kumaraswamy, 2002; 
Lawrence and Phillips, 2004). Individual organisations in the mature field also have little or no 
ability to exercise discretion (Greenwood et al., 2011). The implication is that firms in matured 
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fields are less likely to exercise discretion in disclosure compliance and may be uniform in their 
disclosure practice. 
Emerging fields are typically unsettled because they have highly permeable boundaries that 
allow actors from outside to enter with relative ease, bringing with them practices rooted in 
logics from other fields (Maguire et al., 2004). This situation complicates the balance of interests 
within the field, and consequently the practice in emerging fields is unpredictable and 
fragmented. An implicit assumption of the distinction between emerging and mature field is that 
organisation practices are more or less similar (isomorphic) in mature fields than in emerging 
fields. 
3.4.5.  Field structure 
Greenwood et al. (2011, p.337) compare field structure based on their degree of “fragmentation”, 
“formalisation/rationalisation and “centralisation/unification”. The field is fragment when there 
are a number of uncoordinated constituents on which an organisation is dependent for legitimacy 
or resources. The authors argue that fragmentation increases the complexity confronting an 
organisation.  
Additionally, an organisational field can be organised formally or informally. Low formalisation 
increases an organisation’s discretion and the institutional pressure in this field may lack 
intensity when compared to a more formalised, coordinated institutional fields. However, greater 
formalisation sharpens the specificity of demands on organisations and enables an organisation 
to respond in a more calculable manner. Formalisation also makes pressures more visible and 
easier to police. A centralised field is standardised and reduces the complexity to which 
organisations are exposed, because of its unified institutional demands. Furthermore, rules are 
clearer, better specified, more uniformed and integrated in a centralised field (Meyer et al., 1987, 
p.190). 
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3.4.6.  Organisation attributes 
3.4.6.1.  Organisation field-level position 
The field-level position concerns the location of the organisation in its industry or organisational 
field, and is defined in terms of whether the organisation is located at the “centre” or 
“periphery”. Organisations at the centre of the organisation field may be more visible due to their 
size or market capitalisation, and could have a larger number of analysts following. 
Organisations at the periphery are small and may not attract an analyst following.  
Abbott (1988) associates dominant organisations in the organisation’s field to those at the centre 
while subordinate firms to those at the periphery. Leblebic, Salancik, Copay and King (1991) 
argue that an organisation located at the “periphery” is motivated to deviate from established 
practices because it is less restricted by institutionalised relationships and expectations. 
Greenwood et al. (2011) argue that for several reasons an organisation at the periphery of a field 
is less likely to experience the same intensity of institutional complexity and therefore, its 
responses might differ fundamentally from those of centrally located organisations.  
3.4.6.2.  Organisation structure 
Greenwood and Hinnings (1996) argue that institutional pressures “enter” an organisation 
through the interpretation and the meaning given by occupants of structural positions as they 
import into an organisation the meanings and norms of logics to which they have been primarily 
exposed. Therefore, an organisation’s decisions are influenced by those who bring to the 
decision process their interpretation of priorities and preferable outcomes (Chung and Luo, 2008; 
Ocasio,1997). Actors (such as organisation employees, management and professionals) are 
“carriers” (Zilber, 2002) that “represent” and give voice to institutional logics (Pache and Santos, 
2010).   
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However, the actors who are carriers of institutional logics are “quite likely to differ in their 
awareness of, and receptivity to institutional pressures (Delmas and Toffel, 2008, p.102).  
Furthermore, the degree to which these “representatives” are committed to, and actively 
advocate, a particular logic can vary (Binder, 2007). The motivation and capability of these 
social agents to enforce their demands also vary. Therefore, not all field-level agents would be 
able to police their logics with the same insistence and demand nor are they able to do so 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). The extent to which occupants of structural positions within an 
organisation can police institutional demands would invariably affect an individual 
organisation’s response to institutional demands such as disclosure requirements. 
3.4.6.3.  Organisation ownership 
Greenwood et al. (2011) argue that organisational ownership shapes its relative receptivity to 
multiple logics. There are two perspectives on organisation ownership, which are public and 
private ownership (Goodrick and Salancik, 1996; Lounsbury, 2001) and family-owned and 
managed firms (Chung and Luo, 2008; Miller et al., 2010). The board of directors serves as a 
conduit through which stakeholder interests and their normative preferences are represented in 
publicly traded corporations (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). The relative proportion of issued 
shares owned by institutional investors and the public will affect the extent of pressures 
transmitted to corporate organisation on disclosure matters (Dobbin, Sutton, Meyer and Scott, 
1993; Edelman, 1992). 
3.4.6.4.  Organisation identity 
Identities can be studied at both organisational and institutional levels (Greenwood et al., 2011). 
Identity at institutional level focuses on inter-organisational or field-level perspective (Wry, 
Lounsbury and Glynn, 2011), while identity at organisational level focuses on tensions and 
contradictions that stem from competing identity claims within organisations (Whetten, 2006; 
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Albert and Whetten, 1985; Foreman and Whetten, 2002). However, there have been recent 
attempts to recognise a potential link between identities at institutional and organisational levels 
(Kraatz and Block, 2008; Glynn, 2008; Battilana and Dorado, 2010).  
For empirical analysis, identity at institutional level focuses on a set of claims to “institutionally 
standardised social categories” (Glynn, 2008; Kraatz and Block, 2008; Pratt and Kraatz, 2009). 
At this level, the focus is less about the unique features of the organisation but rather on 
organisation membership (or claims to membership) in a social category (Glynn, 2008, p.416; 
King, Felin and Whetten, 2010; Gioia, Price, Hamilton and Thomas, 2010). Identity at the 
organisational level focuses on attributes that define the organisation or that makes an 
organisation different from other organisations, especially when compared to those sharing the 
same institutional category (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Whetten, 2006; Dutton and Dukerich, 
1991). At this level, identity influences how expectations and pressures are prioritised, and it 
shapes how possible responses are assessed and selected (Sharma, 2000; Glynn, 2008). The 
focus of this study is on corporate disclosure and follows the perspective of identity at the 
organisational level. 
3.5.  Conclusion 
This chapter begins by arguing that the essence of information disclosure in corporate annual 
reports is an attempt to resolve the “lemons” and agency problem. Although there are attempts to 
minimise these problems via various forms of contracts, this thesis argues that the enforceability 
of contracts depends on a variety of economic and institutional factors (Healy and Palepu, 2001, 
p.410). This thesis emphasises the importance of institutional factors as determinants of 
corporate disclosure and use institutional theory as a lens. This chapter argues that exchanges 
between internal and external constituencies of corporate organisations put financial reporting 
practices at the centre of an ideological struggle (Mezias, 1990). Consequently, an important 
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outcome has been the definition of legitimate methods for use in the preparation of financial 
statements (Mezias, 1990). These legitimate methods include generally accepted accounting 
principles and accounting standards.  
The chapter discusses the Oliver (1991) and Greenwood et al. (2011) frameworks. These 
frameworks are use to identify factors that determine corporate disclosure compliance. The 
reason for adopting these frameworks is the ability of corporate organisations to exercise 
discretion whilst complying with the goals and practices prescribed by institutional audiences. 
Additionally, the instability complicates the complexity of the institutional environment for 
financial reporting. Unlike the PAT framework, which assumes a stable institutional 
environment, the instability in Nigeria’s financial reporting environment makes institutional 
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Chapter Four 
Literature review of the positive accounting theory studies on disclosure 
 
4.1. Introduction 
There are a limited number of studies that have applied the Oliver (1991) and Greenwood et 
al.(2011) institutional frameworks in financial accounting research (see for example Guerreiro et 
al. 2012). Most extant empirical disclosure studies have used the PAT framework to provide an 
explanation of the factors that determine the level of corporate disclosure. The PAT perspectives 
on corporate disclosure are based on the following hypotheses: agency costs, corporate 
governance and monitoring, signalling and information asymmetry, capital needs, litigation costs 
and audit firm reputation (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999).  
Given the limited availability of institutional theory-based disclosure studies, the review in this 
chapter categorised determinants of corporate disclosure by the key hypotheses of positive 
accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Collin et al. (2009, p.143) argue that to a large 
extent both institutional theory and positive accounting theory predictions create the same 
hypotheses, but use different logics in derivation, suggesting that they are complementary in 
nature. This argument provides the rationale for focusing on PAT-based studies in this review. 
The criteria for inclusion of studies in this review are based on specific reference to either 
agency theory or positive accounting theory in the selected disclosure study.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the meaning, types and measures of 
disclosure. Section 3 discusses the classification of determinants of disclosure based on positive 
accounting theory hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the results of studies on determinants of 
corporate financial disclosure. Section 5 discusses the limitations of the positive accounting 
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theory. Section 6 concludes the chapter with a discussion of the limitation of PAT and suggests 
institutional theory as an alternative framework to explain corporate disclosure.  
4.2.  Meaning and measures of disclosure 
Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse (1990, p.122) defined financial disclosure as any deliberate 
release of financial and non-financial information whether numerical or qualitative, mandatory 
or voluntary or via formal or informal channels. Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that firms 
provide disclosure in regulated financial reports, including the financial statements, footnotes, 
management discussion and analysis, and other regulatory filings. The authors further state that 
some firms engage in voluntary communications such as management forecasts, analysts’ 
presentations and conference calls, press releases, internet disclosure and other special corporate 
reports. This form of voluntary disclosure may not be captured in most index-based disclosure 
studies.  
As stated in chapter one, this thesis focuses on mandatory disclosure, which is defined as the 
minimum disclosure in corporate annual reports that is required by relevant accounting 
standards, that is, those items of information that ensure important aspects of corporate activities 
have been disclosed (Wallace and Naser, 1995).   
Different proxies have been used in literature to measure corporate disclosure; however, 
disclosure indices are the most commonly used. Disclosure indices are based on extensive lists of 
selected items, which may be disclosed in company reports (Marston and Shrives, 1991, p. 195). 
The computation of a disclosure index could include mandatory items of information and/or 
voluntary items of information. The index is a research instrument used to measure the extent of 
information reported in a particular disclosure vehicle (such as annual reports, interim reports, 
and investor’s relations) by a particular organisation. Cerf (1961) was the first to use an index in 
a disclosure study, and they have since been used in many other disclosure studies. Selected 
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examples include Depoers (2000), Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003), Naser and Nuseibeh 
(2003), Botosan (1997), Wallace et al. (1994), Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) and Singhvi and 
Desai (1971).  
Prior studies show a great variation in the construction of a disclosure index, and these studies 
also vary in terms of the degree of the researcher’s involvement in constructing the index, the 
type of information included and the number of items of information included in the index 
(Hassan and Marston, 2010). Furthermore, the type of information selected can cover mandatory 
disclosure (Ahmed and Nichollis, 1994; Wallace et al., 1994) or voluntary disclosure (Botosan, 
1997; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1997) or both (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Cooke, 1992; Inchausti, 
1997). In addition, the items of information included in the disclosure index could be weighted 
(Botosan, 1997; Richardson and Welker, 2001) or unweighted (Cooke, 1992; Singhvi and Desai, 
1971). Irrespective of the type of index, the most common research question is ‘what determines 
the extent of corporate disclosure?’ 
4.3. Determinants of corporate disclosure 
There are several perspectives on the determinants of corporate disclosure. Gibbins et al. (1990) 
argue that disclosure position affects the supply of corporate disclosure or the way in which 
information disclosure is managed and identified two dimensions of disclosure position: 
ritualism and opportunism. Ritualism refers to uncritical adherence to predefined disclosure 
norms, which arises from internal behavioural patterns, motivated perhaps by an effective system 
of corporate governance. On the other hand, opportunism is the propensity to seek firm specific 
advantages in the disclosure of financial information (Graham et al., 2005). For example, 
companies might benefit from providing more information to the public in the form of a reduced 
cost of capital (Botosan, 1997).  
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The cost of disclosure also affects corporate disclosure. These costs includes those of 
information processing and dissemination (Hassan and Marston, 2010), the proprietary costs that 
arise when competitors make use of available information about a company to their own 
advantage (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986; Darrough and Stoughton, 1990),or lawsuit costs which 
may be incurred when a company is sued for disclosing erroneous information (Skinner, 1994). 
Based on this, existing disclosure studies suggests that a decision to make information public 
would theoretically be based on a cost-benefit analysis, although detailed estimation of all costs 
and benefits is difficult (Healy and Palepu, 1993; Botosan, 2000). 
4.3.1.  Positive Accounting Theory-based determinants of corporate disclosure 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argue that three hypotheses are commonly tested within the PAT 
framework. These are the bonus plan hypotheses, debt/equity hypotheses and political costs 
hypotheses. The bonus plan hypothesis predicts that managers of firms with bonus plans are 
more likely to use accounting methods that increase current period reported income. Such 
selection will presumably increase the present value of bonuses if the compensation committee 
of the board of directors does not adjust for the method chosen (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990).  
The debt/equity hypothesis predicts that the higher a firm’s debt/equity ratio, the more likely that 
its managers will use accounting methods that increase income. The higher the debt/equity ratios, 
the closer (that is “tighter”) the firm is to the constraints in the debt covenants. The tighter the 
covenant constraints, the greater the probability of a covenant violation and of incurring costs 
from technical default (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990).  
The political cost hypothesis predicts that large firms are more likely to choose accounting 
practices that reduce reported profits, which is based on the idea that governments will intervene 
into corporations’ affairs to redistribute its profits (Jensen and Meckling, 1978).  The assumption 
underlying this hypothesis is that it is costly for individuals to become informed about whether 
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accounting profits really represent monopoly profits, therefore, individuals would “contract” 
with others in the political process to enact laws and regulations that enhance their welfare 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). To counter such political pressures, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) suggest that corporations employ a number of devices such as government lobbying and 
selection of accounting procedures to minimise reported earnings. 
These three predictors of accounting choice are either used separately or jointly in empirical 
studies, however, they are not reinforcing (Milne, 2002). They imply opposing incentives and 
hence represent trade-offs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Subsequent to Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978), empirical studies have used or suggested a wider range of measures to proxy these three 
predictors of accounting choice. The next section discusses these proxies and their empirical 
results.  
4.3.2.  Disclosure and the political cost hypothesis 
Several empirical studies have sought to establish evidence for the political cost hypothesis as an 
explanation for a firm’s disclosure. Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) gave one of the earliest and 
more comprehensive attempts to test Watts and Zimmerman’s argument with respect to annual 
report disclosure. They argue that politically visible firms would disclose more information. 
Several proxies have been used to measure a firm’s political visibility, including size, industry 
membership, capital intensity, assets in place, labour pressure and systematic risk. 
4.3.2.1.  Size  
Size is the most commonly used proxy for political sensitivity. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) 
argue that larger firms are subject to more political costs and therefore when these are high there 
is a greater incentive to withhold information. However, some studies have argued that larger 
firms tend to employ highly skilled individuals and sophisticated management reporting systems 
that enables them to provide a wider array of corporate information. For example, as the number 
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of subsidiaries and areas of activity grow with a firm’s size, the amount of information to be 
processed by managers increases the likelihood of higher information disclosure. Additionally, 
analysts and the public tend to impose greater demands on larger firms to provide information. 
Alternatively, larger firms are more able to afford the costly disclosure process (Depoers, 2000). 
There is no consistent measure of size. Some studies have used total assets (Inchausti, 1997; 
Patelli and Prencipe, 2007), whilst others have used sales/turnover (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; 
Inchausti, 1997; Collin et al., 2009; Al-Akra, Eddie and Ali, 2010). In addition, other studies 
have used the total number of shareholders (Singhvi, 1968; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Cooke 
1989a, 1989b; Cooke, 1991) and total market value of the firm (Al-Akra, Eddie and Ali, 2010).  
These inconsistent measures of size might have accounted for the differences in empirical results 
of the impact of size on corporate disclosure. For most empirical studies, a positive significant 
association has been found between size and disclosure (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Inchausti, 
1997; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Cho and Wong-Boren, 1987). However, Al-Akra, Eddie and 
Ali (2010) found an insignificant negative association between disclosure and size for their 
Jordanian-based study, probably due to the institutional context of the study.  
This thesis argues that although the PAT-based studies provide evidence on political costs, size-
disclosure relationship supports a legitimacy perspective of institutional theory rather than the 
self- interest perspective of PAT. This is because a large organisation would engage in wider 
relational networks in which case, it needs to maintain or enhance legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). 
The larger and the more complex the relational network becomes, the more the self-interest of 
corporate managers would decrease if they were to enhanced corporate legitimacy.  
Furthermore, PAT-based studies argue that the greater the size of a corporation the more 
politically visible the corporation becomes, hence the higher the possibility of incurring political 
costs. While this is true, this thesis argues that political cost becomes an issue when a firm’s 
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conduct in the social environment becomes illegitimate. In other words, an illegitimate conduct 
would attract sanctions (political costs) from an institutional perspective. Therefore, as long as 
the corporation conducts its business legitimately, political costs are minimised. Additionally, 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) specifically referred to the size of profit when discussing political 
cost, that is, the higher the profit earned the greater the likelihood of  increased taxation (the 
political cost). This thesis argues that using corporate size (total assets, revenue) as a proxy for 
political cost is not a sufficient proxy for the PAT’s  political cost hypothesis.  
4.3.2.2.  Industry/sector membership  
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) suggest that industry membership affects the political 
vulnerability of a firm. The self-interest perspective argues that competitors in the industry are 
likely to use the information disclosed by a firm to change their product plans (Darrough, 1995). 
This can lead to a proprietary cost in the form of a reduction of future cash flow attributable to 
the disclosure on the firm (Dye, 1990), which therefore prevents managers from making 
adequate disclosure. However, it is in the manager’s interest to distinguish its firm from a less 
profitable firm in the industry via information disclosure (Milgrom, 1981; Grossman, 1981).  
Empirical studies frequently use two proxies to capture the effect of industry on disclosure. The 
first is a dummy variable to indicate if a firm belongs to a particular industry classification (Al-
Akra et al., 2010). The second is a measure of barrier to entry, which captures the potential for 
proprietary cost (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Darrough, 1995). Since barriers to entry are 
difficult to measure, empirical studies have used the amount of investment necessary to enter a 
sector such as total fixed assets as a proxy for barrier to entry. This amount represents the 
financial input needed to be competitive as an established firm in a chosen sector (Depoers, 
2000). Firms that are protected in their sector by heavy barriers to entry are more likely to 
disclose more information than those that are not. 
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Most empirical studies that use an industry dummy find a negative association between 
disclosure and industry classification (Curuk, 2009; Al-Akra et al., 2010), which suggests that 
firms conceal information from their competitors. On the other hand, empirical studies that use 
gross fixed assets as a proxy for barrier to entry find a significant positive association between 
gross fixed assets and disclosure (Depeors, 2000). This suggests that when there is a significantly 
high barrier to entry, established firms would willingly disclose more information. 
Consistent with institutional theory perspective, this thesis argues that industry membership 
provides a platform for relational networks that aids voluntary diffusion of institutional 
requirements. Therefore, the observed impact of industry classification on disclosure as shown in 
the above studies may be picking up the effect of voluntary diffusion among individual 
corporations in the industry category. This negative association of industry dummy with the level 
of disclosure may suggest that the industry structure is fragmented. On the other hand, a positive 
association of industry dummies with the level of disclosure would suggest that institutional 
norms are widely diffused in the industry. In such industry, a firm do not adopt the same 
corporate reporting strategy as others from the same industry, could be interpreted by the market 
as a signal of ‘bad news’, and the market price will tumble (Depoers, 2000). 
4.3.2.3.  Labour pressure  
Liberty and Zimmerman (1986) argue that employees within a company could form a pressure 
group, which would be likely to impose negative wealth transfers in the form of wage demands. 
Consequently, it may be preferable for the firm and its managers to withhold certain information 
which could be useful to unions in terms of their bargaining power. Frantz and Walker (1997) 
argue that when the information is relevant to both the financial market for valuation purposes 
and a union for wage-bargaining purposes, either unfavourable or and favourable information 
may be concealed by managers who would gain either way. Similarly, Darrough (1995) argues 
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that firms with high salary overheads would consequently disclose less information to deter 
demands for higher wages and better working conditions. The proxies for labour pressure 
include labour charges on turnover ratio (Depoers, 2000) and labour skills (Ahmed and Nicholls, 
1994). The labour charges on turnover ratio suggest that the wage bill is representative of the 
intensity of labour in a firm. 
Deegan and Hallam (1991) found a negative association between voluntary value-added 
statement disclosure and labour pressure. Similarly, Depoers (2000) finds a significant negative 
association between voluntary disclosure and labour pressure. This suggests that firms would 
conceal such information from their employees if it were likely to increase pressure for higher 
wages.  
4.3.2.4.  Employee efficiency   
Employee efficiency could influence disclosure (Watson et al., 2002). Employees could put 
pressure on management for higher salaries if they perceived that they are highly efficient, and 
management may therefore decide to hide information that reveals employees efficiency. On the 
other hand, management may decide to reward employee’s efficiency and make this known on 
the annual report in order to attract additional highly skilled staff to the organisation. 
Consequently, a significant positive relationship could be observe between employee’s 
qualifications and disclosure (Singhvi, 1968). Sales per employee (Watson et al., 2002) and 
professional qualification by the principal accounting officer (Singhvi, 1968) have been used as a 
proxy for labour skills.  
Watson et al. (2002) found a positive relationship between information disclosure and efficiency 
(measured by sales per employee). This implies that an efficient firm increased information 
disclosure. However, Abayo et al. (1990) and Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) found no relationship 
between the level of compliance with mandatory disclosure and possession of professional 
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qualifications by the principal accounting officer. Similarly, Parry and Grove (1990) found no 
relationship between the quality of financial reporting and the employment of qualified 
accountants by companies in Bangladesh. 
4. 3.2.5  Systematic risk  
Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) found a significant positive association between disclosure and 
systematic risk measured by market beta coefficient derived from the market model. Belkaoui 
and Karpik (1989) interpreted the results to mean that politically visible firms would disclose 
more information. However, Firth (1984) found no relationship between the extent of disclosure 
and systematic risk and interpreted the result to mean that there is no association between market 
performance and extent of disclosure. The inconsistent result could be due to Botosan’s (1997) 
observation that the market beta is derived from the traditional CAPM formula, which assumes 
that the true parameters for the model are known.  
4. 3.2.6  Organisational complexity 
Two aspects of organisational complexity have been studied in empirical research; these are the 
nature of the industry in which an organisation operates and geographical concentration 
(Bushman et al., 2004; Bushman et al., 1995; Bodnar et al., 1998). From the perspective of 
geographical concentration, Bushman et al. (2004) found a significant positive relationship 
between accounting information disclosure and industry concentration. Empirical studies have 
also focused attention on multi-national corporations. For example, Depoers (2000) argues that 
operating in a number of geographical areas including other countries increase the amount of 
information controlled by a firm, which would lead to increased disclosure.  
Furthermore, Cooke (1989) argues that the more a firm is exposed to international operations, 
the greater the amount of information control by the company’s management. Moreover, some 
countries such as the US require diversified firms to disclose segment data (Givoly et al., 1999), 
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these additional disclosure requirements are expected to increase the information disclosed by 
multinational firms.  Depoers (2000) finds a significant positive relationship between disclosure 
and a firm’s foreign activities. Similarly, Raffournier (1995) finds that firms with high exports-
on-sales ratios disclose more information than those who export less. 
However, when organisational complexity is associated with diversification this could results in 
costly governance responses (Denis et al., 1997). An inability to effectively govern  MNCs may 
result in low information aggregation and disclosure. In addition, multinational firms face a 
complex managerial decision-making environment that generates a range of monitoring 
difficulties. Furthermore, multinational firms face cultural and legal diversity across markets; 
consequently, this may increase the level of information asymmetry in complex organisations 
such as MNCs (Habib et al., 1997).  Similarly, Gilson et al. (2001) argue that multi-industry 
firms attempt to suppress the activities of information intermediaries, which increases the level 
of information asymmetry.   
4.3.3.  Disclosure and the debt covenant /equity hypothesis  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that managers have incentives to provide information about 
their activities instead of being investigated, this is because, the cost borne by the managers to 
disclose such information (bonding costs) are lower than the costs the principals would bear to 
control insider’s activities from the outside (monitoring costs). Different proxies have been used 
to investigate the debt/equity hypothesis. These are discussed in the sections that follow. 
4.3.3.1.  Leverage  
Different measures have been used to measure leverage, including total debts to total assets 
(Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989); liabilities to equity (Inchausti, 1997; Al-Akra et al., 2010), total 
liabilities to total equity (Ho and Wong, 2001), and total equity to total assets (Patelli and 
Prencipe, 2007). However, the findings have not always been consistent. Belkaoui and Karpik 
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(1989),  Patelli and Prencipe (2007) and Al-Akra et al. (2010) find a significant negative 
association between disclosure and leverage whereas other results show no significant 
association between leverage and disclosure ( Wallace et al., 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995). 
Differences in these results were due to differences in national settings and the different proxies 
used for the variables (Patelli and Prencipe, 2007).  
4.3.3.2.  Audit firm size 
In order to monitor the dysfunctional behaviour of managers and mitigate the effect on owners’ 
utility or wealth, equity-holders adopt several monitoring devices, and among these are the 
appointment of external auditors, audit committees and independent directors. Firth (1979) 
argues that large audit firms may incite companies to increase information disclosure in order to 
preserve their reputations. Furthermore, Verrechia (1990a) argues that the skills possessed by a 
high quality audit firm could increase the precision of information reported. Bar-Yossef and 
Livnat (1984) argue that being audited by one of the big firms is a signal of high cash flow 
expectations, as a result, good firms are likely to disclose more information to ‘advertise’ their 
performance. 
Empirical studies have used a dummy variable to indicate whether one of the big audit firms 
audited a company, and these have yielded a mixed result. Wallace et al. (1994) found no 
relationship between audit firm size and disclosure. Wallace and Naser (1995) found a 
significant negative association between audit firm type and mandatory disclosure.  Raffournier 
(1995) found a significant relation between audit firm type and disclosure in his univariate tests.  
Al-Akra, Eddie and Ali (2010), Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), and Patton and Zelenka (1997) 
found a significant relation between audit firm type and disclosure in their multivariate test.  
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Despite the foregoing, consistent with Healy and Palepu (2001), this thesis argues that the 
effectiveness of audit firms depends more on the institutional arrangements and the stability of 
these institutional settings. 
4.3.3.3.  Independent directors 
Another monitoring mechanism is the appointment of independent directors on the board. 
Independent board members are professionals with neither a management role nor business or 
ownership ties to the company, but with professional reputations to protect (Patelli and Prencipe, 
2007). Independent board members have a role in limiting agency problems by reducing the risk 
of collusion between top management and the controlling shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Forker (1992) argues that the presence of non-executive directors on corporate boards reduces 
the benefits of withholding information, thus providing the incentive to disclose more 
information. However, he does not find significant empirical support for his hypothesis. 
Similarly, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Ho and Wong (2001) do not find any significant 
relationship between the proportion of independent directors and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure provided by listed firms. 
On the other hand, Chen and Jaggi (2000) find that the total number of independent directors on 
corporate boards is positively associated with the comprehensiveness of financial disclosures. 
Patelli and Prencipe (2007) found a significant positive relationship between the proportion of 
independent board members and voluntary disclosure. Similarly, Eng and Mak (2003) find 
empirical evidence that an increase in outside directors reduces the level of corporate disclosure. 
The aforementioned discussion shows a mixed result on the impact of independent board 
members on corporate disclosure. 
P a g e  | 90 
 
A related proxy used in empirical studies is the evaluation of the impact of the proportion of 
foreign board members on corporate disclosure. Singhvi (1968) found that Indian companies 
managed by locals disclosed less information than their non-Indian counterparts.  
4.3.4.  Disclosure and the bonus plan hypothesis 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978, p.114) assume that management’s utility is a positive function of 
the expected compensation (or wealth) in future periods, and a negative function of the 
dispersion of future compensation (or wealth). They argue that a manager’s total compensation 
consists of wages, incentive compensation (cash bonuses and stock or stock options), and non-
pecuniary income, including perquisites (Jensen-Meckling, 1976a). Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) argue that managers seek to increase either the level of incentive compensation or the 
firm’s share price via the choice of accounting standards they made.  
Empirical analysis has distinguished between mechanisms which increase management wealth 
via increases in share price (that is stock and stock options which are presumed to be the more 
viable option) or via increases in incentive cash bonuses (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). The 
focus of this review is on the relationship between the stock and stock options compensation and 
corporate disclosure. 
Nagar et al. (2003) argue that current investors need information about the firm’s future expected 
cash flow and risk which is available to managers due to their proximity to operating activities, 
however self-interested managers would be reluctant to reveal this. Such poor disclosure 
weakens investors power to discipline managers and consequently managers can become 
entrenched, as their chance of replacement is reduced (Schleifer and Vishny, 1989). Edlin and 
Stiglitz (1995) argue that rent-seeking managers have the incentives to exacerbate information 
asymmetry by selecting projects that obfuscate firm performance. 
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Moreover, Nagar et al. (2003) argue that disclosure can cause the labour market to reassess 
managerial talent and ability. Therefore, unless they are suitably compensated a risk-averse 
managers would be reluctant to disclose their private information if they were uncertain about 
how such disclosure would affect them (Nagar, 1999). Furthermore, Skinner (1994, 1997) argues 
that managers and shareholders face different legal costs of disclosure; as a result, encouraging 
managers to disclose is important, yet is not easy to achieve.  
Based on the aforementioned, Nagar et al. (2003) argue that stock price-based incentive 
contracts effectively encourage disclosure for several reasons. First, stock price is a timely 
performance measure because investors can immediately react to disclosures by trading in the 
firm’s shares. Second, if investors perceive disclosed information to be irrelevant to the current 
contingency, the stock price will not change. That is, the price formation process takes into 
account both the quality and the quantity of information disclosed. Third, stock price-based 
incentives encourage both good news and bad news disclosures. Consequently, stock price 
appreciation is a natural incentive for managers to release good news. Nagar et al. (2003) argue 
that this property of the stock price reduces the risk imposed on managers and leads to a more 
efficient contract.   
Similarly, investors with rational expectations respond not only to disclosure but to non-
disclosure, which they rationally perceive as “worse” news (Verrecchia, 1983; Milgrom, 1981). 
Therefore, it is beneficial for managers compensated on stock price to disclose bad news to 
investors rather than remain silent. However, since silence can also mean that the manager does 
not have private information, Dye (1985) argues that investors react negatively to non-disclosure 
only when they expect the manager to have private information.  
Nagar et al. (2003) found a positive relation between disclosure practices and a firm’s long-run 
use of stock price-based incentives. The authors argue that these results suggest that in the long 
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run, these incentives mitigates disclosure agency problems instead of exacerbating them. The 
result also suggests that stock price-based compensation itself plays a role in this process by 
providing managers with an incentive to improve price informativeness through disclosure. The 
results are also consistent with Lambert and Larcker (1987) who found that firms use stock 
price-based incentives when prices are informative about managerial actions.  
Nagar et al. (2003) concluded that potential litigation costs are an institutional force that helps 
elicit bad news disclosure from managers who have stock price-based incentives; this suggests 
that the strength of institutions is an important determinant of the level of disclosure in corporate 
annual reports. 
4.4.  Conclusion  
Most empirical disclosure literatures have relied heavily on positive accounting theory to explain 
managerial behaviour and accounting practice (Neu and Simmons, 1996). Positive accounting 
theory assumes that the relative power between agents and principals affects reporting decisions 
(Zimmerman, 1977). The theory also assumes that the self-interest of actors affects accounting 
practice and compliance with accounting standards. As discussed in the preceding sections, most 
empirical studies that relied on the PAT framework have yielded conflicting and mixed results.  
However, Mezias (1990) used both PAT and the institutional framework in his study of financial 
reporting among US corporations and found that 4 out of the 7 variables belonging to 
institutional theory could not be rejected where as only 2 out of the 6 variables from PAT were 
significant. Similarly, Collin et al. (2009) studied the accounting choices of Sweden Municipal 
Corporations and found that 5 out of the 6 factors were significant for institutional theory, while 
only 3 out of the 6 factors were significant for PAT predictions.  
Based on the foregoing results, Mezias (1990) and Collin et al. (2009) refute Watts and 
Zimmerman’s (1978, 1990) claim of PAT being the only viable theory for predicting accounting 
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choice or organisation disclosure compliance. The failure of PAT is not its reasoning based on 
utility satisfying, but in its negligence of context (Mezias, 1990; Fields et al., 2001). Institutional 
theory requires more contextual information to make a better prediction (Collin et al., 2009) 
while PAT’s preoccupation is with the agent-principal relationship and its contractual nature 
whilst neglecting wider societal issues. Accordingly, this study turns to institutional theory as an 
alternative framework to provide explanations for corporate disclosure. However, in terms of 
empirical testing it is difficult to separate or distinguish PAT measurement from that of 
institutional theory (Collin et al., 2009). The next chapter presents a review of institutional 
















P a g e  | 94 
 
Chapter Five 
A review of institutional perspective of disclosure and hypothesis development 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter uses the Oliver (1991) and Greenwood et al. (2011) institutional frameworks to 
identify organisation characteristics that affect the level of mandatory disclosure. Section two 
presents a brief overview of organisational responses to institutional pressures. Section three 
discusses causes of variation in the level of mandatory disclosure. Section four discusses the 
impact of the Oliver dimensions of institutional pressures on the level of mandatory disclosure. 
Section five discusses the inter-industry variation in disclosure based on the Greenwood et al. 
institutional framework. Section six concludes the discussion in this chapter. 
5.2  Overview of organisational response to institutional pressures 
In the application of institutional theory, some studies have focused on organisational resistance. 
These studies found that an organisation adopts various resistance tactics, including denying the 
validity of various external claims; attacking the legitimacy of the entities making claims; 
attempting to co-opt or control these entities; or trying to influence the entity (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995). Other resistance tactics include deleting or 
marginalising institutional entities (Pratt and Foreman, 2000), or banishing or permanently 
suppressing other groups and belief systems (Selznick, 1951). However, Kraatz and Block 
(2007) argue that there is an inherent weakness in the results of these studies because an 
organisational effort to eliminate, silence or marginalise constituents may prove to be ultimately 
self-defeating.  
Other studies focus on decoupling and loose coupling. Decoupling occurs when an organisation 
adopts structures that appear to conform to institutional requirements without actually complying 
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in practice, making it a form of symbolic adoption without implementation (Westphal and Zajac, 
1994, 1998). Organisations also decouple by compartmentalised identities that is, they attempt to 
relate independently to various institutional constituents; they sequentially attend to different 
institutional claims or create separate units and initiatives that demonstrate their commitment to 
the values and beliefs of particular constituents (Pratt and Foreman, 2000). However, Kraatz and 
Block (2007) argue that the concept of decoupling cannot be invoke without knowing the 
organisational “core” from which a thing is decoupled, and that it is problematic to describe 
something as merely symbolic unless we know where the true substance resides.  
A related study to decoupling is loose coupling. This assumes that a single organisational core 
does not exist (Weick, 1976; Orton and Weick, 1990), but that an organisation has different units 
and that each unit would respond differently to pressures from their environment. The weakness 
of the loose-coupling perspective is that the attempt by individual units to respond differently to 
the pressures from their immediate environment could result in sub-optimisation, perpetuation 
and exacerbation of rifts among the organisation’s units (Bowen and Levin, 2003; Duderstadt, 
2000; Zimbalist, 1999). 
Another stream of study focuses on balancing disparate demands. The tactics may include 
playing constituent parts against one another, or where an organisation may attempt to find 
cooperative solutions to the political and cultural tensions which constituent institutions creates 
(Pratt and Foreman, 2000; Oliver, 1991; Donaldson and Preston, 1995). The main weakness of 
this perspective is that there is no clear line separating situations of reluctant and mutual 
acceptance from those of true co-operation. Conflicts may persist since relationships that are 
cooperative in their effect may remain conflictual in their process. Furthermore, balancing may 
be precarious if struck among various objectives, constituents and role identities (Clark, 1956; 
Selznick, 1951). Similar studies focus on substituting and framing (George, Sitkin and Barden, 
2006; Williams and Benford, 1996; Hunt, Benford and Snow, 1994).  
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Additionally, some studies suggest that both internal and external pressures on corporate 
organisations affect its behaviour (Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). Most empirical studies on the 
institutional impact on corporate practice have paid particular attention to the symbolic adoption 
of institutional requirements without implementation, that is, a response that provides appearance 
of compliance without doing so in practice (Westphal and Zajac, 2001). Other studies have 
examined the impact of regulatory ambiguity on organisation behaviour (Goodrick and Salancik, 
1996). They found that regulatory ambiguity creates the opportunity for corporate organisations 
to adopt strategic behaviour, which eventually becomes an acceptable social norm (Goodrick and 
Salancik, 1996; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Edelman, 1992).  
Furthermore, some studies have examined the impact of external ratings on managerial 
behaviour. For example, Chartterji and Toffel (2010) analysed how firms respond to the social 
rating firm, KLD Research & Analytics. They found that firms that initially received poor ratings 
subsequently improved their environmental performance relative to other firms, including firms 
that had higher rating or were never rated.  
Elsbach and Kramer (1996) and Espeland and Sauder (2007) examined how graduate and 
professional schools responded to school rankings and found that officials in lower-ranked 
schools reacted defensively by focusing on their strengths and allocating resources strategically 
to influence future rankings. In general, these studies demonstrate that poorer performance on the 
dimension covered by the rating program leads to greater subsequent improvement. These results 
are consistent with the idea that low-performing organisations are subject to greater pressures to 
improve. The foregoing discussions suggest that institutions exert significant and varying 
impacts on corporate practices. 
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5.3.  Hypotheses based on variation in the level of mandatory disclosure 
Several studies have argued that internal organisation dynamics need to be considered in the 
explanations of organisational response to institutional pressures (Fligstein, 1985; Oliver, 1991; 
Scott, 2001; DiMaggio, 1988; Greenwood et al. 2002; Casile and Davis-Blake, 2002). Other 
studies argue that organisational response to their institutional contexts is moderated by its 
structure (Delmas and Toffel, 2010; Okhmatovskiy and David, 2011), and the marginal cost and 
perceived benefits (Chartteji and Toffel, 2010). Similarly, Tay and Parker (1990, p.75) argue that 
an organisation might not comply with institutional requirements if it perceives that the 
consequences of non-compliance are not serious. However, accidental non-compliances can 
result from a lack of awareness or understanding of institutional requirements due to the 
complexity of the institutional environment (Herz, 2005). 
Furthermore, corporate managers may be responding to environmental and economic incentives 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991). For example, fear of litigation may induce some companies to 
disclose more information (Skinner, 1994), such fear can arguably depend on the exposure or 
visibility of the company to its legal environment, that is, the probability that legal action will be 
taken against the company for disclosing incorrect information and the severity of its 
consequences (Bushman and Piotroski, 2006). In addition, the effectiveness of enforcement 
regimes plays a pivotal role on the level of organisational compliance (Leuz and Wysocki, 
2008). Companies may also need time to learn to apply and possibly fully comply with new 
reporting rules (Cuijpers and Buijing, 2005; Daske, 2005). These learning periods may vary from 
company to company. This suggests that the level of disclosure may vary from year to year. 
In Nigeria, the regulatory regime for financial reporting and disclosure has been stricter in the 
early 2010s as compared to the early 2000s. Corporate organisations and their officers are 
subject to stringent security regulations and stricter public and private enforcement systems 
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during the early 2010s. Accordingly, this thesis proposes that the level of mandatory disclosure 
in the early 2010s would be higher than in the early 2000s. This leads to the following 
hypothesis. 
H1: There is no significant difference in the level of mandatory disclosure across 
regulatory regimes in Nigeria 
However, selective attention to one or more aspects of the institutional environment (Thornton, 
2002), variations in the perception of corporate managers (Wallace, 1988), varying exposure or 
susceptibility to institutional influences, and the nature or location of the organisation in its 
organisational field (Dobbin et al., 1988) can affect corporate disclosure. Additionally, the social 
motives of individuals within the organisation, their personal dispositions towards the 
institutional requirements, and experiences with similar situations shape how an organisation 
understands and responds to institutional requirements (Kelley and Thibaut, 1978).   
Other factors that affect the level of disclosure include unintentional neglect, for example if 
managers overlook particular disclosure requirements (Glaum, Schmidt, Street and Vogel, 2013),  
managers’ misinterpretation of disclosure rules, for example, when managers erroneously 
conclude that certain rules do not apply or do not compel them to disclose information. In 
addition, managers may intentionally fail to comply with the disclosure rules. The foregoing 
discussions suggests that different factors could lead to a variation in the level of mandatory 
disclosure among corporate organisations in Nigeria. This leads to the following hypothesis. 
H2: There is no significant difference in the level of mandatory disclosure across listed 
Nigerian companies 
Furthermore, institutional and organisational dynamics are tightly linked (Stanga, 1976), 
therefore, managements’ motivation to provide value-relevant information could range from a 
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desire to reduce the cost of capital, to developing a reputation for compliance and transparency. 
This reputation is expected to enhanced the value of manager’s human capital.  
In addition, the complexity of each accounting standard may influence the level of disclosure on 
each accounting standard. The disclosure requirements of some accounting standards are more 
complex than the requirements of other reporting standards. For example, Beattie et al. (2007) 
argue that the IFRS for business combination and for goodwill impairment testing are 
controversial and challenging. Amidst widespread concern regarding the application and 
enforcement of complicated and controversial accounting standards, some corporate 
organisations claiming to comply with accounting standards may not fully comply with its 
requirements (Street et al. 1999; Street and Bryant, 2000; Street and Gray, 2001; Glaum and 
Street, 2003; Abdelsalam and Weetman, 2007). 
In Nigeria, the World Bank ROSC (2004) found that some corporate CEOs and managers were 
not familiar with the requirements of some of the national accounting standards. This lack of 
familiarity would result in unintentional non-compliance with these accounting standards, and 
would lead to variation in the level of disclosure amongst companies on each of the accounting 
standards. The foregoing discussion leads to the following hypothesis. 
H3: There is no significant difference in the level of mandatory disclosure on each 
accounting standards 
The foregoing discussions focus on variation in organisations’ responses to their institutional 
contexts. Subsequent sections in this chapter formulate hypotheses based on the institutional 
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5.4.  Hypotheses development based on Oliver’s (1991) model 
There are limited studies that apply the Oliver framework to corporate financial reporting. This 
thesis focuses on organisation acquiescence (compliance) with particular emphasis on disclosure. 
The Oliver’s framework is used to identify factors that could explain organisation disclosure. 
Oliver asked why, who, what, how and where concerning the source of pressures and specified 
conditions under which it was more likely that a company would conform to these pressures. 
These factors are grouped under “cause”, “constituents”, “contents”, “control” and “context”. 
The dimensions of these factors are used to predict the level of disclosure. 
5.4.1.  Causes of institutional pressures 
5.4.1.1.  Legitimacy 
Oliver (1991) identifies legitimacy as one of the causes of pressure from the institutional 
environment. A legitimate organisation is one whose values and actions are congruent with the 
values and expectations of social actors and it involves endorsement by the organisation’s 
relevant audiences (Deepehouse 1996). Legitimating from a financial disclosure perspective is 
how an organisation achieves acceptance from social actors (Sejjaaka, 2005), by adopting the 
means and ends that are considered reasonable and rational in acquiring endorsement (Ashforth 
and Gibbs, 1990).  
The most commonly used legitimacy proxy is status (Guerreiro et al., 2012; Oliver, 1991). Status 
is a measure of a firm’s perceived quality vis- a- vis its peers (Podolny, 1993). As a firm’s status 
in the industry rises, the impact of informal institutional pressures on the firm to correct its 
deviant behaviour wanes. Higher-status firms are not worried that they may suffer rejection for 
nonconforming behaviour (Deephouse, 1999; Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001) because they have 
accumulated ‘idiosyncrasy credits’ that allowed them to absorb legitimacy challenges without 
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penalty (Deephouse and Carter, 2005). This suggests that higher-status firms are ‘emboldened to 
deviate’ from industry norms (Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001, p.380).  
In contrast, lower-status firms are concerned with the legitimacy of their actions and therefore 
will take action to ‘demonstrate their conformity to accepted practice’ in the industry (Phillips 
and Zuckerman, 2001, p.382). This argument suggests that a firm’s status can moderate the 
impact of institutional influences on its decision to correct its deviant behaviour (Phillips and 
Zuckerman, 2001). 
The second legitimacy proxy is organisation size, for which there are at least three arguments. 
First, with increasing size the possibility of social control decreases. Second, in large 
organisations there are sufficient accountants to make it possible to comply with disclosure 
requirements. Third, large organisations are closely monitored by the media which increases the 
felt normative pressure on these organisations (Archamdault, 2003; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Hossain, 
2000; Inchausti, 1997; Cooke, 1989a, 1992 and Owusu-Ansah, 1998).   
Some institutional scholars have argued that larger establishments’ greater visibility makes them 
especially anxious to maintain legitimacy (Goodstein, 1994; Ingram and Simons, 1995). This 
also makes them more likely to attract media attention (Ingram and Simons, 1995) and to be held 
to higher standards than smaller establishments would be (Goodstein, 1994). This suggests that 
larger establishments would be particularly sensitive to external pressure to increase disclosure.  
However, despite being visible and therefore liable to greater scrutiny, larger organisations may 
also be in a stronger position to resist and may be less sensitive to pressure to increase 
disclosure. They can accrue power through superior political access and can more easily afford 
to lobby or donate to politicians, or sue regulatory agencies (Drope and Hansen, 2006; Hansen, 
Mitchell and Drope, 2005; Schuler, 1996). Larger organisations may also benefit from greater 
political and social capital, because they provide greater employment opportunities. Due to their 
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size and the opportunities they present they could arguably be able to resist external pressure and 
therefore demonstrate a lower level of disclosure (Grant, Bergesen, and Jones, 2002). 
However, accounting standards can be used as an extra-organisational form of rationality that 
reveals an organisation’s commitment to rational behaviour (Touron, 2005). Therefore, despite 
its ability to resists, an organisation may choose to increase disclosure, in order to gain 
legitimacy for using fashionable business practice, rather than solely for economic benefits 
(Chua and Taylor, 2008; Irvine, 2008; Mir and Rahaman, 2005; Rodriques and Craig, 2007). 
This suggests that, a large organisation could be willing to comply with accounting standards 
disclosure requirements.  
In Nigeria, large corporations make significant contributions to the development of accounting 
standards. They also donate funds and are represented on the board of accounting standard 
setting bodies. These suggest that accounting standards are a products of consensus on 
acceptable business practice. This thesis anticipates that large organisations would increase the 
level of disclosure to demonstrate their commitments and acceptance of these financial reporting 
standards and thus maintain their legitimacy for using acceptable business practice (Suchman, 
1995). This leads to the following hypothesis. 
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between organisation size and the level of 
mandatory disclosure in annual reports of Nigerian listed companies 
5.4.1.2.  Economic efficiency 
Watson et al. (2002) argue that efficiency shows how effectively management utilises the assets 
at their disposal. Such efficiency could be measured by various ratios such as stock turnover, or 
sales per employee. Other efficiency measures are  rate of return,  defined as a ratio of net profit 
to net worth, and earning margin which is defined as a ratio of net profit to net sales (Singhvi and 
Desai, 1971). The rate of return measures the overall performance of a business while earnings 
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margin shows the corporation’s capacity to absorb rising costs, leading to a more stable and 
successful corporation. Furthermore, the higher the earnings margin, the stronger the 
corporation’s position to compete on price (Singhvi and Desai, 1971). 
Furthermore, Deephouse (1996) argues that social actors could see highly performing 
organisation as legitimate, ceteris paribus, given their ability to better utilise acquired resources. 
Similarly, Inchausti (1997) argues that managers of profitable firms will disclose detailed 
information in order to support their personal position and compensation. Furthermore, Ng and 
Koh (1994) argue that more profitable companies will be subject to greater public scrutiny and 
will therefore try to avoid external regulation by voluntary disclosure of a higher level of 
information. However, corporate management may be reluctant to give information on earnings 
or sales breakdown by divisions, particularly when one or more of the divisions are unprofitable 
(Singhvi and Desai, 1971).   
Poorly performing firms may have a negative perception by stakeholders, and such may damage 
the organisation’s legitimacy.  To conceal the poor performance, corporate organisation may 
potentially disclose less information. Nevertheless, firms with poor performance may also 
disclose more information. Studies in impression management (Clatworthy and Jones, 2006) and 
signalling (Ball et al., 2003; Watson et al., 2002) provide evidence to support the idea that 
poorly performing companies disguise poor performance with ‘rhetoric’ and information 
overloads in the annual reports (Adelopo, 2011), or alternatively they may withhold information 
on poor performance altogether (Kothari, Shu and Wysocki, 2009). 
Watson et al. (2002) argue that efficiency is the driver of corporate performance, and this can be 
measured in terms of sales per employee. In Nigeria, rationalisation of workforce is one of the 
strategies to increase performance in the presence of strong market competition (Greenwood et 
al., 2009). However, labour rationalisation would attract pressure from government and labour 
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unions, which suggest that Nigerian corporate organisation, will avoid disclosing information 
that would heighten the pressures from government and labour unions. Therefore, this study 
expects that corporate organisations would reduce the level of mandatory disclosure as it 
increases its efficiency through rationalisation of its workforce. The discussion leads to the 
following hypothesis. 
  H2: There is a significant negative association between efficiency and the level of mandatory 
disclosure in annual reports of Nigerian listed companies 
5.4.2.  Constituents of institutional pressure 
5.4.2.1.  Multiplicity of constituents 
Oliver (1991) argues that passive acquiescence to institutional demands is difficult to achieve 
because acquiescence to one constituent precludes the ability to conform to alternative 
constituents with conflicting expectations. Oliver argues that organisations are likely to attempt 
avoidance strategies in the face of multiple conflicting pressures from constituents. For example, 
an oil company may attempt to conceal the extensiveness of an oil spill to avoid coping with the 
kind of costly clean up that displeases its shareholders but is demanded by the public. In addition 
to incompatible institutional demands, organisations are driven by their own interests to reduce 
the uncertainty, conflict and instability that multiplicity generates (Oliver, 1991).  
Among the multiple constituents of corporate disclosure are investors that demands information 
to evaluate potential returns on their investment and the government that demands information to 
evaluate the potential tax revenue from corporate organisations. On the other hand, the managers 
would want to benefits from reduced cost of capital due to increased information disclosure 
(Botosan, 1997).  Therefore, this thesis argues that corporate managers would assess the benefits 
of increased disclosure vis-a vis the cost of increased disclosure resulting from a higher tax 
(Eilifsen, Knivsfla and Saettem, 1999). For example, Scholes et al. (1990) find that banks in the 
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US are more inclined to take action to reduce taxes when the costs of doing so, in terms of  the 
effects on income reported to shareholders and regulators are relatively small and the potential 
tax benefits are great. This suggests that the need to balance between costs of higher disclosure 
level (arising from higher tax) and the benefits of higher disclosure (arising from lower cost of 
capital) could determine the firm’s optimal disclosure in the presence of multiple institutional 
audiences (Eilifsen et al. 1999). 
Therefore, the disclosure level would be affected by the manager’s assessment of how the 
disclosure might influence investors’ appraisal of the firm’s market value, and hence the firm’s 
cost of capital and the cost of higher disclosure in the form of higher corporate taxation. To 
capture this strategic choice, this study argues that the proportion of taxes, interests and 
dividends paid to turnover would impact disclosure level. This is because the interest and 
dividends paid are measures of cost of capital, while tax is a measure of the cost arising from a 
higher level of information disclosure.  
In Nigeria, the inefficient tax system could allow corporate organisations to avoid higher taxes. 
Corporate managers also determine the dividend policy, which influences the dividend 
payments. In addition, corporate organisations could sell part of their assets to pay off debt 
capital and thus eliminate the monitoring of the company by debt-holders. This discussion leads 
to the following hypothesis. 
H3: There is a significant positive association between the proportion of taxes, dividends 
and interests paid to turnover and the level of mandatory disclosure in annual reports of 
Nigerian listed companies  
5.4.2.2.  Dependence 
Corporate organisations that depend on outside sources for resources are vulnerable to both 
changes in the flow of resources and institutional pressures (Verbruggen, Christianens and Milis, 
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2010). Such organisations are driven to comply with the requirements of strategic resource 
providers.  
Guerreiro et al. (2012) observe that an important source of dependence on external constituents 
is financial dependence on shareholders for equity capital. The authors argue that dependency is 
particularly important for subsidiaries that are controlled financially and economically by parent 
companies. Similarly, Frankel, McNichols and Wilson (1995), Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999), 
and Lang and Lundholm (2000) all found a positive link between external capital raising 
activities and disclosure quantity and quality. In addition, Leuz and Wysocki (2006) found that 
extensive disclosures are observed pre-IPO activities.  
However, an organisation can raise its finance internally. For example, Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
found internal source of financing are considered preferable by a highly performing corporation. 
This implies that these firms do not need to raise equity capital frequently through the capital 
market, and the management of such a corporation could afford to give less attention to higher 
information disclosure (Singhvi and Desai, 1971).   
The perspective of this thesis is that the degree of pressures from resource providers depends on 
the importance and concentration of the resources provided. Therefore, this thesis uses a free 
cash flow (Dechow et al. 1996) to measure the extent to which an organisation could be self-
sufficient before it needs to raise additional funds. These internally generated funds would 
enhance corporate ability to reduce the level of information disclosure in annual reports. 
Therefore, an organisation with more free cash could afford to ignore the pressures from external 
providers of finance for increased information disclosure. This leads to the following hypothesis. 
H4: There is a significant negative association between free cash and the level of 
mandatory disclosure in annual reports of Nigerian listed companies 
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5.4.3.  Content of institutional pressures 
5.4.3.1.  Consistency with a firm’s goals 
Oliver (1991) argues that organisations will be more willing to acquiesce to external pressures 
when these pressures or expectations are compatible with internal goals. She further argues that 
the willingness and ability of organisations to accept and conform to institutional rules or 
expectations may be circumscribed by a lack of consistency with its goals. Since organisational 
goals often serves primarily as a rationale for its existence, managers would seek to influence 
legitimacy by recruiting and co-opting targets who are credible to their constituents, yet who are 
unlikely to demand dramatic changes in organisational activities (Suchman, 1995). This form of 
cooptation becomes a viable strategy when audiences occasionally desire a symbolic response in 
order to further their own cultural or political objectives (Pfeffer, 1981). The cooptation of such 
powerful targets from the institutional constituents will enhance the organisation’s cognitive 
legitimacy and influence legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). 
In Nigeria, one of the cooptation strategies is in form of appointment of representatives of 
powerful shareholders or bondholders to sit on the board. With such cooptation, the organisation 
can afford to reduce the level of mandatory disclosure particularly if such disclosure would have 
a negative impact on the firm’s competitive advantage. The rationale for such a reduction in the 
level of disclosure is that with larger proportion of board shareholding, the board members 
wealth would be affected by the level of information disclosure (Nagar et al., 2003).  However, 
this thesis argues that with a high potential of higher taxation resulting from increased disclosure, 
a potential use of information disclosed by the company’s competitors, and the board members 
having access to private information about the company, the board members will reduce the level 
of information disclosure. This suggests that higher proportion of issued shares owned by board 
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members may ultimately lead to a reduced disclosure level. This discussion leads to the 
following hypothesis. 
H5: There is a significant negative association between board shareholding and the level 
of mandatory disclosure in annual reports of Nigerian listed companies 
5.4.3.2.  Discretionary constraints 
Oliver (1991) argues that the loss of organisational freedom would impact organisational 
compliance. She noted that researchers have emphasised the importance of organisational 
discretion and decision-making autonomy in organisation-environment relations. The need for an 
organisation to retain control over processes and outputs impose a limit on the willingness of 
organisations to conform to institutional requirements. Consequently, as autonomy begins to be 
threatened, an organisation may move to compromise. Potential loss of autonomy will therefore 
explain in part, why organisations engage in ceremonial conformity or why institutional 
constraints may be challenged or attacked.  
This thesis focuses on the relationship between a subsidiary company and its parent company as 
a source of discretionary constraints. Kostova and Roth (2002) argue that subsidiary managers 
hold a belief that a subsidiary depends on the parent company for providing major resources. 
Implied in this notion of dependence is subordination and control. The relative 
power/dependence of an organisation affects its compliance with institutional pressures. The 
more dependent an organisation is on a legitimating actor, the more it will comply with the 
demands of the legitimating constituent (Meyer and Zucker, 1988; Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991; 
Zucker, 1987).  
In the context of corporate financial reporting in Nigeria, a subsidiary company is required by 
law to prepare financial reports. This suggests that while the parent company might require the 
subsidiary to comply with a group manual that would enable the parent to prepare the 
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consolidated financial statements, the subsidiary would also need to comply with the disclosure 
requirements of the institutional environment in which it operates. This situation will result in a 
tension between the subsidiary which needs to comply with the requirements of its immediate 
institutional environment and the parent company that requires compliance with the group’s 
financial manual (Doz and Prahalad, 1984; Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991).  
The foregoing suggests that the subsidiary is inclined to interpret a parent’s mandates as 
coercive, even though the parent might believe in the efficiency of the mandate (Kostova and 
Roth, 2002). Therefore, institutional duality makes the pressures for legitimacy on a subsidiary 
company particularly strong and complex and the subsidiary find it difficult to reconcile these 
two institutional pressures. The needs to satisfy both the demands of the immediate institutional 
environment and the requirements of the parent company would lead to a higher level of 
disclosure by a subsidiary company. This leads to the following hypothesis. 
H6: There is a significant positive association between the level of mandatory disclosure 
by a subsidiary company relative to a non-subsidiary company in Nigeria 
5.4.4.  Control by institutions 
5.4.4.1.  Legal coercion 
Scott (2001) argues that the state’s ability to impose its will upon organisations with sanctions is 
a major regulatory mechanism of control, and one that can induce conformity. Furthermore, prior 
literature suggests that regulatory enforcement action such as administrative or judicial 
proceedings that subject firms to fines, penalties and various forms of injunctive relief may 
enhance compliance (Short and Toffel, 2008). Other forms of enforcement activities such as 
routine monitoring activities and inspections (Magat and Viscusi, 1990; Braithwaite and Makkai, 
1991; Helland, 1998; Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998; Gunningham et al., 2005; Gray and 
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Shadbegian, 2005; Shimshack and Ward, 2005) have also been found to enhance corporate 
compliance.  
Other more aggressive enforcement activity such as citing organisations for violations (Helland, 
1998) and confrontational deterrence measures such as penalties (Gray and Scholz, 1991; 
Gunningham et al., 2005; Gray and Shadbegian, 2005; Medelhoff and Gray, 2005; Shimshack 
and Ward, 2005) have enhanced compliance. Each of these activities encourages compliance by 
raising the potential cost of non-compliance. Frequent inspections also increase the likelihood 
that regulators will discover and penalise violations (Dimento, 1989).  
Furthermore, beyond individual experience, organisations may be influenced by enforcement 
activities that affect other organisations in the broader regulatory community (Short and Toffel, 
2007). For example, the overall stringency of an inspection regime can influence companies’ 
expectations that regulators will detect their violations (Epple and Visscher, 1984; Cohen, 1987; 
Cohen, 2000). Additionally, high-profile enforcement actions against other firms have motivated 
some companies to improve their compliance and monitoring of compliance practices (Thornton 
et al., 2005).  The fines imposed in actions against companies have been shown to significantly 
improve compliance not only within the punished firm, but also at surrounding companies 
(Shimshack and Ward, 2005).  
Although corporate disclosure will reflect the effectiveness of the interaction between the 
features of the financial reporting system (Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2008),  Myddelton (2004, 
p. 59) argues that there is sometimes duplication and contradiction in regulatory requirements, 
which makes enforcement difficult to achieve, as well as creating complexity for corporate 
organisations.  
Furthermore, Donaldson and Dunfee (1994) argue that ‘coercion can invalidate consent’ (p.263), 
and the spirit of self-policing can ‘totally evaporate’ if the law is too oppressive (Harvard Law 
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Review, 2003, p.241). In addition, Simpson (2002) argues that coercion does not create 
compliance among corporate offenders because sanctions may over-punish firms, which could 
result in a backlash from other industry members who may view the law as heavy-handed and 
unfair. Therefore, instead of influencing firms to self-correct their deviant behaviour, coercion 
may drive them to conceal their wrongdoing and avoid detection (Pfarrer et al., 2005). 
This thesis covers three regulatory regimes in Nigeria’s financial reporting environment, and 
refers to them as weak regulatory regimes, semi-strong regulatory regimes and strong regulatory 
regimes. The enforcement activities are more effective during a period of strong regulatory 
regimes. This leads to the following hypothesis 
H7: Disclosure compliance is higher in a period of strong regulatory regimes relative to 
weak regulatory regimes 
5.4.4.2.  Voluntary diffusion 
Oliver (1991) argues that organisations are more likely to accede to the requirements of an 
institutional environment when the environment is highly interconnected. This is consistent with 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) who 
argue that interconnectedness facilitates a voluntary diffusion of norms, values and shared 
information. It is also consistent with DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) argument that a high 
degree of structuration and interconnectedness in an institutional environment promotes 
institutional isomorphism and conformity.  
Furthermore, Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that relational networks serve to elaborate 
collective myths and values, which leads to conformity with institutional elements. The networks 
serve as conduits for social and technical information (Gulati, 1998) and facilitate a diffusion of 
acceptable behaviours (Davis, 1991). Firms can also experience informal pressures through 
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personnel exchange, board interlocks, membership in trade associations and sharing similar 
auditors (Granovetter, 1985). 
Oliver (1991) argues that the lower the degree of organisational interconnectedness in the 
institutional environment the more an organisational defiance and manipulation are likely to 
occur. However, Oliver noted that compromise and avoidance responses (e.g. bargaining, 
buffering) can still occur in a highly interconnected environment because inter-organisational 
linkages involve a loss of control and discretion which managers would want to minimise by 
decoupling internal organisational processes from the influence of external relationships.  
Consistent with Granovetter (1985), who argues that firms can experience informal pressures by 
sharing similar auditors, this thesis argues that audit firms can exercise pressure on corporate 
organisations by referring to their authority to qualify their audit report. Additionally, large audit 
firms are more likely than small audit firms to report mis-statements and errors, and to ensure 
compliance by their clients with statutory and regulatory reporting rules (Ahmed and Nicholls, 
1994). The logic for this argument is as follows: first, larger audit firms invest more than smaller 
firms to maintain their reputation as providers of quality audits. They therefore have a greater 
incentive to report inadequate disclosure by their clients (Lobo and Zhou, 2001). Second, large 
audit firms suffer more in terms of reputation for their failure to detect and report corporate 
misstatement. For example, Jensen (2006) argues that many firms deserted Arthur Anderson in 
the wake of the Enron case when concern arose that investors and users of annual financial 
statements were doubtful of the quality of annual reports audited by Arthur Anderson. Third, 
lager audit firms have a higher exposure to legal liability. Hence, large professional auditors 
could enhance the diffusion of accounting standard practice across firms (Ahmed and Nicholls, 
1994; Raffournier, 1995; Patton and Zelenka, 1997). 
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The foregoing suggests that large firms have greater incentives for ensuring greater compliance. 
Furthermore, corporate organisations would be willing to appoint one of the big four audit firms 
with a view to enhancing the credibility of their annual reports. Additionally, corporate financial 
year end could affect the appointments of audit firms. Since most listed companies’ financial 
year ends in December, the big four arguably have the resources to cope with peak demand, 
whereas, a small audit firm might not.  Therefore, this thesis anticipates that higher disclosure 
would be associated with the big four audit firms. The aforementioned argument leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
H8: There is a significant positive association between the level of mandatory disclosure 
and having been audit by one of the big four audit firms 
5.4.5.  Context of institutional pressures 
5.4.5.1.  Uncertainty 
Several authors argue that uncertainty is a multidimensional construct (Clemens, Bamford and 
Douglas, 2008; Boiral, 2005; Mitchell and Saren, 2006; Pinkse, 2007). Hinnings et al. (2003) 
argue that uncertainty comes from two primary sources: the environment (an exogenous source); 
and the tasks faced by organisational members.  
Milliken (1987) defined uncertainty as consisting of three separate dimensions: state, effect and 
response uncertainty. State uncertainty is the ambiguity that managers perceive in the business 
environment, specifically their lack of understanding regarding changes in the business 
environment. Effect uncertainty is the uncertainty about the implications of a given state of 
events and its likely impact on firms’ abilities to function (Milliken, 1987, p. 137). Response 
uncertainty represents a manager’s inability to evaluate the impact of potential approaches that 
firms could adopt, such as when the management is unable to evaluate the impact of the outcome 
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of a pending event, or the outcome of their response to a threat or unique opportunity provided to 
the organisation (Milliken, 1987, p.137).  
Miller and Shamsie (1999) argue that state uncertainty exists in the general environment while 
effect and response uncertainty occur within the firm. Miller and Shamsie (1999) also argue that 
state uncertainty affects the entire industry while effect and response uncertainty only affects 
individual firms. Huff (1978) argues that in situations of high effect/response uncertainty, 
managers follow existing laws. She further argues that if managers do not have a clear picture of 
how their general environment affects them or how their decisions can translate into 
performance, they choose to follow existing rules of behaviour.  
Furthermore, Mizruchi and Fein (1999) argue that imitating other firms’ behaviour occurs when 
a clear course of action is unavailable. Such uncertainty leads a firm to check competitors’ 
actions and responses (Peteraf and Shanley, 1997). However, Thompson (1967) argues that high 
environmental uncertainty could lead to avoidance strategies as organisations attempt to buffer 
themselves from the vulnerabilities of operating in an unpredictable environment.   
The focus of this study is on effect uncertainty, that is, uncertainty about the effect of 
information disclosure on a firm’s market value. In this regard, Dye (1990) argues that 
uncertainty about investors’ interpretations of corporate disclosure affects managers’ disclosure 
behaviour. Therefore, a manager’s belief about how an investor will interpret private 
information, could influence a decision about disclosure.   
This thesis argues that the extent of uncertainty about investors’ responses to information 
disclosure is captured by the degree of variability in daily return on market share price. 
Consistent with Bushman et al. (2004), Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that the standard 
deviation in market return captures volatility in market return, and that this is used to proxy 
uncertainty. This study anticipates that a standard deviation in daily return on market share price 
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would influence information disclosure. With a higher level of manager’s inability to predict 
how the market would respond to information if disclosed in annual reports, corporate managers 
would tend to withhold the level of information disclosure in their annual reports. This 
discussion leads to the following hypothesis. 
H9: There is a significant negative association between the level of mandatory disclosure 
and standard deviation in return on market share price of Nigerian listed companies 
5.4.5.2.  Interconnectedness 
While formal coercive sanctions are enforced through legal or official means, interconnectedness 
among industry members takes the form of informal operating norms and practices, which may 
induce voluntary compliance (Braithwaite and Fisse, 1983; Innes, 1999).  Therefore, it is 
plausible to suggest that stronger, closer ties among firms could lead to stronger self-policing 
within an industry, which will increase disclosure. This increased disclosure arises when firms 
imitate similar, large, and/or successful firms within their network (Deephouse, 1996; Fligstein, 
1985; Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Haveman, 1993). 
For example, Edelman et al. (1992) found that professionalism and network ties in the legal field 
helped diffuse informal practices regarding firm arbitration procedures into de facto ‘laws of the 
land’, even though no formal laws regarding these procedures had ever been passed. Similarly, 
Rao, Davis and Ward (2000) found that the interrelation of company boards (interlocks) had an 
impact on whether or not a firm left NASDAQ to join the NYSE, irrespective of performance 
implications.   
Different measures could be used to proxy interconnection among firms. This thesis focuses on a 
proxy that could have a direct impact on firm’s disclosure policies and the level of disclosure. 
This thesis argues that non-Nigerian nationals on the board would facilitate the diffusion of 
international best practice in financial reporting. The extent to which this facilitation could be 
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enhanced is measured by the proportion of members of the board of directors who are non-
Nigerian in the respective organisation.  
However, the non-Nigerian national on board may be interested in a symbolic response to 
institutional pressure given that they have an interest to protect (Pfeffer, 1981). For example, the 
non-Nigerian board members may be rent seekers, who would want to avoid higher taxes on 
their holdings. Therefore, these non-Nigerian on board would use their position to facilitate a 
reduction in the level of information disclosure. This discussion leads to the following 
hypothesis. 
H10: There is a significant negative association between the proportion of non-Nigerian 
nationals on boards and the level of mandatory disclosure in annual reports of Nigerian 
listed companies 
5.5.  Hypotheses development based on Greenwood et al. (2011) model 
The hypothesis in this section uses the Greenwood et al. (2011) framework to identify 
organisational and institutional characteristics that could affect corporate disclosure.  
5.5.1.  Complexity of institutional regimes in Nigeria  
This study covers three regulatory regimes in Nigeria; this thesis refers to these as weak 
regulatory regime (2000-2002), semi-strong regulatory regime (2003-2011), and strong 
regulatory regime 2012/13. The weak regime was characterised by a high degree of institutional 
“fragmentation”, the semi-strong regulatory regime is characterised by a “formal structuring” of 
the regulatory environment, and the strong regulatory regime is characterised by 
“centralisation/unification” of the regulatory environment. 
During the weak regulatory regime, several regulatory agencies such as the SEC, NSE, CAC, 
FRC, PENCOM, and the Inland Revenue Service formulate their own rules for financial 
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disclosure. The interests and demands of these institutional agencies regarding the contents of 
financial reporting and disclosure are differentiated which results in a fragmented regulatory 
environment. During semi-strong regulatory regime, the NASB Act 2003 was used as a 
legislative instrument to enforce compliance with the accounting standards issued by the NASB.  
During the strong regulatory regime, the government has established the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) via the FRC Act 2011 and all the hitherto self-regulatory agencies such as 
PENCOM, SEC, NSE, ICAN etc are members of the FRC. In addition, the IFRS was adopted for 
the preparation of corporation financial reports, effective from the period commencing from 1
st
 
January 2012. This situation leads to a “centralisation/unification” of the regulatory environment 
for financial reporting. This “unification” strengthens regulatory enforcement, and therefore, it is 
plausible to suggest that the ability of organisations to exercise discretion in financial disclosure 
will be minimised in during a strong regulatory regime. This discussion leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: Intra-industry variation in the level of mandatory disclosure is lower during period of strong 
regulatory regime relative to a period of weak regulatory regime in Nigeria 
5.5.2.  Organisational field 
Greenwood et al. (2011, p. 334) argue that the nature and extent of institutional complexity 
facing organisations is fundamentally shaped by the structure of the organisational fields (i.e. the 
industry) within which they are located. Two implicit approaches to compare the structure of 
organisational fields are the contrasts between “emerging” and “mature” fields (Wooten and 
Hoffman, 2008; Anand and Peterson, 2000; Child, Lu and Tsai, 2007; DiMaggio, 1991). 
A matured field is characterised by regularised inter-organisational relationships, that is, the 
existence of identifiable patterns of interactions combined with an articulated institutional 
infrastructure (Greenwood et al., 2011). These institutional infrastructures are examined in terms 
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of the roles of “collective actors”, such as professional associations (Greenwood, Suddaby and 
Hinnings, 2002; Lounsbury, 2002; Purdy and Gray, 2009; Washington, 2004), mechanisms of 
enforcement, such as the loss of accreditation and/or withdrawal of legitimacy (Quinn, Trank and 
Washington, 2009; Zuckerman, 1999), and increasing state regulation (Dobbin and Dowd, 
1997). 
Furthermore, a matured field is characteristically more settled, and institutional complexity is 
minimised because tensions between competing logics have been worked out at institutional 
field level. In addition, institutional demands in a matured field are more predictable, relative to 
emerging fields (Dejean, Gond and Leca, 2004; Garud, Jain and Kumaraswamy, 2002; Lawrence 
and Phillips, 2004). Furthermore, the institutional logics in a matured field have been clarified 
and built into regular organisational practice, hence variation in organisational practice due to 
organisational discretion is reduced (Greenwood et al., 2011).  
On the other hand, emerging fields are typically unsettled and have a highly permeable boundary 
that allows actors from other fields to enter with relative ease, bringing with them practices 
rooted in logics from other fields (Maguire et al., 2004). The entrance of actors from other fields 
complicates the balance of interests within an emerging field. Therefore, organisations in 
emerging fields are faced with a high degree of institutional complexity due to a lack of 
consistent and predictable institutional demands.   
In Nigeria, some industries have a long established financial reporting history, such as those in 
the consumer goods industry, while some industries can be classified as emerging organisational 
fields, such as those in the services and healthcare. In addition, due to the economic significance 
of some industries in Nigeria, such as those in the oil and gas and financial services, there have 
been frequent changes in regulation that affects the reporting practices of companies in these 
sectors. This thesis argues that the level of disclosure in long-established industries and highly 
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regulated industries would be different from those of other sectors. This leads to the following 
hypothesis. 
H2: Intra-industry variation in the level of mandatory disclosure differs among industries 
categories in Nigeria 
5.5.3.  Organisation attributes 
5.5.3.1.  Organisation field-level position  
Greenwood et al. (2011) argue that an organisation’s field-level position concerns the location of 
the organisation in its industry or organisational field. The authors defined organisation field-
level position in terms of whether an organisation is located at the “centre” or “periphery”. 
Abbott (1988) associates dominant organisations in the field with those at the centre while 
subordinate firms are those at the periphery.  
Malerba and Orsenigo (1996), Philips and Zukerman (2001) and Podolny (1993) argue that 
organisations at the centre are those that are distinguishable by their visibility, status, resources 
(usually their size) and the media attention they receive. For example, Roberts (2003) and 
Rowley and Berman (2000) argue that social and environmental activists have targeted Nike, 
McDonalds, Starbucks and Home Depot in part  because of their market leadership status. 
Leblebic, Salancik, Copay and King (1991) argue that organisations located at the “periphery”, 
such as small firms, are more motivated to deviate from established practices because they are 
less restricted by institutionalised relationships and expectations. Furthermore, Greenwood et al. 
(2011) argue that for several reasons organisation at the periphery of a field are less likely to 
experience the same intensity of institutional complexity and therefore their responses might 
differ fundamentally from those of centrally located organisations. For example, Ahmadjian and 
Robinson (2001) found that organisations at the centre of their field were most reluctant to 
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abandon the traditional Japanese practice of providing lifelong employment due to the media’s 
perception about this practice. 
From another perspective, Singhvi and Desai (1971) argue that organisation at the periphery 
finds it costly to accumulate detailed information while organisations at the centre have greater 
resources to implement GAAP and are better placed to benefit from reduced costs of preparing 
financial information (Murphy, 1999).  Organisations at the centre are also likely to realise the 
possible benefits of better disclosure, such as easier marketability of securities and greater ease 
of financing (Singhvi and Desai, 1971).  
The perspective of this thesis is that the visibility of an organisation in its field, proxied by its 
size, is an indication of its position in its organisational field. Furthermore, a large company 
would attract political pressure, pressure from regulatory institutions, and pressure from capital 
market participants, which would add to the commitment of organisation to increase disclosure 
as its size increases. The foregoing discussion leads to the following hypothesis. 
 H3: Intra-industry variation in the level of mandatory disclosure in annual reports of Nigerian 
listed companies is positively associated with corporate size. 
5.5.3.2.  Organisation structure 
Institutional pressures ‘enter’ an organisation through the interpretation and meaning given by 
occupants of structural positions (Greenwood and Hinnings, 1996). Since actors “represent” and 
import into an organisation norms of logics to which they have been primarily exposed, the 
presence of multiple intra-organisational communities will not only heighten an organisation’s 
experience of institutional complexity, but also influence its possible response (Greenwood and 
Hinnings, 1996). However, the occupants of structural positions are “quite likely to differ in their 
awareness of, and receptivity to these institutional pressures (Delmas and Toffel, 2008, p.102).  
Furthermore, the degree to which these “representatives” are committed to, and actively 
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advocate, a particular logic can vary (Binder, 2007). In addition, the motivation and capability of 
social referents to enforce their demands vary. Therefore, not all agents police their logics with 
the same insistence and demand for compliance, nor are they able to (Greenwood et al. 2011).  
The perspective of this thesis is the nature of an organisation operations could influenced the 
extent to which the occupants of structural positions can police institutional demands. This thesis 
argues that a labour intensive organisation would likely have strong labour unions that would 
police institutional demands in contrast to a capital intensive organisation.  Labour charges on 
turnover ratio (Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Depoers, 2000) have been used to measure the 
potential for labour pressure on organisational practice. The labour charges on turnover ratio 
suggest that the wage bill is a representative of the intensity of labour pressure in a firm. This 
measure suggests that organisational employees are users of financial reports, and that 
information disclosure could lead to increased pressure from employees to demand higher 
salaries. Therefore, if management assume that information disclosure would motivate a demand 
for higher wages private information may be withheld. 
The perspective of this thesis is that capital intensity is a better proxy for an organisation 
structure. Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) measure capital intensity as the ratio of gross fixed assets 
to turnover, that is, the amount of investment in fixed assets that is required to generate one unit 
value of turnover. This study argues that where substantial investment in fixed assets is required 
to enter an industry, this could be a significant barrier to new entrants to the industry or market 
even when existing companies have earned monopoly profit and made this known through 
increased disclosure (Patelli and Prencipe, 2007). It follows that firms with a high entry barrier 
could increase information disclosure without a potential loss of profit to competitors. 
Furthermore, capital intensity could contribute to the disclosure infrastructure if this is required 
to increase the level of disclosure (Oliver, 1991). In addition, high capital intensity could suggest 
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low labour intensity, which implies that an organisation with high capital intensity would be less 
susceptible to pressure from labour unions that police institutional requirements. Besides, capital 
intensity may suggest that the operations of the organisation are complex, and that the 
organisation potentially have more information to disclose, which increases the level of 
information disclosure.   
However, corporate managers may face difficulties aggregating information arising from the 
complex nature of its operations, and information may be merged when preparing the annual 
reports. This suggests that corporate organisation with high capital intensity may not necessarily 
increase their level of information disclosure.  
The foregoing discussions suggest that the intensity of capital would influence the level of 
disclosure.  Therefore, it is expect that an increase in capital intensity would lead to an increase 
in the level of disclosure. The discussion leads to the following hypothesis. 
H4: There is a significant positive relationship between capital intensity and intra-industry 
variation in the level of mandatory disclosure. 
5.5.3.3.  Organisation governance 
Chung and Luo (2008) and Ocasio (1997) argue that actors who bring their interpretations of 
priorities in their institutional environment and preferable outcomes to the organisation decision 
process influence that organisation’s decisions. Actors (such as employees, management and 
professionals) are “carriers” (Zilber, 2002) and they “represent” and give voice to institutional 
logics (Pache and Santos, 2010). They therefore serve as channels through which institutional 
pressures “enter” an organisation.  
This thesis focus on occupants of corporate governance positions, that is, corporate board 
members. Recent corporate governance literature suggests that CEOs and other top executives 
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are key factors in the determination of corporate practices.  This literature argues that managers 
have their own styles when making strategic decisions, and attempts to imprint their personal 
marks on the company they manage (Business Week, 2001).   
Similarly, Pfeffer (1972) argues that boards of some firms with particular perceived 
characteristics are chosen deliberately to maximise important resources for the firm. For 
example, if some management styles are more performance enhancing than others, better-
governed firms may be more likely to select managers with such styles. In such cases, managers 
do not only impose their idiosyncratic style on the firm they lead, but are purposefully chosen by 
firms because of these specific attributes (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). Furthermore, Bertrand 
and Schoar found that managers who hold an MBA degree appear overall to follow strategies 
that are more aggressive while older generations of CEO appear overall more conservative in 
their decision-making. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, this thesis focuses on the nationality of CEO as peculiar 
characteristics that would influence the level of disclosure. This perspective is consistent with 
Singhvi (1968) who found that Indian companies managed by locals disclosed less information 
than their non-Indian counterparts. This thesis argues that the nationality of CEOs would 
influence the level of mandatory disclosure in the annual reports of Nigerian listed companies.  
Therefore, the proportion of non-Nigerian nationals on board would significantly contribute to 
observed differences in the level of disclosure. This argument is based on the reasoning that non-
Nigerian board members are individuals who has international experience and exposure on the 
best financial reporting practice.  
However, these individuals have their self-interest to protect. For example, they could avoid 
disclosing information that would lead to higher taxes, in such circumstance; increase in the 
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proportion of non-Nigerian board member would lead to a reduction in the level of mandatory 
disclosure.  This discussion leads to the following hypothesis. 
H5: There is a significant negative relationship between the level of mandatory disclosure in the 
annual reports of Nigerian listed companies and the proportion of non-Nigerian nationals on 
boards  
5.5.3.4.  Organisation ownership 
The impact of organisational ownership on the level of disclosure can be evaluated in terms of 
the form of ownership and who owns the organisation (Greenwood et al., 2011).  Based on the 
perspective on who owns the organisation, Goodrick and Salancik (1996) found that public and 
private hospitals differed in their responses to the use of caesarean operations. Similarly, Chung 
and Luo (2008) and Miller et al. (2010) found that strategies and decisions in family-owned and 
managed firms are influenced by “community” norms rather than exclusively by those of the 
market. Furthermore, Lounsbury (2001) found that publicly-funded universities diplomatically 
aligned their responses to the preference of governments from which they received funds.  
The perspective of the form of ownership focus considerable attention on publicly traded 
corporations and the role of the board of directors as conduits through which stakeholder 
interests and their normative preferences are represented (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  
This thesis focuses on the proportion of issued shares owned by board members. This thesis 
argues that board members have an access to private information about their company; therefore, 
there is no incentive to incur additional costs of increasing information disclosure in the 
corporate annual report. However, the personal wealth of these board members could be affected 
by the level of disclosure, as the market could penalise the company for failing to disclose its 
private information when the market perceives that the company has private information, which 
it fails to disclose (Nagar et al., 2003). The need to avoid such market penalty would motivate 
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the board members to disclose their private information. The aforementioned discussion leads to 
the following hypothesis.  
H6: There is a significant positive relationship between the proportion of share ownership by 
directors and intra-industry variation in the level of mandatory disclosure 
5.5.3.5.  Organisation identity 
Identity at the organisational level is an attribute that distinguishes an organisation from others 
that shares the same institutional category (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Whettten, 2006). Identities 
serve as a filter “for interpreting and responding to strategic issues and environmental changes” 
(Glynn, 2008, p. 408); hence, identities shape an organisation’s discretion when confronted with 
a complex institutional environment (Greenwood et al., 2011). It follows therefore, that the more 
an organisation values its identity, the more it shapes how the organisation perceives and 
responds to institutional complexity. Although different empirical measures of organisation 
identity could be used, this study focuses on age, leverage and audit fees. 
5.5.3.5.1.  Age 
Moingeon and Ramanantsoa (1997) argue that while history is instrumental in defining corporate 
identity, identity is instrumental in guiding history. Age as a proxy for organisation identity 
suggests that older organisations have historical antecedents that shape the organisation’s 
behaviour, including disclosure compliance. Similarly, Melewar and Karaosmanoglu (2006) 
argue that stakeholders’ perceptions of organisations are formed over a long period; hence, the 
history of organisational activities such as on information communication could influenced the 
current level of disclosure.  
This study argues that older organisations would have an established culture and norms on 
disclosure. Therefore, external pressure may not lead to an increase level of disclosure since an 
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old organisation may find it difficult to change their disclosure behaviour. However, an older 
organisation may accumulate experience to increase the level of disclosure, therefore, the older 
the organisation, the higher would be the level of disclosure. This discussion leads to the 
following hypothesis. 
H7: There is a significant positive relationship between a firm’s age and intra-industry variation 
in the level of mandatory disclosure 
5.5.3.5.2.  Leverage  
Greenwood et al. (2009, p.9) argue that firms with a high debt ratio tend to sell assets to reduce 
their reliance on loan providers and consequently on external debt financing. This strategy would 
help reduced corporate monitoring by debt-holders, and avoidance strategy becomes a strategic 
alternative (Oliver, 1991). However, organisation with high debt ratio could choose to increase 
information disclosure in order to benefit from lower cost of debt (Fama and Jensen, 1983). This 
suggests that high debt ratio would lead to increased level of disclosure. This leads to the 
following hypothesis. 
H8: There is a significant positive relationship between leverage and intra-industry variation in 
the level of mandatory disclosure 
5.5.3.5.3.  Audit fees 
Another means by which a relevant external agency would distinguish a firm is the credibility of 
the firm’s financial reports.  Richardson (1987) argues that accounting information disclosure 
gains credibility in part through its association with independent professionals. This is because 
professional associations such as accountancy have convinced external parties of their moral and 
ethical superiority and that they set higher moral and ethical standards for themselves than other 
non-professional occupational groups (Kieser, 1989; Randle, 2004a, 2004b).  
P a g e  | 127 
 
However, the status of the individual members of the professional group will determine its 
ability to enhance the credibility of the organisation associated with them. For example, Han 
(1994) argues that firms often use large high-status audit firms because they convey more 
legitimacy than small low-status audit firms, even if the latter have the capacity to handle their 
audits. Status in this context refers to the prestige granted the audit firm because of its position in 
a social structure rather than its observed performance (Gould, 2002; Podolny, 1993).  
Podolny and Phillips (1996) argue that statuses are transferred through exchange relationships. 
From the perspective of financial reporting, the value of this exchange relationship between an 
organisation and the professional audit firm is measured in this thesis by audit fees. This 
suggests that higher audit fees may signal higher credibility of the financial reports.  The 
foregoing discussions suggest that corporate organisations would increase the amount of audit 
fees to enhance the credibility of their financial reports. This leads to the following hypothesis. 
H9: There is a significant positive relationship between audit fees and intra-industry variation in 
the level of mandatory disclosure 
5.6.  Conclusion 
Previous studies have tended to ignore the role of institutions in the process of information 
disclosure. This thesis offers a perspective on the impact of institutions on the level of mandatory 
disclosure.  The discussions recognise the interests of agents, and that these interests are 
moderated by institutional norms in the information disclosure process. The selected predictive 
factors are based on the Oliver (1991) and Greenwood et al. (2011) framework.   
The Oliver framework suggests that organisation disclosure compliance is a strategic response to 
institutional pressures while the Greenwood et al. framework suggests that the degree of an 
organisation’s exposure to institutional complexities varies, resulting in a variation in 
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Chapter Six 
Research strategy and methodology 
6.1.  Introduction 
Researchers have used several methods to investigate the effect of institutions on economic 
outcomes including quasi-experiments, experiments, micro-level surveys of managers’ 
perceptions of institutional constraints in countries where their firms operate, and descriptive 
cluster analyses (Wysocki, 2011). Quasi-experiment studies make a distinction between 
exogenous and endogenous institutions such as a country’s colonial origin (Acemoglu et al., 
2001) or geographic location (Hall and Jones, 1999). Other studies rely on proxy indicators of 
business environment such as the strength of the legal system (La Porta  et al., 1997, 1998), 
regulatory constraints (Djankov et al., 2003b) and governance attributes (Kaufman et al., 1979). 
However, this approach struggles to distinguish observed country-level institutions from sector- 
or region–specific effects on economic outcomes (Wysocki, 2011). In addition, the approach 
suggests that the identified institutional variables affect average economic outcomes and a very 
small number of independent variables can be manipulated in experimental study. These issues 
make them inappropriate for exploratory analysis (Trotman, 1996; Libby et al., 2002; Bonner, 
2008; Libby and Seybert, 2009). 
Furthermore, the direct survey of managers’ opinions on important institutional factors addresses 
the limitations in experimental studies (Commander and Svejnar, 2007). However, survey 
variables are subjective and the measurement errors do correlate with the explanatory variables 
in a regression model (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). In addition, survey responses are only 
valid when the respondents have relevant insight into the phenomenon being investigated (King, 
2002). Additionally, survey studies suffer the limitation of an inability to include control 
variables and there is a limit to the number of variables that can be held constant in a survey. 
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Furthermore, surveys and experimental studies run the risk that participants will not respond in 
the same manner as they would in a natural environment, and this results in various forms of 
response bias (Groves et al., 2004). 
Although the different methods can provide an answer to different parts of a research question 
and triangulation method can provide the strongest basis for valid conclusions. However, 
resource and time constraints limit the use of the triangulation method in this thesis. This study 
uses archival data from corporate annual reports to evaluate the impact of institutions on the 
level of corporate disclosure. Archive methods rely on arms-length statistical analysis of key 
variables and attempt to retrieve meaning by ex post facto interpretations of tests of significance 
(Tomkins and Groves, 1983). This approach assumes that the meanings of variables will be 
‘stable’ and ‘situation-independent’.  
This thesis aims to illuminate the impact of institutional factors on the level of corporate 
disclosure in an historical context, which makes archival method necessary. In addition, archive 
method provides a basis for generalisation, and therefore, supports a potential convergence of 
findings from different institutional contexts. It also provides evidence to support the construct 
validity of the research instrument (Maines and Wahlen, 2006). Additionally, the research 
question addressed in this thesis makes the archive method appropriate. The method also benefits 
from analysis of data that arises from conducting business within a complex institutional 
environment, and therefore indicates the outcome of judgments and decisions made by 
individuals.  
6.2.  Research strategy 
The sample for this study is drawn from 148 listed companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(NSE) at the end of 2013. While it is relatively easy to access firms’ annual reports in developed 
economies, this is not the case in Nigeria. For example, although the NSE report indicated that 
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there were 148 active stocks on the Exchange at the end of 2013 (NSE X-Compliance Report, 
2013), the annual reports submitted by these companies to the stock exchange merely consisted 
of statement of financial position, income statement, cash flow statement, and statement of 
changes in equity. Therefore, these reports are not detailed enough to extract relevant items 
information required for disclosure in accounting standards.  
Consequently, this study explored three alternative sources for data collection. First, the library 
of the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC), however, due to poor record 
management by the SEC some pages have been removed from the available annual reports.  To 
complement the available data from the SEC, a search was made for annual reports on the 
respective companies’ websites. However, only the most recent annual reports for some the 
companies were available. Therefore, this study obtained additional annual reports from African 
Financial website.  
Based on the aforementioned challenges, the sample was based on the availability of annual 
reports from 2000 to 2012. This study focused on the years 2000, 2005 and 2012. The selection 
of these years was influenced by the waves of regulatory reforms in Nigeria that affected 
corporate financial reporting. These include a major programme of privatisation, global financial 
crisis and post-financial crisis, all of which have had significant economic impact, on corporate 
financial reporting.  
The year 2000 was selected because it was the first full year for corporate financial reporting 
after the completion of the second phase of privatisation and commercialisation in Nigeria. The 
privatisation programme suggests that there would have been significant change in corporate 
ownership. Consistent with previous studies, this thesis argues that a change in ownership due to 
privatisation would result in changes in corporate disclosure practice (Abdelsalam and Weetman, 
2007). 
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The year 2005 was selected because it was the first full year to prepare annual reports after the 
Nigerian Accounting Standard Board (NASB) Act 2003, which was signed into law in July 
2003. Since the Act was a legal instrument to enforce compliance with the Nigerian Accounting 
standards, this thesis argues that if the Act had been effective it would have had significant 
impact on the level of disclosure in annual reports of Nigerian listed companies by 2005.  
Nigeria adopted the IFRS/IAS for financial reporting effective from 1
st
 January 2012. Corporate 
organisations whose financial year-ends were in December would prepare the first time IFRS-
based financial reports in December 2012, and those with year-ends in other months would 
prepare theirs in 2013. A dummy variable was used to represent each of these years in the 
empirical analysis.  
The samples 100 firm-years, made up of 57 listed companies. This represents an average of 41% 
of listed companies in the respective industries. This sample size is a fair representation when 
compared with Street, Gray and Bryant (1999, p.13) who sampled 49 firms out of 221 firms, 
representing 22% of their study population. The total number of listed companies on the NSE 
varies from year to year due to newly listed equities and delisted equities. However, this study 
included firms that were listed in the earlier years but have been delisted by the Exchange in 
recent years for their inability to satisfy post-listing requirements, this is to avoid survival bias.  
The NSE had 11 industry classifications on the main board in 2013, these are agriculture, 
conglomerates, construction and real estates, consumer goods, financial services, health care, 
information communication and technology, industrial goods, natural resources, oil and gas and 
services. However, the following industry categories were not included in the sample for this 
study, financial services with 47 listed companies because of the specialised nature of companies 
in this sector. ICT with 7 listed companies because this sector consisted of newly listed 
companies and did not have publicly available annual reports prior to 2005, and natural resources 
with 4 listed companies because this sector consisted of newly listed companies and did not have 
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publicly available annual reports prior to 2005. Table 8 presents the distribution of the number of 
listed companies in each industry and the number of companies sampled in each industry. The 
sample is spread across eight sectors: agriculture, conglomerates, construction and real estates, 
consumer goods, healthcare, industrial goods, oil and gas, and services, and is made up of 36 
percent of the listed firms in year 2000, 49 percent in 2005 and 39 percent in  2012/2013. The list 
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Table 8 Sample distribution by industry categories 
 
  
Year Industry  Active Stocks Available  Percent of   
  Annual Reports Active Stocks  
     With Annual  
     Reports 
 
2000 Agriculture   2  1  50% 
 Conglomerates   6  1  17% 
 Construction/Real Estates  6  0  0% 
 Consumer Goods   16  8  50% 
 Health Care   8  0  0% 
 Industrial Goods   16  6  38% 
 Oil & Gas   7  4  57% 
 Services    10  5  50% 
 Total    71  25  35% 
 
2005 Agriculture   3  2  67% 
 Conglomerates   8  1  13% 
 Construction/Real Estates  6  2  33% 
 Consumer Goods   14  14  100% 
 Health Care   8  4  50% 
 Industrial Goods   24  6  25% 
 Oil & Gas   8  7  88% 
 Services    12  5  42% 
 Total    83  41  49% 
 
2012/13 Agriculture   4  3  75% 
 Conglomerates   6  2  33% 
 Construction/Real Estates  4  2  50% 
 Consumer Goods   18  11  61% 
 Health Care   9  4  44% 
 Industrial Goods   19  3  16% 
 Oil & Gas   8  2  25% 
 Services    19  7  37% 
 Total    87  34  39% 
Total Firm-year sample    100 
 
 
Industry      Sample  Percent of 
Size   Total Sample 
  
Agriculture      6  6% 
Conglomerates      4  4% 
Construction/Real Estates     4  4% 
Consumer Goods      33  33% 
Health Care      8  8% 
Industrial Goods       15  15% 
Oil & Gas       13  13% 
Services       17  17% 
Total Firm-year sample     100  100% 
 
Source: Author’s computation, 2014 
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6.3.  Research method 
6.3.1.  Selection of accounting standards for evaluation 
The goal of this study is to evaluate the impact of institutions on the level of disclosure in the 
annual reports of Nigerian listed companies. Accounting standards that set out the minimum 
disclosure guidelines have been used as the basis for evaluating the level of disclosure. The 
selection of accounting standards was influenced by a consideration of the applicability of 
selected standards to all sampled firms. Consequently, some specialised accounting standards or 
standards that focuses on specific industries are considered not to be appropriate for inclusion in 
the evaluation of the level of disclosure. Therefore, this thesis includes the following Nigerian 
Statements of Accounting Standards (SASs) and the corresponding IFRS/IASs. SAS 1 disclosure 
of accounting policies, SAS 2 information to be disclosed in Financial Statements, SAS 3 
accounting for property, plant and equipment and SAS 21 earnings per share. The corresponding 
IASs/IFRS are IAS 1 presentations of financial statements, IAS16 property, plant and equipment 
and IAS 33 earnings per share. Table 9 summarises the number of items checked in each of the 
standards.  
Table 9 Summary of accounting standards used for computation of disclosure index  
 
GAAP Title       IAS/IFRS  SAS 
        Items    Items  
 Presentation of financial statements/    92   18 
Disclosure of accounting policies (IAS1/SAS1)  
Information to be disclosed in Financial Statement  
(IAS5/SAS2)       NA   87 
Property plant and equipment (IAS16/SAS3)   16   8 
Earnings per share (IAS33/SAS21)    12   7 
Total         120   120 
Source: Author’s computation, 2014 
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Although the Nigeria Accounting Standard Board (NASB) had issued thirty statements of 
accounting standard prior to its replacement by the FRC in 2011 (see appendix 2), not all of the 
standards are included in this study for the following reasons. Eight of the national accounting 
standards are industry-specific standards such as the accounting standards for banks, insurance, 
oil and gas and communication industries. Nine of the standards may be biased in favour of 
specific industry such as accounting standards on lease, investments, segment reporting, 
consolidated financial statements, foreign currency conversion. Two of the standards would not 
make a significant contribution to the computation of disclosure index, these are accounting 
standards on abridged financial statements and on interim financial reporting.  
6.3.2.  Measurement of the level of disclosure  
Cooke (1998) argues that  disclosure is an abstract concept that cannot be measured directly. He 
argues that a suitable proxy such as an index of disclosure can be used to determine the extent of 
information disclosed by a firm. Therefore, this study has used a disclosure index to measure the 
extent of disclosure in corporate annual financial statements or notes to the accounts. Curuk 
(2009) argues that the procedure for the measurement of the extent of disclosure (that is the 
creation of a disclosure index) can be summarised as follows:  
1. Construction of a disclosure-scoring sheet/template 
2. Scoring the disclosure items 
3. Creation of disclosure index 
6.3.2.1.  Construction of disclosure scoring sheet  
Curuk (2009) argues that there is no general theory regarding the number and selection of items 
to be included on a disclosure-scoring sheet, and that the scope of the selection of information 
items usually depends on the focus of the study. This study has used two sets of scoring sheets, 
first, a scoring sheet based on the Nigerian accounting standards and second, a scoring sheet 
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based on IFRS/IAS. The Nigerian standards-based scoring sheet is a self-constructed scoring that 
is comparable to a prior study in Nigeria that used a disclosure-scoring sheet. The IFRS/IAS 
based self-constructed scoring sheet used the Deloitte (2011), PwC (2012) and KPMG (2012) 
IAS/IFRS disclosure checklists as a validation check. This approach is consistent with Al-Akra, 
Eddie and Ali (2010) who validated their self-constructed scoring sheet against the PwC and 
KPMG disclosure templates.  Appendix 3 presents the scoring sheets used in measuring the level 
of disclosure in this study.  
6.3.2.2.  Scoring the disclosure items 
Disclosure index studies adopt self-constructed disclosure indices which can be unweighted or 
weighted and assumed that the extent of disclosure is a sound proxy for disclosure quality 
(Botosan, 1997). Empirical evidence does not clearly show whether unweighted or weighted 
indices are better since prior studies shows non-significant (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987) and 
significant differences emerged in the results of these indices (Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003).  
This thesis uses an unweighted disclosure index for several reasons. First, an unweighted index 
obviates the need for making judgements as to the relative importance of each information item. 
This is because research shows that individuals and even experts have poor insight into their own 
judgement process (Slovic, 1969; Ashton, 1974). Furthermore, an unweighted index permits an 
independent analysis devoid of the perceptions of a particular annual report user group. The 
differential weighting system has several problems, which are documented in the literature (Firer 
and Meth, 1986; Dhaliwal, 1980; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Also, earlier studies demonstrated that 
the equal weighting system is superior to the differential weighting system (Einhorn and 
Hogarth, 1975; Tsalavoutas, 2011) because it avoids the biases of the weighting system. 
The most commonly used approach to computing the index is a modified dichotomous 
procedure, in which an item scores one if it is disclosed zero, if it is not disclosed, and NA if it is 
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not applicable (Curuk, 2009). A similar approach was adopted in this study, in that the contents 
of a company’s annual report are checked against the items on the scoring sheet and coded as 
one (for disclosed), zero (for not disclosed) and NA (for not applicable) depending on whether 
the report contained the item of information which is relevant to the particular company.  
Two potential problems may arise with the computation of a disclosure index. First, many items 
may not be applicable to the reporting enterprise. Second, there is the issue of interpreting a 
company’s non-disclosure of accounting items. Companies may simply not have a particular 
accounting issue or alternatively they may be failing to report their non-compliance with the rule. 
To minimise the impact of these problems, consistent with Cooke (1989) the annual reports were 
thoroughly read before they were scored to ascertain if undisclosed information items were 
indeed inapplicable to the companies. Next, the applicability of any information item was 
confirmed by reviewing preceding and succeeding years’ annual reports, since Nigerian listed 
companies are required to disclose comparative figures for each financial statement item. 
Finally, the applicability of items was determined by logical reasoning (Owusu-Ansah, 2000). 
For example, it is logical to expect a company to disclose its accounting policy for inventory 
valuation if it owns some kind of inventory. 
Similarly, for a paragraph of the accounting standard that requires that accounting policy on 
consolidation should be disclosed, this study first checked whether or not the company prepares 
consolidated financial statements. Where a company does not prepare such statements, then the 
requirement to disclose the policy on consolidation is not applicable. In addition, if the standard 
requires a company to disclose its significant relationship with an ultimate parent or associated 
company, this study first checked the section of the annual report on the distribution of 
shareholding and significant shareholders to establish that the company has an associate or 
subsidiary of another company. This procedure helps to establish whether the requirements to 
disclose the relationship with an associate or parent company are applicable to the company. 
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Having scored the disclosure sheet for each company in the sample for each year, a disclosure 
index was created to measure the extent of disclosure. 
6.3.2.3.  Creation of disclosure index 
The disclosure index is a ratio computed by dividing the total actual score awarded to a company 
by the total maximum score that particular company is expected to earn. In other words, the 
mandatory disclosure index (MDI) for each company is computed as the total number of 
mandatory items disclosed by the company divided by the total number of relevant items of 
mandatory disclosure requirements. The index is defined as follows: 
      
     
   
   
   
                                                                                      
where 
      =  mandatory disclosure index for the    company in year , where   is 2000,  
2005 or 2012/13 
    , =   number of mandatory items that were relevant for the     firm in year  , 
     = 1  if the     (relevant) item is disclosed by the company   in the year  ; 
         if the     (relevant) item is not disclosed.  
Therefore             
According to Tsalavoutas (2011) there are two variants of unweighted disclosure index; the 
Cooke index and the Partial Compliance (PC) index. The Cooke’s index divides the total number 
of mandatory items disclosed by the company by the total number of mandatory disclosure 
requirements. Tsalavoutas (2011) argues that the commonly used Cooke’s method suffers a 
serious limitation due to the difference in the number of disclosure items required for each 
standard. For example table 9 indicates that there is a significant difference in the number of 
items required for disclosure in each of the selected standards, and shows that while the 
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IAS1/SAS1/SAS2 requires a larger number of items to be disclosed other standards such as the 
standards on earnings per share require fewer items. Street and Gray (2001) and Tsalavoutas, 
Evans and Smith (2010) argue that the disclosure compliance index may be substantially biased 
because of these differences in the number of items required for disclosure and the method 
employed for measuring disclosure. Similarly, Al-Shiab (2003, p. 222) argues that standards 
which require more items to be disclosed, or standards with more items included in the index are 
unintentionally and indirectly not treated equally with those that require fewer items to be 
disclosed.   
Based on this, Tsalavoutas (2011) suggests unweighted partial compliance (PC) as an alternative 
method that avoids this problem. The partial compliance index is adjusted for non-applicable 
items in the construction of the disclosure index. Therefore, the partial disclosure index for each 
company is measured by dividing the number of items disclosed by the number of applicable 
items on each accounting standard (Al-Shiab, 2003, p. 223). Consistent with Tsalavoutas (2011) 
this study measured both Cooke index and PC index and tests the difference in these indices with 
a t-test. However, this study focuses on items required for disclosure rather than measurement 
items in the computation of the disclosure level (Street and Gray, 2001).  
6.3.3.  Validity and reliability test of disclosure index 
To ensure that the disclosure index for each company reflects its true disclosure behaviour, this 
study evaluates the validity and reliability of the disclosure index.  
6.3.3.1 Validity of disclosure index 
Carmines and Zeller (1991, p.17) define validity as ‘the extent to which any measuring 
instrument measures what it is intended to measure’. Hassan and Marston (2010) argue that three 
measures of validity exist: criterion validity, content validity and construct validity.  Criterion 
validity is a measure of how well one instrument stacks up against another instrument or 
predictor (Litwin, 1995, p. 37). A correlation between a measured variable and an external 
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variable are used to assess criterion validity. A significantly high correlation between the 
measure and an external criterion suggests that the instrument is a valid measure for the criterion. 
For example, Botosan (1997) measured the correlation between her self-constructed disclosure 
index and each of the Association for Investment and Management Research (AIMR) scores. 
Hope (2003b) compared his own scoring of accounting policy disclosures against the Centre for 
International Financial Analysis Research (CIFAR) for a sample of 21 firms. In addition, he 
compared CIFAR’s overall disclosure scores with various countries’ ‘Best Annual Report 
Awards’ and with Botosan’s 1997 scores. However, criterion validity is not an appropriate 
measure of validity in social science because most social science focuses on theoretical concepts 
for which there are no known criterion for comparison (Carmines and Zeller, 1991). 
Content validity focuses on how well an instrument measures what it is intended to measure, and 
is assessed by seeking subjective judgement from non-experts and/or professionals, hence it can 
be referred to as face validity. However, this type of validity is not sufficient to conclude the 
validity of a measure due to concerns about biases in the perception of individuals on the 
construct being measured (Dhaliwal, 1980). Construct validity is generally used in social science 
studies. Construct validity focuses on the extent to which a measure performs in accordance with 
theoretical expectations. If the measure was consistent with theoretical expectations, then one 
would conclude that the measure of the construct is valid (Carmines and Zeller, 1991, p. 27). In 
addition, a test of construct validity requires a pattern of consistency of findings with prior 
studies. This study uses construct validity to evaluate the validity by evaluating the extent to 
which the model results conform to results of prior disclosure studies. 
6.3.3.2. Reliability of disclosure index 
The reliability of a measure refers to its consistency and the notion consists of external and 
internal reliability (Bryman and Cramer, 1999). External reliability refers to the consistency of a 
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measure over time and is evaluated by administering a test on two occasions to the same group 
of participants. For the construct to be reliable people who scored high on the test initially should 
also score high when retested. The problem with such a procedure is that intervening events 
between the test and the retest may account for any discrepancy between the two sets of results, 
therefore, the use of an external reliability test is not deemed fit for this study. 
Internal reliability is used when an instrument is measuring a single idea on a different scale and 
the aim is to test whether the instrument is internally consistent. One of the procedures for 
estimating internal reliability is the split-half reliability test. In this test, the response to the 
instrument is divided into two groups either randomly or on an odd-even basis. The correlation 
between each half of responses is estimated which could vary between 0 and 1. The nearer the 
result to 1 the more internally reliable is the instrument. Bryman and Cramer (1999) recommend 
a correlation coefficient of at least 0.8. This thesis tests the reliability of the self-created 
disclosure index by randomly splitting the computed disclosure level to two and a correlation 
coefficient was estimated.  The results indicate that there was no significant bias introduced in 
scoring the disclosure for each company, which suggests that the disclosure index for each 
company is reliable. 
6.4.  Data measurement and analysis 
This study uses both descriptive, univariate and multivariate analysis to provide answer to the 
research questions. The descriptive statistics are various measures of central tendency such as the 
mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and minimum. The univariate analysis is a paired-
samples t-test and a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test for disclosure indices. Due to the 
unequal number of samples in each year, the SAS PROC GLM is used to evaluate differences in 
the level of disclosure by companies, by years and by type accounting standards. Since the 
computed F statistic in the analysis of variance does not tell how the means differ, this thesis 
performs post hoc tests on the computed level of disclosure. The multivariate regression model is 
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used to evaluate the relationship between the proxies for institutional antecedents and the level of 
disclosure.  
6.4.1.  Measurement of the dimensions of the Oliver’s (1991) framework 
The Oliver (1991) framework is used to identify organisation characteristics that could influence 
the level of disclosure in corporate annual reports. Table 10 presents the summary of the 
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Table 10 Measures of the dimensions of the Oliver’s (1991) framework 
  
Institutional  
Antecedents Dimensions  Variables   Empirical Measure 
 
Cause  Social fitness/  Size    Natural logarithm of turnover 
Legitimacy    
  Economic efficiency Sales per employees Ratio of turnover to employees size 
        
Constituents Multiplicity of constituents Taxes, interest    Proportion of taxes, interest and dividend  
     and dividend paid  paid to turnover 
Dependence Free cash   *Dechow, et al. (1996) Ex  
Ante measure of the demand for external 
financing 
Content  Consistency with   Board shareholding  Natural log of percent of board holding 
Firm’s goals  
Discretionary Constraints Subsidiary company  Dummy variable if company is a subsidiary 
   
Control  Legal coercion  Regulatory regimes  Regulatory periods are divided 
    into three regulatory phases 
   weak regulatory regime (2000),  
   semi-strong regulatory regime 
(2005) and strong regulatory regime (2012/13) A 
dummy variable 1 is assigned to periods 
corresponding to the respective regulatory 
regime, 0 otherwise 
Voluntary diffusion Big 4 audit   dummy variable 1 if a company is audited by  
one of the big four audit firms, 0 otherwise (The 
big four are KPMG, Deloitte, PwC, Ernst 
&Young) 
Context  Uncertainty  Standard deviation   Standard deviation of daily return on 
of returns on daily   market share price market share over 
   each of the company's financial 
year period 
  Interconnectedness  Proportion of non-nationals Number of non-national on board to  
on board   board size 
    
*Consistent with Dechow et al. (1996) Ex Ante measure of the demand for external financing is 
measured as follows: 
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Free cash = Cash from Operations + Cash from Financing= Dividends Paid +Interest Paid + Capital Investment -
Cash from Financing= Cash from operations – (Dividend +Interest + Capital 
Investment) 
       
                     
     
                                                                                                   
where:      =  current assets in previous period.  
It is assumed that current assets are readily convertible into cash and represent the stock of funds 
available for the firm. When FreeC is negative, the absolute value of the ration (       ) 
provides an indication of the number of years that the firm can continue its current level of 
operating and investment activities from internally generated funds.  
This thesis uses four models to examine the association between the level of disclosure and firm-
level institutional factors. The functional relationship is defined as follows: 
                                                           
                                                           
                                                                         
where  
      =   Cooke, PC, Cooke’s log odds and PC log odds index 
Consistent with prior studies, this thesis analysed the regression models for four dependent 
variables: the Cooke index, partial compliance index, and the logarithms of the odds ratio of 
these indices (Akhtaruddin 2005; Ali et al., 2004; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; Tsalavoutas, 
2011; Hodgdon et al., 2009; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007). This approach allows for the 
comparison of the results of the regression models (Leventis, 2001). 
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One of the main assumptions of the classical linear regression model is that the independent 
variables do not correlate with each other. This study checked for multi-collinearity with a 
variance inflation factor (VIF) < 10 as a threshold (Gujarati, 2003, p. 62). This study also tested 
for the presence of multi-collinearity in the independent variables with a correlation matrix.   
A problem of heteroskedasticity can arise in regression analysis because of the presence of 
outliers (Gujarati, 2003, p. 390). Outliers is a common problem in cross-sectional data and the 
presence of outliers in either the dependent or independent variables can contaminate the results 
of the coefficient estimates. The estimates break down when they take on values arbitrarily 
which are far from the true value, were the data not contaminated by an outlier. Although there 
are circumstances, in which data can be justifiably winsorised that is, removed from the dataset. 
However, unusual observations are not necessarily bad observation, it is reasonable that such 
data is not disregard in the analysis.  
In a situation when outlying observations that could ruin the least square estimate cannot be 
removed with justifications and such outlying data cannot necessarily be spotted, robust 
regression techniques are required. Robust regression aims to fit a model that describes the 
majority of a sample (Rousseeuw and Leroy, 1987). Robustness is achieved by giving the data 
different weights within the calculation of the estimates, so that outlying data have a relatively 
smaller influence on the regression estimator (Draper and Smith, 1998). 
An ‘S’ estimation was introduced by Rousseeuw and Yohai (1984) to measure the fraction of an 
estimator that has been contaminated and causes the estimates to take on an arbitrary value. This 
study uses the ‘M’ estimation technique introduced by Huber (1973) and the ‘‘MM’’ estimation 
technique introduced by Yohai (1987) to correct for outliers. The ‘M’ estimation technique is 
used extensively in data analysis when one assumes that contamination is mainly in the response 
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or dependent variable. The ‘MM’ estimation corrects for outliers in both the dependent and 
independent variables. The ‘MM’ estimation produces a higher statistical efficiency.  
Furthermore, the disclosure scores are not normally distributed, which violates a major 
assumption of the classical OLS regression. To mitigate this problem, this study transformed the 
disclosure index by computing a log of the odds ratio of the disclosure index which are used for 
the regression analysis. Consistent with Tsalavoutas (2011), Al-Shammari et al. (2008) and Al-
Shiab (2003), the log of the odds ratio is computed as follows: 
      
 
   
                                                                                     
where   is the transformed level of compliance and    is the ratio of companies’ disclosure. 
These are compute for the PC method and Cooke’s index. The use of log of the odd ratio  is 
consistent with Cooke (1998, p. 211) who argues that since the disclosure index is a metric ratio, 
it is legitimate to transform it when used in a regression analysis. This approach also avoids the 
production of less powerful results (Leventis, 2001). 
6.4.2.  Measurement of the dimensions of the Greenwood et al.’s (2011) framework 
This study builds on Deephouse’s (1999) articulation of firm level strategic conformity to 
institutionalised practices to measure intra-industry variation in the level of disclosure. 
Deephouse (1999, p. 152) argues that individual firms can be different to some degree from 
others and still maintain legitimacy, provided the firm selects strategies within the range of 
acceptability. This is based on the argument that members of an organisational field are 
indifferent to certain amounts of differentiation (Suchman, 1995; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). 
The implication is that the level of disclosure for a particular firm may be different from the 
average level of disclosure in its organisational field (industry). Therefore, consistent with 
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Deephouse (1999) and Finkelstein and Hambrich (1990), this study computes a strategic 
deviation in the level of disclosure, which is measured as follows: 
 
    
          
   
                                                                                                               
 
where 
     =  the standardised frequency of items disclosed by focal firm in year   
    =  the frequencies of items disclosed by focal firm in year   
       =  the mean of the frequencies of items disclosed by all sample firms in year   
    =  the standard deviation of the frequencies of items disclosed by all sample firms in year   
This thesis argues that investors would base their decisions on the number of items of 
information disclosed in annual reports. In addition, an investor will be influenced by differences 
in items disclosed in the annual report.  Furthermore, most investors in Nigeria are not fully 
knowledgeable about the overall items required for disclosure by relevant accounting standards 
and therefore would not seek to use them as a denominator to calculate a disclosure index. To 
explain the determinants of variation in disclosure, this study uses the Greenwood et al. (2011) 
framework to identify factors that would explain intra-industry variation in the level of 
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Table 11 Measures of dimensions of the Greenwood et al. (2011) framework  
 
Conceptual Framework   Dimensions   Empirical measures 
  
Institutional complexity Waves of regulatory regimes Fragmentation: dummy variable 1, for period  
2000, 0 otherwise 
Formal Structure: dummy variable 1, for period  
2005, 0 otherwise 
Centralisation: dummy variable 1 for period     
2012/13, 0 otherwise  
                                                                                                        
 
Organisational field  Industry dummy  Dummy variable 1 for each of the following  




Consumer goods  
Industrial goods  




Organisation Attributes Organisation field position  Natural logarithm turnover 
 
Organisation structure Capital intensity 
 
Organisation ownership Proportion of board shareholding 
 
Organisation governance Proportion of non-Nigerian nationals on board 
 
Organisation identities Age since established 
 
 Proportion of total assets financed by debt 
 
 Audit fees 
 
Source: Author, 2014 
The functional form of the relationship between variation in the level of disclosure and the 
predictor variables is stated as follows:  
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where:       =  Standardised frequency of mandatory items disclosed by focal firm for 
each year.  
Equation (6) has two types of dummy variables, one for the group effects (industry dummies) 
and the other for time effects (regulatory regimes dummies). Therefore, this thesis estimates a 
two-way fixed-effect model. The two-way fixed model explores the fixed effects of industry 
variables and the time (regulatory regimes variables). The functional form of the two-way fixed-
effect model is stated as follows: 
                                                                                                                          
Where   is the intercept 
   =  dummy coefficient for industry   
   =  dummy coefficient for regulatory regime time period 
  =  slopes for other variables in the model 
    =  error term 
Consistent with Park (2009), the functional form for estimating the dummy coefficients for the 
industry and time variables are stated as follows: For industry group dummy: 
  
                                                                                     
For time dummy 
  
                                                                                       
where 
    =  dependent variable (DV) mean of group   
    =  dependent variable (DV) mean at time   
    =   mean of independent variables (IVs) of group   
     =   mean of independent variables (IV) at time   
    =  overall mean of the dependent variables 
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    =  overall mean of the independent variables 
The time effect (regulatory regime dummy) reflects the overall deviations in disclosure caused 
by trends in overall corporate disclosure. The industry dummy reflects time-invariant influences 
of industry sector on the change in disclosure in that sector. According to Park (2009), it is 
expected that the slopes of the non dummy variables should remain constant.  Park (2009, p.52) 
proposes five strategies to estimate the parameters of the two-way fixed effect model. This thesis 
uses two of these strategies. The first strategy dropped one dummy from each category of the 
dummy variables and used the dropped dummy as a reference category. The second strategy 
includes all dummy variables and imposed restrictions on the cross-section and time-series 
dummy parameters. The restriction is state in functional form: 
       and      .  
The approach that drops one dummy variable from each category helps avoids the problem of 
perfect colinearity and of heteroscedasticity. The estimated coefficients of dummy variables are 
interpreted as the difference between the variation in the reference category and that of the 
estimated dummy.  
The second approach imposed a restriction on the dummy variables. The estimated coefficient of 
dummy variables in this second approach is interpreted as deviations from the overall average 
change in dependent variable. The sign of the deviation can be either positive or negative. A 
positive sign indicates divergence that is, the sector’s and time’s average disclosure is higher 
than the average overall disclosure level. A negative sign indicates convergence that is, the 
sector’s and time’s average disclosure is lower than the average overall disclosure level, 
suggesting that firms in the sector  need to increase their disclosure level to reach average 
disclosure level for all sampled firms.  
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6.4.3 Poolability test for panel data regression models 
In the fixed effect model, it is expected that the coefficients of the slope variables and constant 
should remain the same irrespective of the strategy used to estimate the model.  According to 
Park (2009, p. 21), poolability tests whether or not slopes are the same across groups or over 
time. Thus, the null hypothesis of the poolability test is          . This test uses the   
statistic, 
      
               
         
       
 
         
             
                                            
where 
   =   number of industry 
  =   number of time periods 
     =  number of observations 
  =   number of regressors excluding dummy variables 
       regression model including the intercept 
             = SSE of pooled OLS  
           =  SSE of the OLS regression for the industry (group)   dummy variable 
The robust model drops a dummy from each category while the efficient model includes all 
dummies but imposes a restriction. If the null hypothesis for the F-test is reject, the panel data is 
not poolable which suggests that the model with the restriction is better than the one with the 
dropped dummy variable. This study uses SAS
®
 for the entire analysis with the syntax and codes 
for the analysis being based on relevant SAS documentation.  
6.5.  Conclusion 
Although different research methods have been used to study the level of disclosure in corporate 
annual reports, this thesis presents an argument in favour of archival research. The chapter gives 
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detailed explanations of the procedure for computing the level of disclosure. The approach and 
strategy adopted to provide answers to the research questions were discussed. The next chapter 
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Chapter Seven 
Firm-level institutional determinants of mandatory disclosure  
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents empirical evidence on the level of disclosure and the impact of institutional 
factors on the level of mandatory disclosure in the annual reports of Nigerian listed companies. 
This thesis draws on prior literature (Tsalavoutas, 2011; Al-Shiab, 2003; Tsalavoutas et al. 2010) 
to estimate four types of level of disclosure. These are Cooke’s index, Partial Compliance (PC) 
index and the odds of the logarithms of these indices. This study also computes the level of 
disclosure for each accounting standard. The second section of this chapter presents the results 
on the level of mandatory disclosure and the differences in disclosure levels. The second section 
of this chapter presents the multivariate results on the impact of institutional factors on the level 
of mandatory disclosure.  
7.2. The level of mandatory disclosure in annual reports of Nigerian listed companies 
Table 12 presents the descriptive statistics for the level of mandatory disclosure for the years 
selected for this study. Table 12 shows that the level of mandatory disclosure was in the range of 
26% (minimum disclosure level) to 65% maximum disclosure level for 2000, 32% to 73% in 
2005 and 56% to 95% in 2012. The mean shows a generally increasing trend in the level of 
disclosure over the selected years. This suggests that over the selected years, the sampled 
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Table 12  Descriptive statistics of the level of mandatory disclosure 
 
                                             Accounting                                             Accounting 
                                                                                      Information          PPE&eps       Information  
                     CookeIndex                 PCIndex            CookeIndex          CookeIndex             PCIndex 
 2000   2005   2012  2000   2005   2012 2000   2005   2012 2000   2005   2012  2000   2005   2012 
 n=23   n=43   n=34  n=23   n=43  n=34  n=23  n=43  n=34  n=23  n=43  n=34  n=23   n=43   n=34 
 
Mean   42       49       75    46       46       77    41       46       80      44      57       59       46        53      82 
Stddev    12        10      8    11       11        8    13        11       9       16      15       10     13 11      8 
Max     65       73     94     65       73       94     73 73     100     82     95        82      73 88     100 
Min     26        32     56     30 31      56      19 31      56     23     32         39       22 31      56 
Source: Author’s computation 
The standard deviation shows a decreasing rate of variability in the level of mandatory disclosure 
by the sampled companies. In addition, an increase in the maximum levels of disclosure was 
observed in the year 2012, which was the first year of mandatory IFRS adoption in Nigeria. This 
result is consistent with prior disclosure studies, which suggest that IFRS adoption leads to 
increased disclosure (Curuk, 2009; Abdelsalam and Weetman, 2007). One possible reason for 
the increased disclosure is that corporate managers wanted to demonstrate that the previous 
year’s disclosure was low, not because of their inefficiency but because Nigerian GAAP was of 
poor quality and that, the previous accounting regime did not allow a higher level of disclosure 
to be made in the financial statements (Tsalavoutas, 2011). However, the substantial increase in 
the level of disclosure may trigger the suspicion of shareholders that the improved disclosure is a 
result of a ‘transitional big bath’ leading to a misleading perception about corporate transparency 
in Nigeria (Inchausti, 1997). The consequence would be inappropriate adjustment of stock price 
of listed equities. 
Table 13 shows the computed mandatory disclosure level in the annual reports of the sampled 
companies. This thesis sampled 23 firm year in 2000, 43 in 2005 and 34 in 2012. The template 
for the computation of the level of mandatory disclosure in 2000 and 2005 was based on the 
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Nigerian national accounting standards. The template for year 2012 was based on International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and International Accounting Standards.  
Table 13 reports the percentage levels of mandatory disclosure computed on the Cooke index. 
Consistent with past studies (Curuk, 2009, Abdelsalam and Weetman, 2007), the results in table 
13 indicate that the level of disclosure requirements generally improve over time, with increasing 
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Table 13  Level of mandatory disclosure in annual reports of Nigerian listed companies 
                             CookeIndex              PCIndex   
S/N Company 2000 2005 2012 2000 2005 2012 
1 UACN  65 73 84 65 71 84 
2 WAPCO  64 67 76 64 73 76 
3 PZ  57 56 81 65 56 81 
4 NBC  57 57 nc 57 54 nc 
5 BETAGLASS 56 nc nc 63 nc nc 
6 FLOURMILL 51 56 92 51 51 92 
7 CAP  49 53 72 56 46 75 
8 OANDO  48 70 94 55 73 94 
9 RTBRISCOE 42 42 80 42 39 80 
10 NESTLE  42 53 76 42 46 79 
11 BCC  42 46 nc 48 37 nc 
12 ASHAKACEM 37 33 nc 42 31 nc 
13 NIWICABLE 36 nc nc 41 nc nc 
14 OKOMUOIL 35 33 63 39 32 66 
15 DUNLOP_DNTR 35 47 nc 35 41 nc 
16 NB  35 46 84 39 37 88 
17 CONOIL  35 49 nc 39 46 nc 
18 7UP  33 47 72 38 37 75 
19 VONOPRODUCT 33 42 nc 38 34 nc 
20 CHEVRON_MRS 33 41 nc 38 36 nc 
21 ACADEMY 28 48 56 32 41 56 
22 TOTAL  28 38 nc 32 41 nc 
23 UPL  26 nc 75 30 nc 78 
24 PRESCO  nc 37 60 nc 37 63 
25 LIVESTOCK nc nc 68 nc nc 71 
26 STUDPRESS nc 44 nc nc 37 nc 
27 TRANSEXPR nc 49 nc nc 51 nc 
28 AIRSERVICE nc nc 74 nc nc 74 
29 ABCTRANS nc nc 81 nc nc 81 
30 REDSTAREX nc nc 78 nc nc 78 
31 NAHCO  nc 60 74 nc 64 74 
32 GUINNESS nc 51 77 nc 42 80 
33 CHAMPION nc nc 61 nc nc 64 
34 DNMEYER nc 41 nc nc 36 nc 
35 UNILEVER nc 68 73 nc 58 76 
36 CADBURY nc 32 nc nc 31 nc 
37 NNFM  nc 44 nc nc 42 nc 
38 UTC  nc 41 nc nc 44 nc 
39 DANGSUGAR nc nc 74 nc nc 77 
40 HONYFLOUR nc nc 66 nc nc 69 
41 NASCON nc nc 72 nc nc 75 
42 ENAMELWA nc 41 nc nc 44 nc 
43 UACN_PropDev nc 56 79 nc 53 79 
44 JBERGER nc 43 85 nc 42 85 
45 COSTAIN nc 58 nc nc 54 nc 
46 NIGROPES nc 42 nc nc 42 nc 
47 DANGCEM nc nc 78 nc nc 78 
48 BERGER nc 51 nc nc 47 nc 
49 TRANSCORP nc nc 77 nc nc 77 
50 GLAXOSMITH nc 53 77 nc 54 77 
51 MAYBAKER nc 51 76 nc 47 76 
52 FIDSON  nc nc 74 nc nc 77 
53 NEIMETH nc 51 nc nc 47 nc 
54 PHARMDEKO nc 46 64 nc 42 67 
55 MOBIL  nc 44 nc nc 49 nc 
56 AP_Forte  nc 48 78 nc 39 78 
57 BOCGAS nc 56 nc nc 53 nc 
 
Source: Author’s computation, Note: nc*= not computed due to non-availability of annual reports 
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The results in table 13 show substantial variations in the levels of mandatory disclosure among 
the sampled companies ranging from 94% for Oando in 2012 to 26% in 2000 for UPL. The level 
of compliance in 2000 suggests that ineffective enforcement of disclosure regulations, coupled 
with financial and human resources constraints to implement disclosure requirements have 
contributed to the observed low-level disclosure.  
Furthermore, the results show an increase in the overall average level of disclosure in 2005 
relative to 2000. Table 13 shows that companies with increased level of mandatory disclosure in 
2005 included UACN, WAPCO, Flour Mills, Oando, Nestlé and Chevron/MRS oil. However, 
despite the NASB Act 2003, which was then the legal instrument to enforce compliance, some of 
the sampled companies had a marginal decrease in the level of disclosure. Among these 
companies are Ashaka Cement Company and Okomu oil.  In addition, table 13 shows a 
significant increase in the level of mandatory disclosure in 2012. This was the first year of IFRS 
adoption in Nigeria; the result suggests that the IFRS disclosure requirements permits increased 
disclosure relative to the Nigerian national accounting standards.  
To ascertain the financial reporting standards that contribute most to the degree of variations 
observed in the average levels of disclosure, table 14 reports the level of disclosure for each 
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Table14  Level of mandatory disclosure based on selected accounting standards 
             Accounting                                                                            Accounting 
            Information                                PPE& eps                            Information 
                                                         Cooke Index                              Cooke Index                         PC Index   
S/N Company 2000 2005 2012 2000 2005 2012 2000 2005 2012 
1 WAPCO  73 73 82 41 50 57 73 73 82 
2 UACN  68 71 86 59 77 79 68 71 86 
3 NBC  58 54 nc 55 64 nc 58 54 nc 
4 PZ  56 56 90 59 55 54 67 56 90 
5 OANDO  49 73 100 45 64 75 59 88 100 
6 RTBRISCOE 46 39 86 32 50 61 46 47 86 
7 FLOURMILL 46 51 99 64 68 71 46 61 99 
8 BETAGLASS 46 nc nc 82 nc nc 55 nc nc 
9 BCC  44 37 nc 36 68 nc 53 45 nc 
10 CAP  42 46 78 68 73 54 51 55 83 
11 OKOMUOIL 39 32 71 23 36 39 47 43 76 
12 ASHAKACEM 39 31 nc 32 41 nc 47 37 nc 
13 DUNLOP_DNTR 37 41 nc 27 64 nc 37 41 nc 
14 NB  37 37 85 27 68 82 45 45 90 
15 VONOPRODUCT 36 34 nc 27 64 nc 43 41 nc 
16 NESTLE  34 46 80 64 73 61 34 55 85 
17 CONOIL  34 46 nc 36 59 nc 41 55 nc 
18 CHEVRON_MRS 34 36 nc 32 55 nc 41 43 nc 
19 7UP  31 37 77 41 73 57 37 45 82 
20 NIWICABLE 29 nc nc 55 nc nc 35 nc nc 
21 TOTAL  27 41 nc 32 32 nc 33 49 nc 
22 UPL  25 nc 79 27 nc 61 31 nc 84 
23 ACADEMY 19 41 56 55 68 54 22 49 56 
24 PRESCO  nc 37 67 nc 36 39 nc 45 71 
25 LIVESTOCK nc nc 72 nc nc 54 nc nc 77 
26 STUDPRESS nc 37 nc nc 64 nc nc 37 nc 
27 TRANSEXPR nc 51 nc nc 45 nc nc 61 nc 
28 AIRSERVICE nc nc 80 nc nc 54 nc nc 80 
29 ABCTRANS nc nc 85 nc nc 68 nc nc 85 
30 REDSTAREX nc nc 84 nc nc 61 nc nc 84 
31 NAHCO  nc 64 79 nc 50 57 nc 78 79 
32 GUINNESS nc 42 79 nc 73 68 nc 51 84 
33 CHAMPION nc nc 67 nc nc 43 nc nc 71 
34 DNMEYER nc 36 nc nc 55 nc nc 43 nc 
35 UNILEVER nc 58 78 nc 95 57 nc 69 83 
36 CADBURY nc 31 nc nc 36 nc nc 31 nc 
37 NNFM  nc 42 nc nc 50 nc nc 51 nc 
38 UTC  nc 44 nc nc 32 nc nc 53 nc 
39 DANGSUGAR nc nc 78 nc nc 61 nc nc 83 
40 HONYFLOUR nc nc 70 nc nc 54 nc nc 74 
41 NASCON nc nc 76 nc nc 61 nc nc 80 
42 ENAMELWA nc 44 nc nc 32 nc nc 53 nc 
43 UACN_PropDev nc 53 85 nc 64 61 nc 53 85 
44 JBERGER nc 42 90 nc 45 71 nc 51 90 
45 COSTAIN nc 54 nc nc 68 nc nc 65 nc 
46 NIGROPES nc 42 nc nc 41 nc nc 51 nc 
47 DANGCEM nc nc 84 nc nc 61 nc nc 84 
48 BERGER nc 47 nc nc 59 nc nc 47 nc 
49 TRANSCORP nc nc 83 nc nc 57 nc nc 83 
50 GLAXOSMITH nc 54 83 nc 50 61 nc 54 83 
51 MAYBAKER nc 47 82 nc 59 57 nc 57 82 
52 FIDSON  nc nc 80 nc nc 54 nc nc 85 
53 NEIMETH nc 47 nc nc 59 nc nc 57 nc 
54 PHARMDEKO nc 42 72 nc 55 39 nc 51 77 
55 MOBIL  nc 49 nc nc 32 nc nc 59 nc 
56 AP_Forte  nc 39 86 nc 73 54 nc 47 86 
57 BOCGAS nc 53 nc nc 64 nc nc 63 nc 
 
Source: Author’s computation, Note: nc*= not computed due to non availability of annual reports 
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The results in table 14 show that there is substantial variation in the levels of disclosure on each 
of the accounting standards. The level of disclosure ranges from 100% in 2012 (perfect 
disclosure) in the case of accounting standards on information to be disclosed in financial 
statements, to 19% in 2000 (very low) for the same accounting standard. For example, Oando plc 
had 100% disclosure level in 2012 but had about 50% disclosure level in 2000 on similar 
accounting standards. This suggests that this company might indicate to the users of annual 
reports that the level of disclosure in previous years was low, because the requirements of the 
then accounting standards did not permit increased disclosure, or that the regulatory regime was 
very weak.  
Furthermore, table 14 shows the level of mandatory disclosure on individual accounting 
standards for the sampled companies, and for each year. The level of disclosure varied in the 
annual reports of the sampled companies. Several examples of this variation are restrictions on 
dividends distribution, contingent assets, amount of post balance sheet events, deferred tax on 
revalued property plant and equipment, actuarial gains or loss on employees’ pensions, the effect 
of reclassified assets on depreciation provisions, diluted earnings per share before extra-ordinary 
items, and effect of policy change on diluted earnings per share. Additionally, variations exist for 
revised amounts on provision for contingent liability and assets, discount amount on provision 
for contingent liability and assets, the timing of outflow on provision for contingent liability and 
assets, and probable inflow from provision for contingent liability and assets. In addition, 
changed segments in segment reporting, reasons for changes in segment and the effect of such 
changes, write off on quoted investment, and reasons for not writing off the value of quoted 
investment. Furthermore, director opinions on the market value and cost of quoted investment, 
restriction on the title of assets, amount secured on liabilities, errors due to incorrect account 
estimates, accounting policy on diluted earnings per share, accounting policy on segment 
reporting and the terms of loans to related party were not consistently reported.  
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However, the sampled companies consistently disclosed some items of information. For 
example, cash and bank balances, auditor remuneration, director remuneration, taxes on income, 
net income or loss, basis for property plant and equipment, year addition to property plant and 
equipment, and year disposal from property plant and equipment. In addition, book value of 
property plant and equipment by category, closing value of inventory, depreciation policy, taxes 
on reported income, and cash flow statement items were all consistently disclosed. This suggests 
that Nigerian firms commonly disclosed items that may be of common interest to the users of 
annual reports, but failed to disclose items, which may not be familiar to uninformed users.  
Overall, the main evidence that emerges from examining the level of disclosure for the sampled 
companies is that, despite the adoption of IFRS for financial reporting in Nigeria, the level of 
disclosure among Nigerian listed companies varies substantially. This result demonstrates that a 
high degree of heterogeneity exists when it comes to the importance that Nigerian companies 
attach to accounting standards disclosure requirements.  
Table 15 provides further statistical evidence on the sources of variation in the level of 
disclosure. Table 15 shows an F value of 58.46 and p value of <.0001 and this result indicates 
that a significance difference exists in the level of disclosure. By comparing the average level of 
disclosure for each year, the results shows that the level of disclosure was not significantly 
different in 2000 but was significantly different in 2005 and 2012. This provides the basis for 
rejecting the first hypothesis, that is, H1: There is no significant difference in the level of 
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Table 15  Analysis of variance in the level of disclosure 
 
The ANOVA GLM procedure for level of disclosure    
Mean RMSE  Coeff Var R-Square   F Value   Pr > F  
  
Overall difference 57.02 10.99 19.27  0.63  58.46 <.0001  
Sources of Difference      
Indices          5.83 0.00 
Year               341.85  <.0001 
Indices*Year          13.93 <.0001 
Companies_Yr2000       8.96 <.0001 
Companies_Yr2005       7.84  <.0001 
Companies_ Yr2012        5.81  <.0001 
Year Effect 2000   43.93 13.17 29.98  0.02  0.69 0.60 
Year Effect 2005  50.12 11.43 22.80  0.12  7.14 <.0001 
Year Effect 2012  74.60 8.54 11.45  0.50  41.33 <.0001 
Source: Author’s computation  
 
Table 15 also shows that significant difference exists in the level of disclosure of the sampled 
companies. This provides the basis for rejecting the second hypothesis, that is, H2: There is no 
significant difference in the level of mandatory disclosure across listed Nigerian companies. 
Furthermore, table 15 shows that there was a significant difference in the level of disclosure on 
each of the accounting standards. This provides the basis for rejecting the third hypothesis, that 
is, H3: There is no significant difference in the level of mandatory disclosure on each accounting 
standards. This thesis investigates the factors that might account for the observed differences in 
the level of disclosure in the next section.    
7.3. Firm-level institutional determinants of the level of mandatory disclosure 
Institutional factors stated in the Oliver (1991) model are used to identify relevant organisational 
characteristics that are in turn used to predict each of the four disclosure compliance variables.  
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7.3.1.  Descriptive statistics 
Table 16 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis to provide 
answers to the second empirical question. 
Table 16 Descriptive statistics on the dimensions of Oliver (1991) framework  
 
   Mean   Median  Standard Deviation  
  2000 2005 2012 2000 2005 2012 2000 2005 2012 
Variable  n = 23 n = 43 n = 34 n = 23 n = 43 n = 34 n = 23 n = 43     n = 34 
Turnover   10.93   24.90  80.00   8.48   5.41   17.70  10.01   37.00   132.59  
Effcy  1.26 1.40 1.54 1.20 1.32 1.53 0.23 0.26 0.26 
TaxIntDivprop 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.17 0.09 
FreeCash  -4.31 5.04 -6.29 -1.17 -0.19 -0.53 6.61 37.38 32.12 
BoardHoldingPct 5.01 5.87 13.89 0.24 0.81 5.06 12.32 11.96 17.57 
Subsidiary 0.30 0.33 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.47 0.43 
BigAuditorDmy 0.70 0.77 0.74 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.46 0.42 0.44 
Transreturn 2.65 2.48 2.19 2.33 2.48 2.08 1.59 1.18 0.81 




Table 16 shows the descriptive statistic for each corresponding period of regulatory waves in 
Nigeria. The results are interesting; firstly, there is a consistent increase in the average turnover 
of the sample companies over the years from an average of 10.9 billion Nigerian Naira in 2000 
to 80 billion Nigerian Naira in 2012. Several factors might be responsible for this increase. First, 
the inflation rate might have contributed to the increase rather than providing an indication of 
increased productivity. Second, the sample size in the latter period was greater than the sample 
size in 2000. The increased sample size might have contributed to the increase in average 
turnover. However, the increased turnover signifies an increased economic significance of the 
sample firms. 
Note: Total sample consists of 100 non-financial Nigerian firms. The following corresponds to each dimension of 
the Oliver framework. Turnover (turnover) for legitimacy, sales per employees (effcy) for economic efficiency. 
Taxes, interest and dividend paid (TaxIntDivprop)  for multiplicity. FreeCash for dependency,  Proportion of board 
holding (BoardHoldingPct) for consistency with firm’s goal, subsidiary for discretionary constraint, big 4 audit 
firms (BigAuditorDmy) for voluntary diffusion, standard deviation of daily return on market share price 
(transreturn) for uncertainty and proportion of non-Nigerian national on board (PropNonNat) for 
interconnectedness.   
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The standard deviation of turnover indicates the variability in the turnover of the sampled 
companies. This increased from 10.01 billion in 2000 to 132.59 billion Nigerian Naira in 2012.  
This increase in standard deviation of turnover could be due in part to differences in the 
composition of sample size in the two periods. Although the average efficiency level increased 
over the years, the variation in efficiency among the sampled firms remained constant in 2005 
and 2012. This suggests a relatively similar efficiency level for all the sampled firms.  
The free cash indicates the amount available for investment from internal operations after the 
payment of dividends and interest. The average free cash of -4.31 in 2000 shows that the sample 
firms would need an average of four years to generate the required funds for capital investment 
from their normal level of operating activities. However, there was a reverse to a positive free 
cash value of 5.04 in 2005. The increased free cash suggests an increase in the level of 
confidence in Nigerian businesses during the period, which might be attributable  to a relatively 
stable political environment in Nigeria at that time. As noted in chapter two of this thesis, the 
elected civilian government of 1999 successfully handed over to another elected political office 
holder for the first time in Nigerian political history. The relative political stability increased 
business confidence and hence the demonstrable increase in free cash flow.  
However, the free cash dropped to -6.29 in 2012. This shows that it would take the sampled 
companies about 6 years to generate the funds required for capital investments from their normal 
operating activities. The global financial crisis and general economic downturn in Nigeria in the 
period 2008 to 2010 might have contributed to this result. This suggests that Nigerian companies 
would struggle for a long period of years before they would be able to achieve a very strong cash 
position.  
The proportion of board shareholding increased from an average of 5 percent in 2000 to 14 
percent in 2012. This significant increase in board share holding in 2012 is due to board 
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members acquiring an increasing stake in the companies they managed. This trend is an 
indication that these managers expects good outlook for their companies and that there is a 
potential for increasing their wealth by the share holding in their companies.  
The volatility of the return on daily stock price was reduced in 2012 compared to the previous 
two periods. This might have resulted from the increased confidence of investors in the capital 
market due to the adoption of IFRS in Nigeria. Similarly, the standard deviation of the variation 
in stock return reduced significantly from 1.59 in 2000 to 0.81 in 2012.  
It is interesting to note that the average proportion of non-Nigerian nationals on boards reduced 
significantly from 26.21 percent in 2000 to 19.22 percent in 2012. This result suggests that most 
multinational companies invested in Nigerian companies as rent-seekers and appointed their 
representatives to the boards of these companies. The significant reduction in the proportion of 
non-Nigerian nationals on board could be attributed to the effect of the global financial crisis, 
during which time, most multinational companies sold their shareholding in Nigerian companies, 
repatriated their invested capital and withdrawn their representatives from the board of these 
companies. This result is consistent with the observed reduction in the average number of 
multinational affiliated companies from 0.48 percent in 2000 to 0.29 percent in 2012. 
Table 17 shows the correlation matrix for the model variables. This study performs an initial 
investigation of the independent variables by a multicolinearity test. For robustness, both 
Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric coefficients are reported. Noticeably, the 
magnitude and direction of both coefficients are very similar, suggesting that no serious non-
normality problems exist. Both indicate further that correlations among variables are fairly low, 
implying that there are no major multicollinearity problems. Additionally, this thesis examined 
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) among the independent variables (for brevity not reported 
here). All of the VIF are less than 10 suggesting that no serious multicolinearity problem exists.  
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Table 17  Correlation matrix of model variables  
i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Cooke_Index 1 0.91*** 0.94*** 0.81*** 1*** 0.91*** 0.45*** -0.04 0.11 -0.03 0.11 -0.03 0.24** -0.19* -0.16 -0.47*** -0.32*** 0.75*** -0.11 0.01 0.19* -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 0.10 0.11
PC_Index 2 0.91*** 0.77*** 0.96*** 0.91*** 1*** 0.44*** 0.05 0.11 -0.03 0.08 0.01 0.31*** -0.11 -0.14 -0.45*** -0.18* 0.58*** -0.25*** 0.00 0.22** 0.05 -0.03 -0.10 0.04 0.12
Accindex 3 0.90*** 0.69*** 0.68*** 0.94*** 0.77*** 0.41*** -0.09 0.11 -0.07 0.16 -0.06 0.21** -0.17 -0.15 -0.44*** -0.41*** 0.82*** -0.06 0.05 0.19* -0.06 -0.09 -0.12 0.13 0.12
Othersindex 4 0.83*** 0.96*** 0.65*** 0.81*** 0.96*** 0.41*** 0.04 0.11 -0.06 0.14 0.01 0.25** -0.09 -0.14 -0.44*** -0.20** 0.61*** -0.23** 0.05 0.18* 0.09 -0.04 -0.16 0.01 0.11
Cookelogodds 5 0.99*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.82*** 0.91*** 0.45*** -0.04 0.11 -0.03 0.11 -0.03 0.24** -0.19* -0.16 -0.47*** -0.32*** 0.75*** -0.11 0.01 0.19* -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 0.10 0.11
pclogodds 6 0.90*** 1.00*** 0.68*** 0.96*** 0.90*** 0.44*** 0.05 0.11 -0.03 0.08 0.01 0.31*** -0.11 -0.14 -0.45*** -0.18* 0.58*** -0.25*** 0.00 0.22** 0.05 -0.03 -0.10 0.04 0.12
lnturnover 7 0.49*** 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.42*** 0.52*** 0.47*** 0.34*** -0.12 0.00 -0.44*** 0.28*** 0.41*** 0.06 0.23** -0.22** -0.12 0.32*** -0.14 -0.33*** 0.10 0.25*** -0.17* 0.33** -0.18* 0.05
Efficient 8 -0.14 -0.10 -0.18* -0.11 -0.13 -0.09 0.30*** -0.48*** 0.03 -0.15 0.29 0.24 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.03 -0.13 -0.21** 0.07 -0.15 0.14 -0.22** 0.47*** -0.18* -0.20**
Multi_Const 9 0.01 -0.06 0.05 -0.09 0.00 -0.06 -0.15 -0.28*** -0.01 -0.11 0.11 -0.03 -0.09 0.08 -0.06 -0.13 0.18 0.22** -0.16 0.06 0.19* 0.18* -0.42*** -0.04 -0.02
FreeCash 10 -0.13 -0.08 -0.17* -0.07 -0.19* -0.10 -0.22** 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.16 0.01 -0.16 0.03 -0.14 0.15 -0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.11 0.01 -0.04 0.12
BoardHolding 11 0.12 0.06 0.27** 0.07 0.10 0.04 -0.38*** -0.11 -0.13 0.19* -0.40*** -0.33*** 0.06 -0.39*** -0.17* -0.14 0.30*** 0.22** 0.35*** 0.08 -0.33*** -0.10 -0.26** 0.32*** 0.01
Subsidiary 12 -0.04 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.00 -0.03 -0.23** 0.18* 0.02 0.37*** 0.07 0.02 -0.09 -0.16 -0.27** -0.13 0.10 0.23** 0.08 0.14 -0.15
BigAuditor 13 0.24** 0.30*** 0.13 0.25** 0.24** 0.29*** 0.43*** 0.19* 0.03 -0.13 -0.23** 0.18* 0.17* 0.02 -0.11 0.10 -0.01 -0.33** -0.33*** 0.12 0.18* -0.01 0.09 0.09 0.14
transreturn 14 -0.16 -0.12 -0.14 -0.09 -0.16 -0.12 0.14 0.11 -0.0003 -0.13 -0.17 0.03 0.19* -0.05 0.03 0.12 -0.15 0.09 -0.14 0.08 0.11 -0.19** -0.02 0.11 0.02
NonNattoBrd 15 -0.16 -0.11 -0.19* -0.11 -0.16 -0.10 0.23** 0.10 -0.06 0.08 -0.32*** 0.37*** 0.02 -0.08 0.04 0.15 -0.18 0.16 -0.21** -0.23** 0.25** -0.09 0.03 -0.09 0.04
weakregime 16 -0.47*** -0.45*** -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.47*** -0.45*** -0.22*** 0.11 -0.06 -0.14 -0.17* 0.07 -0.11 0.03 0.04 -0.47*** -0.39*** -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.17* 0.07 -0.16 -0.13
semistrongreg 17 -0.32*** -0.18* -0.41*** -0.20** -0.32** -0.18* -0.12 0.03 -0.13 0.15 -0.14 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.15 -0.47*** -0.62*** -0.05 -0.08 -0.07 0.02 -0.03 0.08 0.04 0.08
strongregime 18 0.75*** 0.58*** 0.82*** 0.61*** 0.75*** 0.58*** 0.32*** -0.13 0.18* -0.04 0.30*** -0.09 -0.01 -0.15 -0.18* -0.39*** -0.62*** 0.09 0.11 0.07 -0.02 -0.12 -0.15 0.10 0.03
Agric 19 -0.12 -0.24 -0.0009 -0.24** -0.12 -0.23** -0.12 -0.14 0.12 0.004 0.06 -0.16 -0.33*** 0.06 0.16 -0.04 0.09 -0.05 -0.11 -0.05 -0.18* -0.11 -0.10 -0.07 -0.06
Services 20 0.002 -0.01 0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.32*** 0.01 -0.13 0.22** 0.35*** -0.27** -0.33*** -0.14 -0.21** -0.03 0.11 -0.08 -0.11 -0.09 -0.30*** -0.18* -0.16 -0.12 -0.10
Conglomerat
es
21 0.19* 0.21** 0.15 0.19* 0.18* 0.20** 0.09 -0.14 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.13 0.12 0.12 -0.23** 0.01 0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.15 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05
Consumergds 22 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.23** 0.00006 0.18* -0.02 -0.32*** 0.10 0.18* 0.12 0.25** 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.18* -0.30*** -0.15 -0.30*** -0.28** -0.21** -0.16
Industrialgoo
ds
23 -0.06 -0.03 -0.10 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.16 -0.19** 0.07 -0.03 -0.05 0.23** -0.01 -0.18* -0.08 0.17* -0.12 -0.03 -0.11 -0.18* -0.09 -0.30*** -0.16 -0.12 -0.10
GasandOil 24 -0.08 -0.09 -0.12 -0.13 -0.05 -0.08 0.32*** 0.62*** -0.23*** -0.17 -0.13 0.08 0.09 -0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.15 0.08 -0.10 -0.16 -0.08 -0.28** -0.16 -0.11 -0.09
Healthcare 25 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.05 -0.17 -0.17* -0.07 -0.02 0.35* 0.14 0.09 0.09 -0.09 -0.16 0.10 0.04 -0.07 -0.12 -0.06 -0.21** -0.12 -0.11 -0.07
Construction 26 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.06 -0.18* -0.03 0.02 -0.08 -0.15 0.14 0.01 0.04 -0.13 0.03 0.08 -0.06 -0.10 -0.05 -0.16 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07
Notes: The bottom left of the table contains Pearson’s correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s correlation coefficents. ***,  ** and * indicate that correlation is significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Variables are defined as follows: Computed index based on Cooke’s method ( Cooke_Index), Computed index adjusted for non-applicable items (PC_index), Index based on information 
to be disclosed in financial statements (Accindex), index based on property plant and equipment and earnings per share (othersindex), odds of the logarithm of Cooke index (Cookelogodds), odds of the logarithm of Partial 
index (pclogodds), logarithm of turnover (lnturnover), sales per employee ( Efficient), ratio of interest, dividends and taxes to turnover (Multi_Const),  standard deviation of daily return on market share price (transreturn). 
Free cash, proportion of board shareholding (BoardHolding), proportion of non-Nigerian ationals on board (NonNattoBrd). 
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Table 17 suggests a statistical significant link between the level of mandatory disclosure and the 
explanatory variables. Turnover, big four audit firms, strong regulatory regimes are significant 
and positively related to the level of mandatory disclosure, while standard deviation of daily 
return on market share price is significantly and negatively associated with the level of 
mandatory disclosure. However, the results suggest no significant link between the level of 
mandatory disclosure and the proportion of interest, dividend and taxes to turnover, free cash, 
board shareholding and proportion of non-Nigerian nationals on the board of sample firms.  
7.3.2.  Multivariate analysis 
Table 18 presents the results of multivariate analysis. The table shows the results for the OLS 
regression, the ‘M’ and the ‘MM’ robust regression estimates. As discussed in section 6.4.1 of 
chapter six of this thesis, the ‘M’ robust regression adjusts for the presence of outliers in the 
dependent variables while the ‘MM’ robust regression adjusts for outliers in both the dependent 
and independent variables. The F value is significant at 1percent. This shows that the 
independent variables are significantly associated with the level of disclosure. The adjusted R
2
 
for the first panel shows that 69 percent of the Cooke index is predicted by the independent 
variables. Although not shown on the table, the results of the VIF show that there is no multi-
collinearity problem among the independent variables. All the computed VIF are less than the 
maximum expected value of 10. The estimated Akaike information criterion (AICR) and the 
Bayesian information criterion (BICR) are lower in the MM estimates of robust regression than 
the M estimates of robust regression. This implies that the MM estimation technique is more 
efficient than the M estimation.  Based on the MM estimation technique, the R-squared shows 
that 64 percent of the Cooke index is predicted by the independent variables.   
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Table 18  Impacts of the dimensions of the Oliver (1991) framework on the level of mandatory disclosure 
PANEL A: Dependent variable using Cooke index 
   
Int. Turn Effcy TaxIntD Free  board  Sub  semireg  strong  big4  stdret  prop F val Rsq AdjRsq 
Cash  hold    reg   non nat 
 
OLS est 39.91*** 2.69*** -9.28** -5.37 -0.01 -0.05 -0.60 7.62*** 27.13***   5.50** -2.05** -0.10** 20.72*** 0.722 0.687 
 se (7.31) (0.85) (4.29) (8.33) (0.03) (0.61) (2.27) (2.52) (3.47) (2.41) (0.83) (0.05)     
M Rob est 39.75*** 2.75*** -10.08** -5.60 -0.02 0.13 1.07 10.12*** 28.61*** 4.80** -2.08*** -0.12***  0.648  
 se (7.11) (0.83) (4.16) (8.10) (0.03) (0.60) (2.21) (2.45) (3.38) (2.34) (0.80) (0.05)     
MM Rob est 39.59*** 2.76*** -10.08**  -5.55 -0.02 0.15 1.28 10.49*** 28.88*** 4.61** -2.11***  -0.13***  0.640  
 se (7.13) (0.83) (4.10) (7.85) (0.03) (0.60) (2.22) (2.53) (3.39) (2.31) (0.81) (0.05)  
 
PANEL B: Dependent variable using log odds of Cooke index 
 
OLS est -0.63* 0.15*** -0.44** -0.17 -0.002 0.007 -0.08 0.31*** 1.18*** 0.24** -0.11*** -0.005** 21.75***  0.731 0.70 
 se (0.34) (0.04) (0.20) (0.39) (0.001) (0.03) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.11) (0.04) (0.002)     
 
M Rob est -0.33 0.11*** -0.48*** -0.23 0.0005 0.003 0.05 0.40*** 1.28*** 0.23** -0.08** -0.005**  0.612  
 se (0.31) (0.04) (0.18) (0.36) (0.001) (0.03) (0.10) (0.11) (0.15) (0.10) (0.04) (0.002)     
                  
MM Rob est -0.47 0.11*** -0.40** -0.20 -0.007*** 0.005 0.03 0.40*** 1.27*** 0.26** -0.09** -0.005** 0.613  
 se (0.32) (0.04) (0.19) (0.35) (0.002) (0.03) (0.10) (0.11) (0.15) (0.10) (0.04) (0.002)     
 
PANEL C: Dependent variable using partial compliance index 
 
OLS est 37.36*** 2.87*** -11.09** -10.31 0.001 0.27 0.57 8.82*** 18.77*** 6.41** -1.79* -0.09* 8.62*** 0.519 0.458 
 se (8.54) (0.99) (5.00) (9.73) (0.04) (0.72) (2.66) (2.94) (4.05) (2.81) (0.96) (0.06)     
                  
M Rob est 36.34*** 2.95*** -11.64*** -9.98 -0.003 0.46 0.91 11.21*** 19.30*** 6.34** -1.50* -0.12**  0.493  
 se (7.79) (0.91) (4.56) (8.88) (0.03) (0.66) (2.43) (2.69) (3.70) (2.57) (0.88) (0.05)     
                  
MM Rob est 35.31*** 3.08*** -11.80*** -10.01 -0.005 0.47 1.20 12.13*** 19.69*** 5.79** -1.48* -0.12**  0.474  
 se (7.75) (0.91) (4.56) (8.72) (0.03) (0.66) (2.49) (2.79) (3.69) (2.55) (0.87) (0.05)     
 
Note: Total sample consists of 100 non-financial Nigerian firms. The determinants of the computed Cooke index were estimated by regressing the index on corporate characteristics. 
Corporate characteristics were selected based on the Oliver (1991) framework. The following correspond to each dimension of the Oliver framework. Turnover (turn) for legitimacy,  
sales per employees (effcy) for economic efficiency.  Taxes, interest and dividend paid  for multiplicity, proportion of board holding for consistency with firm’s goal, subsidiary dummy 
for discretionary constraint, semi strong and strong regimes for legal coercion, big 4 audit firms for voluntary diffusion, standard deviation of daily return on market share price for 
uncertainty and proportion of non-Nigerian nationals on board for interconnectedness. Significant levels are indicated as follows: ***1%, **5%, *10%, standard errors in parentheses. 
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Based on the regression results in table 18, this study accepts the following hypotheses  
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between organisation size and the level of 
mandatory disclosure in annual reports of Nigerian listed companies 
H2: There is a significant negative association between efficiency and the level of 
mandatory disclosure in annual reports of Nigerian listed companies 
H4: There is a significant negative association between free cash and the level of 
mandatory disclosure in annual reports of Nigerian listed companies 
H7: Mandatory disclosure is higher in a period of strong regulatory regimes relative to 
weak regulatory regimes 
H8: There is a significant positive association between the level of mandatory disclosure 
and having been audit by one of the big four audit firms 
H9: There is a significant positive association between the level of mandatory disclosure 
and standard deviation in return on market share price of Nigerian listed companies 
H10: There is a significant negative association between the proportion of non-Nigerian 
board members and the level of disclosure in annual reports of Nigerian listed companies  
The significant variables in the OLS regression models are also significant in both the M and 
MM estimates of robust regressions. However, the ‘M’ and ‘MM’ show a lower probability 
values for turnover, the standard deviation of daily return on market share price and the 
proportion of board members who are non-Nigerian nationals. On the other hand, the OLS model 
shows a stronger significant level for the big four audit firms. 
The directions of the coefficients of the model variables are consistent with the propositions of 
the hypotheses. For example, size is proposed to have a positive association with the level of 
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mandatory disclosure, and the results show a positive coefficient. This demonstrates the 
robustness of the regression estimates. By focusing on the size of the coefficients in Table 18, 
strong regulatory regime has the highest positive significant coefficient. This implies that the 
level of disclosure increased significantly during strong regulatory regimes. Although this 
finding is not surprising, the results give some level of confidence in the validity of the 
instruments used for this study. Similarly, companies audited by one of the big four firms have a 
high positive coefficients.  This result suggests that the big four audit firms are powerful carriers 
of institutional norms.  
Panel B in table 18 shows that the results for log-transformed levels of disclosure are similar to 
the untransformed levels of disclosure in Panel A. However, both the F ratio and the adjusted R
2
 
for the log transformed Cooke index are higher at 22.2 and 73.5 percent respectively than for the 
untransformed index. In addition, the free cash variable is significant on the MM robust 
regression. By focusing on the coefficients, strong regulatory regimes have the highest positive 
significant coefficient of 1.10. This suggests that a one-year increase in strong regulatory 
regimes makes companies 1.1 times more likely to increase disclosure compliance relative to 
weak regulatory regimes. Size has a coefficient of 0.16, which suggests that with one million 
Naira increase in sales, companies are more likely to increase the level of disclosure 0.16 times. 
On the other hand, the negative coefficient of 0.42 for efficiency implies that companies seeking 
to increase efficiency are 0.42 times more likely to reduce the level of disclosure. Furthermore, 
the results for the Partial Compliance index in Panel C of table 18 shows that both the F ratio the 
adjusted R
2
 estimates of 8.58 and 51.8 percent respectively are lower than the estimate for the 
Cooke index in Panel B. This indicates that the predictor variables have a stronger impact on the 
overall level of disclosure. 
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7.4.  Discussion of results on the impact of institutions on mandatory disclosure  
The Oliver’s (1991) model of institutional theory is used to provide an explanatory framework 
for the research question: what factors can explain organisation disclosure compliance? The 
findings in this thesis have several implications, which are articulated in the discussions in this 
section. This articulation enables this study to appreciate and to be able to put in proper 
perspective the need for a concerted effort by all stakeholders to address the identified 
implications and to overcome emerging challenges.  
7.4.1. Impact of legitimacy 
Oliver (1991) argues that an organisation’s need for legitimacy is one of the causes of 
institutional pressure.  This thesis uses revenue as a proxy for legitimacy beacuse it indicates the 
economic significance or importance of an organisation in its environment. Although other 
proxies such as total assets, number of employees or number of shareholders could ha ve been 
used, these are deemed inappropriate in the context of this study. For example, measure such as 
net value of assets may have a less precise valuation.  
The result shows a significant positive relationship between revenue and disclosure, this is 
consistent with other studies that used the Oliver model or other institutional theory models. For 
example, in the study of employer adoption of childcare services in The Washington State 
Employment Security Department, Goodstein (1994) proxied legitimacy by organisational size 
and found a significant positive relationship between adoption of childcare services and size. 
Similarly, in the study of the choice of accounting standards in Sweden Municipal Corporations, 
Collin et al. (2009) use size as a proxy for legitimacy and find a significant positive relationship 
between choice of accounting standards and a Municipal Corporation’s size. 
The significant positive relationship between revenue (proxy for legitimacy) and disclosure 
suggests that as organisations penetrate the markets they serve as implied by increased revenue, 
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they “communicate honestly” (Suchman, 1995, p. 600) in order to maintain a pragmatic 
legitimacy within their exchange networks. This increased information disclosure enhances the 
reputation of the organisation, and investors in turn will be more likely to trust their investments 
to the company because the increased communication helps in risk assessment (Swanda, 1990; 
Chauvin and Hirschey, 1994). The legitimacy resulting from honest communication also 
enhanced the organisation’s competitive advantage (Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Deephouse, 
2000), this enables the organisation to maximise shareholder returns. 
In addition, as a firm’s size increases, it becomes visible to the institutional community, which 
places the organisation under intense pressure to maintain legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). The 
visibility of the organisation to the institutional community makes it feel a normative pressure to 
increase disclosure, which helps the institutional community evaluate the organisation’s 
activities. However, an organisations might be willing to comply with institutional pressures 
when institutional and technical factors (cost and benefits) converge, that is to say, when 
institutional pressures are strong and disclosure would benefit the organisation, it would lead to 
an increased disclosure (Goodstein, 1994).  
7.4.2. Impact of efficiency 
The study shows a significant negative relationship between organisation efficiency and 
disclosure compliance. Consistent with Watson et al. (2002) efficiency is measured as sales per 
employee. Suchman (1995, p.600) argues that to maintain legitimacy, corporate organisations 
seek to “protect accomplishments”. The negative relationship between efficiency and the level of 
disclosure suggests that to cope with competitive pressure from the product market, a firm 
rationalised its labour force, that is, reduced the number of employees (Greenwood et al. 2009). 
Although the rationalisation helps the firm improved on sales per employee, there would be 
pressure from labour unions and government who would want an increase in the level of 
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unemployment. As a strategy to minimise these pressures, the companies reduced the level of 
information disclosure in order not to provide information that would be used by labour unions 
to increase their pressure on the organisation.  
Furthermore, when firms rationalised their employees size, investors might increase the risk 
profile of the company (Miles and Covin, 2000) because of perceived potential going-concern, 
operational or strategic risks. In response, the company reduced the level of information 
disclosure as a strategy to mitigate these perceived risks. In addition, firms might lose 
experienced and skilled staff when it rationalised, consequently, productivity and quality of work 
such as disclosure was affected negatively.  
The foregoing discussion suggests that when a divergence exists between institutional and 
technical requirements, organisations try to avoid institutional requirements. Such avoidance 
strategies include concealment, (that is disguising non-conformity) and buffering (that is, 
loosening institutional attachments) (Oliver, 1991). The results indicate a reduced commitment 
to institutional requirements. Furthermore, it indicates that the organisation loosened its 
attachments to the institutional goal of increased employment as it downsized its labour force in 
response to intense market competition.  
7.4.3. Impact of legal coercion 
This study uses a dummy variable to proxy legal coercion behind institutional pressures. The 
coefficients of the dummy variables in table 18 show that the level of disclosure during the 
strong regulatory regime has the highest impact on the level of disclosure. This result suggests 
increased enforcement action is essential for improved disclosure in emerging capital markets 
(Jaggi, 1975; Shaffer, 1995). The result also suggests that enforcement actions in Nigeria have 
been effective over time. This result is consistent with Abdelsalam and Weetman (2007) who 
studied changes in accounting disclosures in Egypt in periods before and after the government 
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privatisation programme and found that compliance with established regulations improved over 
the period. 
The result indicates that potential costs of non-compliance due to SEC’s frequent inspections 
(Dimento, 1989) of financial statements might have contributed to the increased level of 
disclosure. The results also suggest that the overall stringency of regulatory regimes has 
influenced companies’ expectations on regulator’s potential detection of violations, which lead 
to increased compliance (Epple and Visscher, 1984; Cohen, 1987; Cohen, 2000).  
In addition, the increased level of disclosure suggests that corporate managers and accountants 
have become more familiar with the disclosure requirements over time, and there is an increased 
incentive for corporate managers to increase disclosure. Some of these incentives include the 
need to raise equity capital on the Nigerian Stock Exchange and the desire to win the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange annual corporate award.  
2012 was the first year of IFRS adoption in Nigeria and it corresponds to the strong regulatory 
regime in this study. The increased level of disclosure during this period suggests that corporate 
managers have demonstrated their commitments to international best practice in financial 
reporting, and to transparent financial reporting (Leuz and Wysocki, 2006), without which, they 
would have voluntarily delisted their securities from the Nigerian Stock Exchange (Leuz, 
Triantis and Wong, 2006).   
7.4.4. Impact of voluntary diffussion 
The big four audit firms were use as a proxy for voluntary diffusion of institutional pressure for 
disclosure. The result shows a significant positive impact of voluntary diffusion on corporate 
disclosure compliance. This result is consistent with Goodstein (1994) who finds a significant 
positive relationship between voluntary diffusion and organisation adoption of childcare 
services.  
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Suchman (1995, p.600) argues that corporate organisations will “stockpile trust” as a strategy to 
maintain pragmatic legitimacy. The result suggests that an organisation’s proximity to the big 
four-audit firm enhaced its external legitimacy, the organisation adopts policies or structures that 
enables it to increase the level of disclosure (Galaskiewicz, 1991). Furthermore, the expertise of 
these big audit firms and their commitment to institutional requirements impacted their clients’ 
level of disclosure, this is due to the ability of the big four to discover shortcomings in their 
clients’ accounting systems (DeAngelo, 1981). 
In addition, the results suggest that auditors vary their preferences towards what their clients 
should disclose; large audit firms are more inclined to adhere to statutory and regulatory rules 
(Wright, 1983). One reason for this result is the large auditor’s exposure to legal liability which 
influences their commitment to “police operations” (Suchman, 1995, p.160) of their clients. This 
policing of their clients have contributed to the increased level of disclosure by firms audited by 
them.  
However, investors must evaluate the disclosure level of the client portfolio of these big four 
audit firms. If for example, all organisations audited by the big four audit have a high level of 
disclosure, investors might conclude that the big four facilitates an increased level of disclosure, 
probably due to their expertise, international exposure, resources and commitment to ensure their 
clients are transparent. However, if there were inconsistencies in the level of disclosure, it would 
be difficult to conclude that the big four have a significant impact.  
Furthermore, an attempt to evaluate the level of disclosure by the clients of the big four audit 
would result in an additional cost of investment decisions.  In addition, the big four may have a 
policy to accept audit assignments from firms that are committed to increased disclosure.  In 
which case, investors’ efforts to compare the disclosure level of the client portfolio of the big 
four would not have an incremental benefit.  
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Another issue that merits the attention of both investors and regulators is the auditors’ ability to 
maintain a professional and independent stance towards clients, which is important to guarantee 
the auditors’ ability to pressure its clients to increase disclosure. If the auditor colludes with its 
clients to obtain advantage (Bazerman et al. 1997), auditing  of an annual report becomes a ritual 
that is designed to afford a sense of comfort that at least the firm has been audited,  rather than 
facilitating increased disclosure (Tagesson and Erikson, 2011; Power, 2003; Carrrington and 
Catasus, 2007). 
The foregoing discussions suggests that the institutional settings in which both corporate 
organisations and the auditor operates are important to guarantee voluntary diffusion of 
institutional requirements. Nigeria institutional environment for financial reporting has improved 
in the most recent periods; auditors could be questioned for any perceived irregularities in their 
client’s financial statements. This improved institutional environment has facilitated auditors’ 
willingness to put normative pressures on their clients that have in turn led to the increased 
disclosure (Power, 2003). 
Based on the result, the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRC), SEC, NSE, CAC and the 
professional accounting bodies such as ICAN, should facilitate a process where the big four 
review the audit working papers of the smaller audit firms. In addition, when financial year-ends 
are concentrated in one month of the year such as December, the smaller auditors might not have 
adequate resources to cope with client audit demands even though they may have the relevant 
professional competency. Therefore, regulators could facilitate the spread of corporate financial 
year-end across the months of the year. This would both enhance the ability of the smaller 
auditors to cope with the audit demands of their clients and facilitate fair competition in the audit 
market in Nigeria. 
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The results in this study suggests the need to examine the audit opinions for a closer 
investigation of the differences in reporting styles of both the big four and smaller audit firms. 
One should expect that the smaller audit firms should qualify their audit opinions in their client’s 
financial statement, as the low disclosure suggests inadequate audit evidence.  
7.4.5. Impact of uncertainty 
The standard deviation of daily return on market share price over the company’s financial year is 
used as a proxy for uncertainty in the Oliver (1991) model. The result show that the level of 
disclosure is significantly and negatively influenced by standard deviation of daily return on 
market share price. This is consistent with Guerreiro et al. (2012) who measured uncertainty on a 
five-point likert scale and found a significant negative association between voluntary IFRS 
adoption and environmental uncertainty in Portugal. The result is also consistent with Land and 
Lundholm (1993) who found a significant negative relationship between standard deviation of 
stock returns and disclosure. The result supports Oliver’s (1991) argument that the higher the 
level of uncertainty in the organisation’s environment, the lower the level of organisational 
acquiescence to institutional pressures. 
The negative significant coefficient implies that when corporate organisations are uncertain 
about the effect of information disclosure on market share prices, corporate managers will 
withhold information. Therefore, that there is the need for consensus among corporate managers, 
regulators, investors and stock market participants on information that is relevant for their 
decision-making. However, it might be difficult to reach a consensus on such optimal disclosure 
level (Burchell et al. 1980).  
Furthermore, due to potential litigation for misinforming the heterogeneous users of the 
corporate financial reports, corporate managers have reduced the level of disclosure (Alexander, 
1991). In addition, the high concentration of share ownership of Nigerian corporate entities 
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might have affected negatively on free float and market liquidity. Since dominant shareholders 
are interested in capital appreciation rather than gains from daily stock trading, an increased 
disclosure might not lead to appropriate adjustments to market share price.  
Furthermore, the significant negative coefficient suggests that there is no news in the information 
disclosed by corporate managers. Investors and analysts might have accessed the information 
and made appropriate adjustments to the market price prior to disclosure in annual reports. This 
situation suggests a serious problem of insider trading and abuse, which needs to be addressed by 
market regulators. Additionally, the negative association might be due to an inefficient capital 
market, that is, the market does not efficiently adjust for information disclosure on corporate 
market share prices.  
Furthermore, the negative association also suggests that, high transaction costs could have 
impeded market response to information disclosure. When transaction costs are high relative to 
the expected returns, there might not be adequate market transactions in response to increased 
information disclosure. In this case, the capital market regulators need to ensure that the costs to 
execute trading orders do not prohibit market participants from taking advantage of information 
disclosure and from making appropriate adjustments to market share prices.  
Furthermore, in instances when capital market regulators put a corporate equity on technical 
suspension for a long period for several reasons such as a proposed merger and acquisition or 
equity offer for sale, information disclosure is not adjust on share price due to inactivity of the 
company’s equity. When a number of stocks are placed on technical suspension, it would lead to 
the observed negative relationship between the level of disclosure and standard deviation of 
stock returns. Additionally, lack of market depth in Nigeria, where very few firms are the major 
drivers of transactions on the NSE could have resulted in the negative relationship between the 
level of disclosure and standard deviation of return on daily stock prices.  
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However, market sentiments and herding behaviour, which are neither quantifiable nor included 
in this study, could have been a significant driver of market share reactions. Despite this 
observation, the results suggest that uncertainty in investors’ responses to information disclosure 
provides an incentive to corporate organisations to withhold information.  
7.4.6. Impact of interconnectedness 
The proportion of non-Nigerian nationals on the board is used to proxy interconnectedness of the 
organisation to its institutional environment. The result shows a significant negative relationship 
between the proportion of non-Nigerian nationals on the board and corporate disclosure 
compliance. This result is inconsistent with Guerreiro et al. (2012) who find a positive 
association between voluntary adoption of IFRS and interconnectedness. Similarly, Goodstein 
(1994) measured the degree of interconnectedness in the institutional environment as the number 
of business, professional and labour unions, and membership organisations in a particular 
country. He found a weak positive association between environmental interconnectedness and 
organisation adoption of work family care by the US public sector.  
Furthermore, Kraatz and Moore (2002) studied the adoption of professional programmes such as 
Computer Science courses by American liberal arts colleges during the 1970s and 1980s, when 
these colleges were led by presidents who had recently migrated either from colleges that had 
professional programmes or from lower-status colleges. Kraatz and Moore (2002) found a 
negative association and interpreted their results to imply that migration will only prove to be 
influential when other forces tend to favour change, and they therefore express scepticism about 
the overall importance of executive migration.  
Suchman (1995, p.160) argues that corporate organisations would “co-opt constituents” as a 
strategy to gain pragmatic legitimacy. The negative association between the level of disclosure 
and the proportion of non-Nigerian nationals on boards suggests that the co-opted members of 
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the international community to the board of corporate organisations in Nigeria do not lead to an 
increased disclosure. The result suggest that these coopted members of the institutional 
community have their self interst to protect, for example, they might want to avoid taxation, 
circumvent exchange controls and avoid other political costs (Kobrin, 1978), therefore, they used 
their position to hide or avoid disclosing adequate information about the company on which they 
are board members.  
Furthermore, the negative relationship between the proportion of non-Nigerian nationals on the 
board and disclosure could be due to a lack of familiarity with the requirements of Nigerian 
national accounting standards (World Bank ROSC, 2004). This lack of familiarity may have 
resulted from the complexity of accounting standards disclosure requirements. In addition, the 
tenure of these non-Nigerian nationals on the board could be a limiting factor. If these non-
nationals have not spent adequate time on the board, they might not be familiar with the 
company routines and financial reporting systems. Therefore, internal antecedents would prevail 
on the financial reporting outcome (Gibbins et al., 1990). Furthermore, non-Nigerians on the 
board might not implement a change in the culture of low level of disclosure.   
The foregoing suggests that although the entry of outsiders may contribute to the diffusion of 
normative models (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), the result in this study suggests that the ability 
of non-Nigerian board members are bound by organisation’s history, values, beliefs and interests 
within an organisation (Fligstein, 1991).  
7.4.7. Impact of organisation dependence 
The MM robust regression in panel B of table 13 shows a significant negative relationship 
between free cash and disclosure. Free cash is used to proxy the degree to which an organisation 
is dependent on a source of institutional pressure. The free cash indicates the number of years an 
organisation could finance its investment and growth strategies from internal operations without 
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recourse to raising external funds. The results show a weak significant negative relationship 
between free cash and disclosure compliance. This result is consistent with Nagar et al. (2003) 
who found a negative association between a firm’s issue of common shares exceeding 20 percent 
of market value and disclosure. However, the result is not consistent with Guerreiro et al. (2012) 
who finds a significant positive relationship between voluntary adoption of IFRS and 
organisational dependence measured by a dummy variable if a focal firm is a subsidiary of a 
multinational company. 
The weak negative relationship between free cash and disclosure suggests that a more financially 
independent organisation can avoid or resist increasing disclosure. Therefore, Nigerian corporate 
managers who are able to finance their investment from internally generated funds, could 
continue to perpetuate themselves in office, and withhold information that enhance an effective 
assessment of these managers by capital market audiences. The inadequate information 
disclosure limits the ability of the capital and labour market to effectively monitor and discipline 
corporate managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). Investors would suffer from adverse selection 
due to inadequate disclosure as they are not able to distinguish between failure to disclose and 
managers not having private information to disclose.   
Several factors could cause corporate managers to want to depend on internal funds. First, 
ownership structure affects investors’ demand for information disclosure. For example, when 
ownership is highly concentrated, the dominant owner might want to avoid dilution of control. 
Therefore, when the organisation is in need of additional investment funds, the dominant owner 
might provide the required funds from private sources. Although the company might be listed on 
the Stock Exchange, the listing could be solely for the purposes of enhancing the organisation’s 
prestige and legitimacy but not for the purpose of raising capital on the stock market.  
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This result supports the resource dependence argument of institutional theory that the lower the 
degree of external dependence on pressuring constituents, the greater the likelihood of 
organisational resistance to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). In other words, if an 
organisation can afford to be independent of institutional constituents, it could strategically resist 
the pressure from such constituents.  
7.5.  Summary of results on institutional determinants of mandatory disclosure 
This study could not reject seven of the ten Oliver’s institutional antecedents, which are used as 
determinants of the level of mandatory disclosure in Nigeria. From a theoretical perspective, this 
study offers strong support for institutional theory, and is consistent with Collin et al. (2009, 
p.163) who found that institutional theory has been more successful than Positive Accounting 
Theory in predicting accounting choice. From an empirical perspective, this study offers new 
insight into determinants of organisation disclosure compliance.  
The results suggest that volatility in stock returns signals pressure on corporate organisations to 
reduce information disclosure. Furthermore, due to the complexity in the operations of the 
capital market, corporate managers might not be in a position to predict the reaction of market 
participants to a disclosed piece of information. Therefore, higher return volatility might signal 
uncertainty to corporate managers and therefore motivate them to withhold information. 
However, a competing explanation is that of rational expectation hypothesis. 
Another significant variable which is not commonly included in disclosure studies is the 
efficiency variable. This is measure by sales per employee (Watson et al., 2002). The significant 
negative relationship between efficiency and disclosure in this study is consistent with Watson et 
al. (2002), and suggests that organisation who seeks to increase efficiency would reduce the 
level of disclosure.  The policy implications of these results are discussed in chapter nine of this 
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thesis. The next chapter presents the results on the determinants of intra-industry variation in 
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Chapter Eight 
Institutional determinants of intra-industry variation in mandatory disclosure  
8.1. Introduction 
Previous studies have paid attention to how organisational fields are structured by a “dominant 
logic” (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008), suggesting an isomorphic response to a dominant logic, but 
we know little about how and why organisations respond to multiple institutional logics 
(Greenwood et al., 2009). This chapter presents and evaluates empirical evidence on the impact 
of market and nonmarket institutional logics on the level of disclosure by Nigerian listed 
companies.  
While some institutional scholars argue that corporate organisations are confronted with multiple 
and conflicting logics (Reay and Hinnings, 2005; Hoffman, 1999), others argue that 
organisation’s response to their institutional context is unlikely to be uniform (Greenwood et al., 
2009). Based on the latter argument, this chapter evaluated the determinants of intra-industry 
variation in the level of disclosure. The measure of this variation is similar to a proxy for 
strategic difference used in prior studies (Deephouse, 1999). This thesis uses the frequency of 
items of information disclosure in corporate annual reports to calculate differences in the level of 
disclosure, that is, the difference between industry-average levels of disclosure and the frequency 
of items disclosed by individual firms in the industry, scaled by the industry standard deviation 
of items disclosed. The measure indicates how well a company reveals financial information 
relative to its competitors in the same organisational field.   
To predict why a company’s level of disclosure is different to those of other competitors in the 
organisational field, this study uses the Greenwood et al. (2011) analytical framework to identify 
relevant institutional factors that can predict differences in the level of corporate disclosure in 
P a g e  | 185 
 
annual reports. These factors are emphasised to the extent that they can help an organisation gain 
or maintain legitimacy. Section two presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. Section 
three presents the multivariate analysis, and section four summarises and discusses the 
implications of the results. Section 6.4.2 in chapter six provides detailed explanation about the 
procedure for measuring the model variables. 
8.2.  Descriptive statistics 
Figure 5 presents the frequency of items disclosed by sample firms on different accounting 
standards. 
Figure 5  Frequency of items disclosed by sample companies 
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financial reports of the sampled firms during the selected periods before and after the adoption of 
IFRS in Nigeria. As indicated in table 9, accounting standards on disclosure of accounting policy 
and information to be disclose in financial statement required 105 items for disclosure. 
Accounting standard on property plant and equipment requires 8 items for disclosure and 
accounting standards on earnings per share requires 7 items for disclosure.  
Figure 5 shows that in 2000, the highest number of items disclosed for combined accounting 
standards on disclosure of accounting policy and information to be disclose in financial 
statement was around 40 items, while some of the companies disclosed just 15 items. In this 
same year, the highest number of items disclosed for combined accounting standard on property 
plant and equipment and accounting standards on earnings per share by one of the sampled firms 
was around 12 items while some of the sampled companies disclosed just 5 of these items. These 
results indicate a significant variation in the number of items disclosed by the sampled firms.  
Furthermore, in 2005, figure 5 shows that one of the sampled companies disclosed 40 items, 
which was the highest for that year for combined accounting standards on disclosure of 
accounting policy and information to be disclose in financial statement, while some of the 
sampled companies disclosed about 20 items of the same set of accounting standards. On the 
other hand, most of the sampled companies disclosed about 10 items for combined accounting 
standard on property plant and equipment and accounting standards on earnings per share in 
2005. Although the minimum number of items disclosed on all these accounting standards was 
higher in 2005 than in 2000, the highest disclosure remained at about the same level. This result 
suggests that the NASB Act 2003 might have contributed to the increase in the minimum level of 
items disclosed in corporate annual reports in 2005, but was not able to push the highest 
disclosure level beyond the 2000 level.  
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2012 was the first year of IFRS adoption in Nigeria. The level of disclosure was based on 
companies that used IFRS for financial reporting for the first time to prepare their financial 
reports for the financial year-end 2012/13. During the period, one of the sampled companies has 
the highest level of disclosure on presentation of financial statements. The company disclosed 
about 90 of the required items in its financial reports. However, one of the sampled companies 
has the lowest disclosure level for presentation of financial statements disclosing about 40 items 
on the accounting standard. In the same year, one of the sample companies with the highest 
disclosure level for combined property, plant and equipment and earnings per share disclosed 15 
items, while the company with the least disclosed 10 items on both standards.  
Figure 5 shows a significant increase in the number of items disclosed after IFRS adoption; 
however, there was a significant variation in the number of items disclosed by the sampled firms. 
This result is consistent with prior studies, which argue that IFRS adoption leads to more 
information transparency. However, the result shows that there were differences in the level of 
information disclosure despite IFRS adoption. The low level of disclosure by some of the sample 
companies is consistent with the argument that when new regulations are introduced, managers, 
accounting staff and auditors need time to actively engage in learning and applying the new rules 
(Abayo, Adams and Roberts, 1993). In addition, full implementation of the new regulation in 
practice may lag behind legal implementation (Rahman, Perera and Ganish, 2002), especially if 
financial or technical resources are not readily available. The result also suggests that Nigerian 
corporate managers should be encouraged to improve on the level of disclosure by providing 
relevant education and training that enhance familiarisation with accounting standard disclosure 
requirements. Although the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRC) has taken steps to 
provide such training through the FRC Academy, the FRC needs to create awareness about the 
activities of the FRC Academy and make it accessible to everyone involved in corporate 
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financial reporting. Table 19 presents the descriptive statistics for the predictor variables, which 
are based on the Greenwood et al. framework. 
Table 19 Descriptive statistics for the dimensions of Greenwood et al. (2011) framework  
 
   Mean   Median  Standard Deviation  
  2000 2005 2012 2000 2005 2012 2000 2005 2012 
Variable n = 23 n = 43 n = 34 n = 23 n = 43 n = 34 n = 23 n = 43 n = 34 
Cap_intensity 0.85 0.88 0.92 0.85 0.90 0.95 0.08 0.11 0.07 
NonNatprop 26.21 28.97 19.22 27.27 33.33 16.67 22.19 23.78 20.22 
BoardHoldPct 5.01 5.87 13.89 0.24 0.81 5.06 12.32 11.96 17.57 
MVE   9.02   27.02   138.96   2.83   5.66   15.31   13.82   50.53   377.15  
Age  38.43 43.25 41.72 38.73 44.99 42.61 11.44 13.40 19.91 
DebtFin  7.04 14.03 16.85 3.96 9.54 17.19 7.66 10.07 12.40 




Table 19 shows the descriptive statistics for the predictors of intra-industry variation in the level 
of disclosure. The average market capitalisation of equity measured by market value of equity 
(MVE) increased significantly over the sampled periods. The average market value for the 
sample firms increased from 9 billion Naira in 2000 to 138.9 billion Naira in 2012. The increase 
in seasoned equity and initial public offering in the immediate period preceding the global 
financial crisis in Nigeria, and the increase in sample size, contributed to the observed increase in 
average market value of the sample firms over the sample periods. The median value of market 
value of equity was significantly lower than mean value, demonstrating that the market positions 
of the sample firms were significantly different to each other. 
The proportion of total assets financed by long-term debt (measured by debt finance) doubled 
from 7 percent in 2000 to 14 percent in 2005; however, it increased marginally to 17 percent in 
Note: Total sample consists of 100 non-financial Nigerian firms. The table shows determinants of intra-
industry variation in disclosure. Corporate characteristics were selected based on the Greenwood et al. 
(2011) framework. The following correspond to each dimension of the framework. (Cap_intensity) represnts 
organisation structure. (NonNatprop) represents organisation governance. (BoardHoldPct) represents 
organisation ownership. Market value of equities (MVE) represents organisation position. Age, Debt Finance 
(DebtFin) and Audit Fees (AuditFees) are proxies for organisation identities.  
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2012. The low proportion of debt finance in the capital structure suggests that Nigerian listed 
companies used more equity finance than debt finance. The implication of this low debt ratio is 
reduced pressure from debt holders for an increase in the level of disclosure. The standard 
deviation of debt finance remains relatively stable over the period, which suggests that the 
sample firms maintains relatively the same level of debt finance over time.  
The average audit fees almost doubled from 5 million Naira in 2000 to 9 million Naira in 2005. 
The average audit fees increased significantly to 65 million Naira in 2012. With 2012 being the 
first year of IFRS adoption in Nigeria, the result suggests that the implementation of IFRS could 
have contributed to an increased scope of audit assignment, which resulted in an increase in audit 
fees. In addition to the variables shown in table 19, other dummy variables were included in the 
evaluation of the determinants of intra-industry variation in disclosure compliance. These 
variables are the dummy variables for industry classification and the dummy variables for the 
three regulatory regimes. 
8.3. Multivariate analysis 
Table 20 presents the results of the results of multivariate analyses on the determinants of intra-
industry variation in disclosure level.  
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Table 20 Impacts of the dimensions of Greenwood et al. (2011) framework on mandatory disclosure 
PANEL A Standardised value of frequencies based on overall items disclosed 
  Int wkreg semireg strgreg Capint Turn Agric Serv Congl Cosgds Indgds GasOil Health Constr NonNat  Brdhold Age DebtFin audfees 
Restric -4.25*** 0.59*** 0.17 -0.77*** 1.95** 0.06 -0.95*** 0.27 0.35 -0.08 0.29 -0.23 0.05 0.29 -0.01 0.05 0.29 0.02** 0.43***
  (1.33) (0.17) (0.12) (0.19) (0.98) (0.10) (0.33) (0.23) (0.42) (0.18) (0.22) (0.27) (0.29) (0.34) (0.004) (0.05) (0.20) (0.01)
 (0.13)  
LSDV    -4.60***  -0.42* -1.36*** 1.95** 0.06  1.22*** 1.30** 0.87** 1.24*** 0.72 1.00** 1.24** -0.01 0.05 0.29 0.02**
 0.43***  (1.31)  (0.23) (0.35) (0.98) (0.10)  (0.41) (0.61) (0.41) (0.43) (0.48) (0.46) (0.50) (0.004) (0.05) (0.20)
 (0.01) (0.13)  
MM  -4.47***  -0.41* -1.28*** 1.71 0.05  1.30*** 1.34** 0.91** 1.26*** 0.71 0.95** 1.33** -0.01 0.06 0.33 0.02** 0.41***
  (1.42)  (0.25) (0.37) (1.08) (0.10)  (0.44) (0.65) (0.44) (0.46) (0.52) (0.48) (0.54) (0.004) (0.06) (0.21) (0.01)
 (0.14) 
 
PANEL B Standardised value of frequencies excluding items on information to be disclose in financial statements 
Restric -3.18** 0.43** 0.17 -0.60*** 0.61 0.05 -1.22*** 0.30 0.31 0.27 0.41* -0.11 -0.36 0.39 -0.002 0.13** 0.34 0.02* 0.34** 
 (1.42) (0.19) (0.13) (0.20) (1.04) (0.10) (0.36) (0.24) (0.45) (0.19) (0.23) (0.29) (0.31) (0.36) (0.005) (0.06) (0.21) (0.01) (0.14) 
LSDV -3.97***  -0.26 -1.03*** 0.61 0.05  1.52*** 1.53** 1.49*** 1.63*** 1.11** 0.86* 1.61*** -0.002 0.13** 0.34 0.02* 0.34** 
 (1.40)  (0.24) (0.37) (1.04) (0.10)  (0.44) (0.65) (0.44) (0.46) (0.51) (0.49) (0.54) (0.005) (0.06) (0.21) (0.01) (0.14) 
MM -3.28**  -0.05 -0.97*** 0.26 0.002  1.38*** 1.46** 1.67*** 1.40*** 1.25*** 0.75* 1.64*** -0.01 0.15*** 0.33* 0.02** 0.37*** 
 (1.33)  (0.23) (0.34) (1.03) (0.09)  (0.40) (0.58) (0.40) (0.42) (0.47) (0.44) (0.48) (0.004) (0.05) (0.19) (0.01) (0.13) 
PANEL A         PANEL B 
F Val. R Sq Adj. R Sq      F Val. R Sq Adj. R Sq 
Rest 4.83*** 0.482 0.38      3.32*** 0.39 0.27      
LSDV  4.83*** 0.48 0.38       3.32*** 0.39 0.27 
MM   0.39        0.38 
Poolability Test  F Val       Poolability Test F Val 
Time    8.08***        4.26** 
Industry   1.86*        2.79** 
 
Note: Total sample consists of 100 non-financial Nigerian firms. The determinants of standardised cross-sectional variation in frequencies of items disclosed were estimated 
by regressing the standardised intra-industry variation in frequencies of items disclosed on corporate characteristics. Complexity of institutional environment is proxy by 
weak, semi-strong and strong regulatory regimes. Capital intensity (Capint) proxy for organisation structure.  Turnover (Turn) proxy for organisation field position. 
Organisational field is proxy by industry classification. Eight industry dummies are agric, services, consumer goods, industrial goods, oil and gas, healthcare and construction. 
Non-Nigerian Nationals on boards (NonNat) proxy for organisation governance, board holding (Brdhold) proxy for organisation ownership, age, debt finance and  audit fees 
(audfees) proxies for organisation identities. Selected significant levels are indicated as follows: ***1%, **5%, *10%, standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 20 shows the results of the impacts of corporate attributes on intra-industry variation in the 
level of disclosure in the corporate annual reports of Nigerian listed companies. This study 
estimated three models, first, the standardised frequencies of total items disclosed in the annual 
reports, second, the standardised frequency of total items disclosed excluding the frequencies of 
IAS 1 items disclosed in annual reports and the respective SAS 1and SAS 2. Third, the 
standardised frequencies of items disclosed on SAS 3 and SAS 23, with the respective 
IFRS/IAS. Three regression models are estimated for each of these three standardised 
frequencies; these are regression models with restriction to dummies variables, the Least Squares 
Dummy Variable (LSDV) regression model and the MM robust regression.  
This thesis accepts the F statistics of a poolability test for both time and industry dummies. This 
suggests that the model with one of the time and industry dummies dropped is better than the 
model with the restriction imposed. The poolability test also indicates that coefficients of the 
independent variables are consistent and stable, suggesting that the results of the coefficients 
estimate are efficient. The detailed procedure for conducting the poolability test was explained in 
section 6.4.3 of this thesis.  
The results in panel A of table 20 shows a significant negative relationship between semi-strong 
and strong regulatory regime periods in the LSDV model. The dummy for the strong regulatory 
regime has the highest negative coefficient. The significant negative coefficient indicates a 
reduction in the differences in the level of disclosure by the sampled firms during these periods. 
This suggests a potential impact of regulatory coercion that enhanced isomorphic or uniform 
disclosure practice (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In addition, the results show a significant and 
positive relationship between capital intensity and standardised variation in the level of 
disclosure. This indicates that organisation structure proxied by capital intensity contributes to 
observed differences in the level of disclosure. A further discussion on this variable is given in 
section 8.4.6 
P a g e  | 192 
 
Except for the oil and gas industry, industry classifications show a significant and positive 
relationship with standardised differences in the level of disclosure. The agriculture industry was 
used as the reference category, which indicates that as one moves from agriculture to other 
sectors, for example the industrial goods sector, the differences in level of disclosure was higher. 
Non-availability of a national accounting standard for the agriculture sector contributed to the 
observed difference in the level of disclosure by companies in the agriculture sector relative to 
those of other sectors.  
Furthermore, the result shows a significant and positive relationship between debt finance and 
standardised differences of disclosure. This result indicates that companies with a higher 
proportion of their assets financed by debt capital disclose more information in their annual 
reports. This is a result of pressure from debt-holders on the companies to disclose more 
information for monitoring purposes; alternatively, companies with higher debt may disclose 
more information to reduce monitoring costs. In addition, the result in panel A of table 20 shows 
a significant and positive relationship between audit fees and standard differences in the level of 
disclosure. This indicates that organisations that pay higher audit fees disclose more information 
in their annual financial reports. Further discussion on this variable is given in section 8.4.4 
The results in panel B in table 20 show a significant and positive relationship between the 
proportion of board shareholding and level of disclosure on property, plant and equipment, and 
earnings per share. Further discussion on this variable is present below in section 8.4.5 
By combining the results in both panel A and B in table 20, this study does not reject the 
following hypotheses: 
H1: Intra-industry variation in the level of mandatory disclosure is lower during a period of 
strong regulatory regime relative to a period of weak regulatory regime in Nigeria 
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H2: Intra-industry variation in the level of mandatory disclosure differs among industry 
categories in Nigeria 
H4: There is a significant positive relationship between capital intensity and intra-industry 
variation in the level of mandatory disclosure. 
H6: There is a significant positive relationship between the proportion of share ownership by 
directors and intra-industry variation in the level of mandatory disclosure 
H8: There is a significant positive relationship between leverage and intra-industry variation in 
the level of mandatory disclosure 
H9: There is a significant positive relationship between audit fees and intra-industry variation in 
the level of mandatory disclosure 
8.4.  Implications of the impacts of institutions and corporate attributes on intra-
industry variation in mandatory disclosure  
This thesis could not reject six out of the nine dimensions of the Greenwood et al. (2011) 
framework used to explain intra-industry variation in the level of disclosure. The next sections 
discussed the implications of these results. 
8.4.1.  Impacts of regulatory regimes  
The study covers three periods; 2000 coded as a weak regulatory regime, 2005 coded as a semi-
strong regulatory regime and 2012 coded as a strong regulatory regime. The model with 
restriction shows that a weak regulatory regime is significant and positively related to 
standardised variation in the level of disclosure. This is the result of a fragmented regulatory 
environment, which lacks cohesive disclosure requirements. For example, during the weak 
regulatory regime, the disclosure requirements of SEC, NSE, NASB and CAMA differ. This 
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situation provides an opportunity for corporate managers to exercise discretion in decision-
making around disclosure. Nigeria adopted the IFRS during the strong regulatory regime. 
However, a strong regulatory regime is significantly and negatively associated with intra-
industry variation in dislosure. This indicates that strong enforcement regime reduced variation 
in corporate reporting practice, which is to say that organisations have little discretion under a 
strong regulatory regime. 
These results have many implications. First, during a stringent enforcement actions and sanctions 
corporate organisations attempt to minimise penalty costs, and by conforming to an established 
disclosure norms. Second, during a weak and fragmented regulatory regime, powerful 
organisations leverage lack of specificity in disclosure requirements (Goodrick and Salancik, 
1996) to exercise discretion on disclosure requirements (Oliver, 1991). During the weak regime, 
the potential impact of regulation depends on the balance of probability between self-interest and 
the power of relevant regulatory enforcement mechanisms (Perrow, 1986). Some powerful 
organisations were able to alter the balance of power, and their self-interest supersedes 
normative requirements.  
The foregoing results suggest that regulatory agencies need to brace up for the challenge of 
ensuring uniformity in the level of disclosure (Mezias, 1990). To meet the challenge of ensuring 
uniform disclosure among Nigerian listed companies, the enforcement mechanism might have to 
depend on organised community groups in the immediate vicinity of non-compliant firms to 
enforce compliance with disclosure requirements (World Bank, 2000). One example of such 
organised community groups is shareholders’ associations, which can play a crucial role in 
pressing for information, and thus encourage increased disclosure compliance. However, the 
proliferation of shareholders associations in Nigeria and their pursuit of self-interest (Uche, 
2015), would inhibit their effectiveness in enhancing uniform level of disclosure. In addition, the 
litigation process in Nigeria is very cumbersome, costly and time-consuming (World Bank, 
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2015). Judicial decisions are often belated and not timely enough to rectify the effect of 
corporate malpractice. This suggest that shareholders associations and other community groups 
would not be encouraged to pursue litigation as an option to encourage improved level of 
corporate disclosure. 
In addition, effectiveness of whistle blowing within and outside an organisation would contribute 
to an improved level of disclosure. However, the Nigerian institutional environment does not 
encouraged whistle-blowers due to the institutional barrier of a lack of freedom of speech to 
publish independent media reports about corporate actions, and a lack of institutional protection 
of whistle-blowers from repression and victimisation.  
8.4.2. Impact of industry classification 
Table 20 shows that all the industries have significant positive coefficients in relation to the 
industry used as a reference category. This result indicates that the nature and extent of 
institutional complexity facing organisations is fundamentally shaped by the structure of the 
organisational fields (i.e. the industry) (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 334). The significant positive 
impacts suggests that some industries are “matured” while some are “emerging”, making the 
companies in these industries subject to different levels of pressure from their institutional 
environment.  
Furthermore, the difference in the level of disclosure indicates a firm’s responsiveness to 
consumers and stakeholders concerns on their legitimacy as it affects the credibility and 
believability of the information produced by these industries (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Scott, 
1995; Suchman, 1995). Additionally, the difference may result from unique operational features 
of firms in each sector, and the historical antecedents of companies in each of these sectors might 
account for the observed differences in the level disclosure. For example, whilst Nigerian 
nationals historically own the agriculture sector many industrial goods, construction and 
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conglomerates corporations were historically the subsidiaries or branches of multinational 
corporations in Nigeria, particularly during the colonial era. These historical antecedents might 
have contributed to the significant differences in corporate disclosure compliance. 
In addition, the stage of economic development in Nigeria has a differential effect on the demand 
for accounting information in different sectors. For example, because of the significant role of oil 
revenue in Nigeria, investing public might presume that oil and gas would yield higher returns 
than those of other sectors. Consequently, investors might exert more pressure on the oil and gas 
sectors than for instance, the agriculture sector for increased information, and this would be an 
incentive for firms in the oil and gas sector to increase disclose.  
Furthermore, the number of listed firms in each sector would influence the interconnections of 
firms in each sector; this would affect the level of disclosure (Goodstein, 1994). Sector with 
higher level of interconnections would encouraged voluntary diffusion of financial reporting 
practice, which would contribute to an increased level of disclosure by firms in these industries. 
Besides, business, financial and operational risks vary from industry to industry. For example, 
the construction sector by its nature has higher operational risks than does the agricultural sector. 
Therefore, investors in the construction sector would put more pressure on those firms to 
disclose more information that would help mitigate the risks on their investment.  
Similarly, some sectors face more stringent regulation than others, for example, the oil and gas 
sector due to its economic significance to the government of Nigeria, which would result in a 
higher level of disclosure. Firms in sectors that are vulnerable to litigation would disclose more 
information to protect their companies and shareholders from the adverse financial consequences 
following reputational damage (O’Rourke, 2003). In addition, corporations operating in sectors 
that cause more environmental damage or questionable human rights issues are pressured to 
disclose more information about their operations. In other words, corporations operating in an 
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environmentally sensitive sector would disclose more information as they attempt to comply 
with environmental standards and codes.   
Finally, the proprietary cost of full disclosure varies from one industry to the other. Any one firm 
in an industry that attempts a balanced disclosure alone faces the risk that bad news could have a 
negative impact on the firm’s valuation while competitors that are more secretive are not 
discipline by the market. For example, investors may misinterpret highly selective disclosure of 
good performance as indicating that the firm is less risky (Blacconiere and Patten, 1994). 
Therefore, the management’s perception of investors’ interpretation of the information disclosed 
would affect the level of disclosure in each industry.  
8.4.3. Impact of debt finance  
The results in table 20 show that debt finance is significant and positively impact intra-industry 
variation in disclosure. This implies that an increase in debt finance increases the difference in 
the level of disclosure. Several reasons could account for this result. First, debt can be used as a 
tax shield; firms with a high debt ratio would be more transparent in information disclosure. This 
conclusion is based on the argument that a positive link exists between a firm’s disclosure level 
and its indebtedness, and firms with high leverage are urged by creditors to disclose more 
information to help them handle their credit risk (Hossain et al. 1994). Furthermore, increased 
disclosure could result in a lower cost of debt.  
However, the source and the nature of debt, rather than the proportion of debt capital, could 
contribute to a differential effect of debt capital on information disclosure. If for example, a 
company issued debenture and several investors subscribed to it, the demand for accounting 
information would be different to a situation when the debt was provided by a bank in term of 
loan or where private individual provided the debt. The he bank or an individual debt provider 
could have a representative on the board of the company and thus have an access to the 
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company’s private information. The conclusion is consistent with Zarzeski (1996) who argues 
that if firms have a higher level of public debt, there would be a higher agency problem in which 
case detailed financial disclosure is required to ensure observance to debt contracts; but financial 
disclosure decreases with leverage when creditors have direct access to information.  
Furthermore, Bushman and Piotroski (2005) argue that taxation provides a mechanism for the 
state to extract wealth from corporations and shareholders, therefore, when a firm’s tax burden is 
increasing, the firm would take measures to reduce their tax payment. This suggests that firms 
that have exhausted or are close to exhausting legal opportunities to avoid taxation by using debt 
capital would tend to be less transparent than other firms that are yet to exhaust opportunities for 
tax avoidance. 
8.4.4. Impact of audit fees  
Table 20 shows a significant positive relationship between audit fees and intra-industry variation 
in disclosure. Suchman (1995, p. 589) argues that organisations link their activities to 
professionals with external authority and competency in order to gain or maintain legitimacy. 
The result indicates that corporate organisations derived legitimacy from the audit services 
offered by external auditors. Therefore, firms that pay higher audit fees increases their level of 
disclosure to maintain a legitimacy of association with external audit firms, which enhanced the 
credibility of their annual reports (Francis, 2004).  
However, an audit fee could result from an increased time by the audit’s partners to hold 
meetings with audit committees (Goodwin and Munro, 2004). Therefore, increased audit fees 
may not necessarily result in increased disclosure. In addition, as an organisation becomes more 
complex the audit risk increases. Therefore, an increase in audit fees may be due to size and 
complexity of the organisation, and at the same time, larger and complex organisations may have 
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more information to disclose. Therefore, the combination of size and audit fees would 
simultaneously influence the level of disclosure.  
Furthermore, a profitable organisation would be less risky than a loss-making organisation. 
Therefore, the auditor’s perception of audit risks may lead to increased audit fees, which may not 
lead to an increased disclosure. In addition, audit tenure would influence the audit risk 
assessment, and the specialisation and size of the audit firm would influence the bargaining 
power of the audit firm, and consequently, the audit fees.  The foregoing discussions suggest that 
many factors influence audit fees, and therefore, a need to investigate factors that influence audit 
fees in the financial reporting process.  
 8.4.5. Impact of board share holding  
Panel B in table 20 shows the result on frequency of items disclosed on accounting standards on 
property plants and equipment (IAS 16/SAS 3) and earnings per share (IAS 33/SAS 23). The 
result shows a significant positive relationship between intra-industry variation in disclosure and 
the proportion of issued shares owned by board members. This result is consistent with Nagar et 
al. (2003) who argue that stock price-based incentive contracts effectively encourage disclosure.  
The result indicates that board members increase earnings-related disclosure to signal their 
credible commitment and to build a reputation that they are not expropriating residual 
shareholders (Gomes, 2000). This commitment is necessary to ensure that residual or minority 
shareholders do not discount the stock price, which ultimately affects the wealth position of these 
board members.  
However, where board members own a substantial proportion of the issued shares, this it would 
results in concentrated ownership. Significant share ownership by board members provided them 
the opportunity to form an alliance with politicians who desire secrecy in private business 
dealings. The directors would want to secure their position in the company while engaging in 
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unethical business transactions by reducing the level of disclosure. This suggests that the 
standard of ethics in the business environment (Bradshaw and Miller, 2007) will affect the 
incentive of board members to either increase or withhold earnings-related disclosure.  
8.4.6. Impact of capital intensity 
Although not very robust, the result shows a significant positive relationship between capital 
intensity and variation in disclosure. Capital intensity indicates complexity in the organisational 
structure, or barriers to entry. When capital intensity provides a barrier to entry, an organisation 
increased the level of disclosure; this in turn reduced the problem of adverse selection among 
investors. The firm also benefits from reduced cost of capital, and foreign investors are attracted 
to the capital imarket. Policy-makers benefit from reduced budget for monitoring and 
enforcement and can utilise resources to promote the reputation of the capital market. This 
suggests that barrier to entry is beneficial to all capital market participants.  
8.5. Summary of results on intra-industry variation in corporate disclosure  
This chapter has built on the idea that organisations experience institutional complexity, and that 
both organisational field and organisational attributes determine organisational response to 
institutional pressures for increased disclosure. The results speak to the argument that an 
organisation’s response are a function of the degree of institutional contradiction (Friedland and 
Alford, 1991: 256), rules specificity (Goodrick and Salancik 1996), and the enforcement 
mechanism (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008; Wysocki, 2011). The results show how an organisation’s 
attributes have affected their response to external pressure to increase information disclosure 
(Greenwood et al. 2011). In addition, the results show that firms do not respond uniformly to 
disclosure requirements, which suggests that a one-size accounting standards do not fit all firms 
in different industries.  
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This study contributes to our knowledge of corporate disclosure practice, and demonstrates that 
the Greenwood et al. framework can be used in financial accounting research. However, it is 
important to understand how individual organisations process the complexity that confronts them 
in the environment; this will involve looking inside individual organisations. Therefore, an 
additional study is required to investigate how individual organisations make sense of and cope 
with, conflicting institutional pressures. The line of argument advanced by March (1994) that 
decisions are shaped by situational recognition, identity and the application of rules could be a 
starting point for such research. Furthermore, to appreciate the strategic responses of 
organisations to institutional complexity, further research could examine why particular logics 
are given salience (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 351). In other words, we need to understand how 
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Chapter Nine 
Summary, implications and recommendations 
9.1. Introduction 
Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) argue that the incentives for the preparers of financial reports depend 
on the sources of demand for, and political influence on financial reporting. Similarly, Leuz, 
Nanda and Wysocki (2003) argue that there is a link between a country’s legal and institutional 
factors and the quality of reported financial information to outside investors. Consistent with 
these views, Leuz et al. (2003) argue that mandated accounting rules and regulations cannot be 
considered in isolation without an understanding of the economic and institutional factors that 
affected a firm’s reporting incentives. Furthermore, Holthausen (2003) proposed that within-
country studies are necessary to control for institutional variables and to maintain the specific 
characteristics of a disclosure regime.   
This thesis advances our knowledge of the determinants of the level of mandatory disclosure in 
corporate annual reports by using institutional frameworks to provide an explanation for this 
phenomenon. The theisis provides answers to three empirical questions: What is the level of 
mandatory disclosure in corporate annual reports of Nigerian listed companies? What factors can 
explain the level of mandatory disclosure in corporate annual reports of Nigerian listed 
companies? What factors can explain intra-industry variation in the level of mandatory 
disclosure by Nigerian listed companies? The next sections present the summary of results of the 
empirical investigations of these questions, the policy implications of these results, and the 
recommendations and limitations of the study.  
 
 
P a g e  | 203 
 
9.2.  Contribution of this study 
This study contributes to the literature on the impact of institutional pressures on corporate 
reporting practice (Nyquist, 2003; Prakash, 1999; Prakash and Kollman, 2004). In particular this 
study use the Oliver (1991) and Greenwood et al. (2011) institutional framework to identify 
organisational characteristics that affects corporate disclosure behaviour in Nigeria. This study 
contributes to the literature by addressing the criticism that institutional theory downplays the 
role of agency and interests in organisational decision processes (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; 
DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Powell, 1991; Scott, 1987).  
When benchmarked against the existing literature, this study offers several key insights. First, 
increased organisation’s legitimacy leads to an increased level of disclosure. Second, increased 
organisation’s efficiency leads to a reduced level of disclosure. Third, strong institutional regime 
increased the level of an organisation’s compliance with institutional requirements. Fourth, 
voluntary diffusion of institutional requirements through recognised professionals such as the big 
four audit firms increased organisation’s compliance with institutional requirements. Fifth, 
uncertainty (e.g. economic uncertainty) reduced the level of an organisation’s compliance with 
institutional requirements.  
The study offers the following additional insights, organisations face institutional complexities to 
which they respond in different ways, in other words, organisations vary in their receptivity and 
response to institutional complexity. This finding is consistent with Weber et al. (2004) who 
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9.3.  Policy implications of the research findings 
Based on the results of this thesis, practitioners and policy-makers involved in financial reporting 
can develop a better understanding of the forces that shape corporate disclosure behaviour, 
which would in turn assist with the implementation of appropriate regulations (Welford, 1998).   
The results show variation in the level of mandatory disclosure, which underscores the 
importance of understanding the procedures employed and issues considered by corporate 
managers in their decisions on whether to disclose a particular item of information. If these 
accounting rituals were well-understood (Gibbins et al., 1990), the investor would ultimately be 
fully responsible for his/her reliance on accounting information. Understanding the accounting 
rituals will also enable investors to perform an objective appraisal of his/her investment decision 
in the light of information at his/her disposal. In addition, it will prevent misallocation of funds 
or the problem of adverse selection. The foregoing suggests that corporate managers should be 
required to discuss under one section in the annual report, those particular items of accounting 
information that are not applicable to them in any particular year.  
In addition, the variation in the level of mandatory disclosure could be the result of a lack of 
specificity or open-ended disclosure requirements in the accounting standards (Goodrick and 
Salancik, 1996). Lack of specificity provides an incentive for corporate managers to interpret the 
disclosure requirements to suit their self-interest.  This implies that regulators should be specific 
when identifying the information that should be disclosed in the accounting standards. On the 
other hand, variation in the level of disclosure might indicate that some corporate organisations 
have a complete disregard for the disclosure requirements. Among possible reasons for this 
disregard could be ineffective oversight of the reporting practices.  
Furthermore, some corporate organisations might wield significant power in the financial 
reporting environment (Perrow, 1986). Organisation can become powerful because of the 
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resources they control, their political connections or because the sanctions imposed for violation 
are insignificant, comparable to the potential gains resulting from violations. This suggests that 
penalties or sanctions imposed for violation should be sufficient to deter corporate organisation 
from non-compliance with disclosure requirements. 
However, in a stable institutional environment, the most powerful organisations would have little 
or no room to exercise discretion regarding disclosure requirements (Mezias, 1990). Therefore, 
the variation in the level of disclosure is a reflection of the instability in the institutional 
environment for financial reporting in Nigeria. The institutional environment for financial 
reporting in Nigeria is destabilised by persistent changes to the leadership of regulatory 
enforcement agencies such as the CAC, SEC and NSE. The instability in leadership results in 
instability in enforcement methods and inconsistent application of sanctions against corporate 
organisations. The lack of stability also results in the selective application of enforcement action 
against corporate managers. This provides an incentive to corporate organisations to deviate 
from full compliance with disclosure requirements.  
In addition, individual investors have no voice in the determination of the content of disclosure 
requirements in Nigeria. These imply that the information needs of the investor are not 
adequately represent when coding the disclosure requirements in the various accounting 
standards. Since the users of corporate annual reports are heterogeneous, individual organisations 
might have considerd the peculiarity of its user’s group when deciding on the information to 
disclose. This might have led to the observed differences in the level of disclosure and therefore, 
it was difficult to achieve uniform disclosure level in corporate annual reports. 
Furthermore, attempts to disclose information that satisfies the information needs of every user 
might lead to information overload, and investors and other users might incur extra processing 
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costs if seeking advice from analysts or investment advisers. Organisations might vary their level 
of disclosure to mitigate the cost of information overloads.  
The foregoing suggests that the forces influencing corporate disclosure are conflicting and 
complex. It remains a challenge to attain optimum disclosure levels and variations would 
continue to exist in the level of disclosure in corporate financial reports. This study also 
demonstrates that variation exists in corporate disclosure despite the adoption of IFRS.  
9.4.  Recommendations of the thesis 
The foregoing implications suggest the need for a regulatory reform in Nigeria. Such reforms 
should not be a mere response to a widespread perception of inadequacy of existing regulations, 
but should be appropriate to the uniqueness of the Nigerian financial reporting environment.  In 
addition, the reform should allow for a regulation that minimises public loss of trust and 
confidence. The government should weigh compliance burdens on corporate organisations to 
avoid providing an incentive to corporate organisation to devise complex avoidance strategies.  
Furthermore, the results suggest the need to evaluate the impact of regulatory intervention when 
formulating a reform agenda. Prior to embarking on a regulatory reform, the government should 
consult other stakeholders; this would assist with the adoption of a reform that will effectively 
solve any perceived financial reporting problems. The government should establish a framework 
that clearly states the procedure for such consultation and should consider all criticisms in the 
development phase of any reporting regulation. Lack of proper consultation could have been one 
of the reasons for the failure of the NASB Act 2003 in Nigeria to achieve its intended objectives, 
the Act was repealed due to its ineffectiveness (FRC, 2012).  
In addition, regulators should undertake a Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), that is, 
reporting regulation should follow a due process to ensure that the benefits do not outweigh the 
cost of compliance. However, the regulator should not rely exclusively on the use of RIA 
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beacuse some of the benefits and costs of such an assessment would not be quantifiable. For 
example, trust is an essential element of any regulatory objective, which might be difficult to 
quantify.  In addition, the parameters used to estimate the costs and benefits might become 
irrelevant to future environmental conditions (Thomadakis, 2007). This suggests the need to 
consider potential future development that allows for innovation in the financial reporting 
process. Undue restrictions that do not consider potential future development would stifle 
flexibility and result in the production of unreliable financial reports. The regulator should trust 
the preparers of financial reports to apply appropriate judgements suitable to the peculiar 
business conditions when preparing their corporate annual reports. However, the question that 
merits attention is, to what extent should the regulator allow corporate managers to exercise 
discretion in the financial reporting process? 
Furthermore, regulators should distinguish inadvertent non-compliance because of an honest 
mistake or misinterpretation of the disclosure requirements from a deliberate attempt at 
falsification with fraudulent intentions. If the regulator applies sanctions on corporate 
organisations when an honest attempt was made to fulfil regulatory objectives there is a risk that 
the preparer of corporate annual reports would perceive the law to be too harsh and oppressive. 
This would provide an incentive to devise avoidance strategy such as escaping the regulatory 
environment (Oliver, 1991). 
Political leaders should ensure the independence and autonomy of the enforcement mechanism 
and the appointments of the leadership for these agencies should not be based on political 
affiliations. This would enhance consistent application of sanctions for violating disclosure 
requirements. Similarly, corporate organisations that are not satisfied with any sanctions or 
penalties imposed on them should be able to challenge these in appropriate law courts. This 
would enhanced managerial perception that the law is fair, and the perception of the civil society 
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that the regulation is effective. In addition, it would influenced the confidence and trust of the 
public that invests in the capital market.  
Furthermore, the government should establish a Compliance Advisory Panel (CAP), which 
should work in collaboration with the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRC) and 
corporate organisations. The role of the panel would be to liaise with corporate organisations on 
compliance matters and advise regulatory bodies on the reasons for observed deviation in 
corporate disclosure requirements. In addition, the panel should be charge with the role of 
surveying the level of disclosure in corporate annual reports and rank corporate organisations by 
the level of disclosure. The best performing organisation should be rewarded annually; this 
reward would provide an incentive to corporate organisations to improve their level of 
disclosure. Additionally, the panel should be charged with the responsibility of helping to clarify 
and communicate specific disclosure requirements to corporate organisations. This would 
ultimately help to restore confidence and trust in corporate financial reports, and promote a 
culture of good compliance in Nigeria.  
Furthermore, the government should commit to ensuring a clear division of responsibilities 
between government ministries and enforcement mechanisms; this will help preserve the 
independence of enforcement mechanisms. The enforcement mechanism’s staff and management 
should act independently from any market interest and should not seek to take direct instructions 
from any other government entity when making enforcement decisions. The present practice 
whereby the Financial Reporting Council is dependent on the annual subscriptions of individual 
professional members in Nigeria could put pressure on the FRC to take a lenient stance against 
violations from powerful donors. To mitigate this, the FRC should have access to adequate 
separate annual budget allocations, with the autonomy to implement its budget allocations.  
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The government should pay particular attention to the views of investors when proposing 
changes to financial reporting regulations. This should be addressed as part of an impact 
assessment. The government should avoid making piecemeal changes or ad hoc amendments to 
regulatory requirements in order to enhance the stability of the regulatory system. The 
enforcement mechanism such as the CAC, FRC, SEC and NSE should create and update on a 
continuing basis, a public registry of regulations, or use other means to ensure that domestic and 
foreign businesses can easily identify all requirements that are applicable to them. These 
enforcement mechanisms should have electronically accessible, interactive websites to make 
regulatory information available to businesses and the public, and to receive comments on 
regulatory matters (BIS, 2011). Furthermore, there should be adequate protection for whistle- 
blowers who report corporate abuse of financial reporting standards.   
The government should review non-regulatory policies such as exchange rates, inflation, 
subsidies and government procurement, and adjust them when they unnecessarily distort the 
willingness of corporate managers to be transparent in financial reporting. This implies that the 
government should adopt a dynamic approach to ensuring that reforms are carried out in a 
systematic and logical order. The government should remove any unnecessary regulatory 
burdens on corporate organisations to lessen the compliance costs for business, improve overall 
compliance and stimulate economic efficiency of the entire regulatory system. 
The FRC should develop a collaborative arrangement with each of the key sector regulators- the 
NSE, SEC, ICAN, ANAN, CBN, NDIC, NAICOM, PENCOM, to draft sector-based financial 
reporting standards. In addition, the FRC should provide necessary support such as workshops, 
training and technical notes, to ease compliance. Although the FRC has taken steps in this 
direction by establishing the FRC academy, the FRC should create an awareness of the activities 
of the academy, which should be easily accessible to all preparers of corporate financial report.  
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The results show that the big four auditors have a significant and positive relationship on intra-
industry variation in the level of disclosure. This suggests a need for a formal collaboration 
between the accounting profession (ICAN/ANAN) and the financial reporting regulators. The 
FRC should make formal arrangements with practicing members of the accounting professions 
for the big four to conduct a review of financial statements audited by smaller auditors, with a 
view to enhancing the quality of their financial statements. This arrangement should include the 
mechanism for exchanging confidential information that would enhance effective monitoring 
and enforcement of financial reporting requirements (World Bank, 2013).  
Furthermore, there is a need to nurture a conscious progressive academic-practitioner interface; 
given the capability of the academic community to propel an advanced professional accounting 
practice. The academic community’s engagement in research is a major source for acquiring new 
knowledge about any phenomenon, and such knowledge is a sine qua non for improved financial 
reporting practice. Therefore, there is need to establish a research fund that should be managed 
independently, to provide funding for quality accounting research. 
9.5.  Limitation of the study 
The study suffers some limitations that are commonly associated with archival research.  First, 
archival research typically tests theoretical predictions (Friedman, 1953), however, it is difficult 
to assess which theory best fits the data in archival research because key variables potentially 
proxy for multiple theories (Graham et al., 2005). For example, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 
(2005, p.4) argue that size might explain reporting decisions because of political costs, the 
information environment or firm risk. Furthermore, Graham et al. (2005) argue that large sample 
analyses may not always speak to the relative importance of competing hypotheses for a 
phenomenon because the explanatory variable with the least measurement error might dominate 
the analysis.  
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In addition, unobservable variables can cause self-selection bias that affects the result of the 
empirical analysis. To correct for omitted variables, one must find a suitable proxy for the 
unobserved variables. For example, organisation power can influence the level of disclosure in 
annual reports (Perrow, 1986). However, this study do not control for the influence of 
organisation power since it is difficult to identify an appropriate proxy for power. This is one of 
the limitations of this study. Furthermore, a problem of simultaneous endogeneity can occur 
when an observed variable depends on unobserved exogeneous variables (variables that do not 
relate to the specified model). A two stage least square (2SLS) or three stage least square (3SLS) 
can address this problem, however, this thesis does not identify exogenous variables that 
correlate with the independent variables but not with the dependent variable.  
Additionally, evaluating legitimacy issues empirically has its methodological challenges, such as 
the practical problems of assessing subjective perceptions and the beliefs of relevant parties. In 
other words, an inability to measure the perceptions of relevant social audiences about the 
legitimacy of corporate organisations is a limitation in this study.  
Furthermore, whilst the findings in this thesis are robust and significant, it employs a 
dichotomous measure of corporate disclosure, which considers every items required in the 
accounting standards as equally important. Whilst results of unweighted and weighted indices 
are generally the same, future studies may improve the analysis by constructing weighted and 
weighted mandatory disclosure indices. In addition, data availability poses a limitation to the 
present study; unavailability of data prevents a proper evaluation of the trend in corporate 
disclosure to have a proper understanding of disclosure behaviour of listed Nigerian companies. 
However, it is interesting to note that despite the difficulty in measuring data, this study has been 
able to document the direct effects of institutional complexity on organisations’ financial 
reporting practices. 
P a g e  | 212 
 
9.6.  Recommendation for further study 
Although this study finds supports for significant aspects of the Oliver (1991) framework, a joint 
use of the Oliver model and economic theories for an empirical study of this nature might have 
the potential to yield more robust results (Collin et al., 2009). Furthermore, this study focuses 
only on acquiescence (compliance) as a form of strategic response, further research should be 
designed in financial accounting research to evaluate the five forms of strategic responses 
proposed by Oliver’s model and assess whether effective compliance or resistance represent the 
responses that most organisations exhibits. In addition, research should extend to evaluate the 
motivating factors behind effective compliance or resistance. 
Furthermore, in order to have a full understanding of an organisation’s strategic responses to 
institutional complexity, a further study should examine why particular logics are given salience 
(Greenwood et al., 2011, p.351). That is, it is important to understand how an organisation 
handles potential loss of legitimacy from an institutional audience whose prescriptions they 
ignored. In addition, we need to understand how organisations managed the losers among the 
competing and conflicting institutional audiences of financial reporting.  
Furthermore, as data availability improves, future studies may need to investigate how other 
country-level institutional factors such as Gross Domestic Products (GDP) affects the level of 
mandatory disclosure in corporate annual reports. Additionally, this thesis has collected data 
from corporate annual reports to conduct the quantitative analyses. However, annual reports can 
sometimes convey mixed messages; therefore, future studies may employ a qualitative approach, 
such as face-to-face interviews and case studies to evaluate the commitment of corporate 
managers to disclosure requirements. This may provide a holistic understanding of the different 
determinants of, and motives for, mandatory disclosures.   
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In addition, the results indicate that the level of disclosure by corporate clients of the big-four 
audit firms was higher than the level of disclosure by clients of non-big audit firms. A future 
could investigate whether there is systematic difference in their reporting styles and audit 
opinions. Finally, future studies may investigate the effectiveness of the whistle-blowing system 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 List of sample companies 
 
S/no Company  Industry 
1 7UP   Consumer Goods 
2 ABCTRANS  Services 
3 ACADEMY  Services 
4 AIRSERVICE  Services 
5 AP_Forte  Natural Gas and Oil 
6 ASHAKACEM Industrial Goods 
7 BCC   Industrial Goods 
8 BERGER  Industrial Goods 
9 BETAGLASS  Industrial Goods 
10 BOCGAS  Natural gas and oil 
11 CADBURY  Consumer Goods 
12 CAP   Industrial Goods 
13 CHAMPION  Consumer Goods 
14 CHEVRON_MRS Natural Gas and Oil 
15 CONOIL  Natural Gas and Oil 
16 COSTAIN  Construction and Real Estate 
17 DANGCEM  Industrial Goods 
18 DANGSUGAR Consumer Goods 
19 DNMEYER  Consumer Goods 
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20 DUNLOP_DNTR Consumer Goods 
21 ENAMELWA  Consumer Goods 
22 FIDSON  Healthcare 
23 FLOURMILL  Consumer Goods 
24 GLAXOSMITH Healthcare 
25 GUINNESS  Consumer Goods 
26 HONYFLOUR Consumer Goods 
27 JBERGER  Construction and Real Estate 
28 LIVESTOCK  Agriculture 
29 MAYBAKER  Healthcare 
30 MOBIL  Natural Gas and Oil 
31 NAHCO  Services 
32 NASCON  Consumer Goods 
33 NB   Consumer Goods 
34 NBC   Consumer Goods 
35 NEIMETH  Healthcare 
36 NESTLE  Consumer Goods 
37 NIGROPES  Industrial Goods 
38 NIWICABLE  Industrial Goods 
39 NNFM   Consumer Goods 
40 OANDO  Natural Gas and Oil 
41 OKOMUOIL  Agriculture 
42 PHARMDEKO Healthcare 
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43 PRESCO  Agriculture 
44 PZ   Consumer Goods 
45 REDSTAREX  Services 
46 RTBRISCOE  Services 
47 STUDPRESS  Services 
48 TOTAL  Natural Gas and Oil 
49 TRANSCORP  Conglomerate and Holding 
50 TRANSEXPR  Services 
51 UACN   Conglomerate and Holding 
52 UACN_PropDev Construction and Real Estate 
53 UNILEVER  Consumer Goods 
54 UPL   Services 
55 UTC   Consumer Goods 
56 VONOPRODUCT Consumer Goods 
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Appendix 2  List of national accounting standards issued by the NASB  
SAS  Title      Effective Date Equivalent   Included? 
SAS 1 Disclosure of Accounting Policies    Jan 1, 1985 IAS 1  Yes 
SAS 2 Information to be disclosed in Financial Statement  Jan 1, 1985 IAS 5  Yes 
SAS 3  Accounting for Property, Plant and Equipment  Jan 1, 1985 IAS 16  Yes 
SAS 4 On Stocks      Jan 1, 1987 IAS 2  No 
 SAS 5 On Construction Contracts    Jan 1, 1988 IAS 11  No  
SAS 6 On Extra-ordinary items and Prior year adjustments  Jan 1, 1988 IAS 8  No 
SAS 7 On foreign currency conversions and translation  Jun 1, 1988 IAS 21  No 
SAS 8 On Accounting for employees retirement benefits  Jan 1, 1991 IAS 19  No 
SAS 9 Accounting for depreciation    Jan 1, 1990 IAS 4  No 
SAS 10 Banks and Non-bank financial Institutions Part 1  Dec31,1990 IAS 30  No 
SAS 11 On Leases      Dec31,1992 IAS 17  No 
SAS 12 On Accounting for deferred  Taxes    Jan 1, 1993 IAS 12  No 
SAS 13 On Accounting for investments    Jan 1, 1994 IAS 25  No 
SAS 14 Petroleum Industry: Upstream Activities    Jan 1, 1994 N/A  No 
SAS 15  Banks and Non-bank Financial Institutions, Part 11  Jan 1, 1997 IAS 30  No 
SAS 16 Accounting for Insurance Business    Jan 1, 1998 N/A  No 
SAS 17 Petroleum Industry: Downstream Activities   Jan 1, 1998 N/A  No 
SAS 18 On statement of Cash flows    Jan 1, 1998 IAS 7  Yes 
SAS 19 Accounting for Taxes     Jan. 1, 2001 IAS 12  No 
SAS 20 Abridge Financial Statements    Jan 1, 2002 N/A  No 
SAS 21 On Earnings Per Share     Jan 1, 2002 IAS 33  Yes 
SAS 22 On Research and Development costs   Dec31,2006 IAS 38  No 
SAS 23 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets Dec31,2006 IAS 37  No 
SAS 24 On segment reporting     Jan 1, 2007 IAS 14  No 
SAS 25 On Telecommunication Activities    Jan 1, 2008 N/A  No 
SAS 26 On Business combinations     Jan 1, 2008 IFRS 3  No 
SAS 27 On consolidated and separate financial statements  Jan 1, 2008 IAS 27  No 
SAS 28 On investments in Associates    Jan 1, 2008 IAS 28  No 
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SAS 29 On Interests in Joint Ventures    Jan 1, 2008 IAS 31  No 
SAS 30 On interim Financial Reporting    Jan 1, 2008 IAS 34  No 
 
Appendix 3 Template for disclosure index on selected Nigerian national standards 
SAS1/ IAS1 Disclosure of accounting policies: disclosures requirements  
21 Where there are several acceptable accounting bases, a reporting enterprise should 
disclose the basis used especially where the knowledge of such basis is significant in 
understanding and interpretation of the financial statements     R1 
22 Accounting policies should be prominently disclosed as an integral part of the financial 
statements under one caption rather than as notes to individual items in the financial statements
            R2 
23b Where there are changes in policy, nature of changes to accounting policy should be 
disclosed           R3 
23c Where there are changes in policy, justification of such changes in accounting policy 
should be disclosed          R4 
23d Where there are changes in policy, effect of such changes in accounting policy on current 
year’s profit should be disclosed        R5 
23e Where there are changes in policy and the effect of such changes is not ascertainable the 
fact should be indicated          R6 
SAS1 Disclosures requirements Stated in Appendix  
SAS1  Accounting policy should be disclose under one caption, the Basis of accounting R7 
SAS1  Accounting policy on consolidation should be disclosed    R8 
SAS1  Accounting policy on Goodwill should be disclosed     R9 
SAS1  Accounting policy on Investments should be disclosed              R10 
SAS1  Accounting policy on Fixed Assets should be disclosed                         R11 
SAS1  Accounting policy on Depreciation should be disclosed                                  R12 
SAS1  Accounting policy on Stocks and Works-in-progress should be disclosed          R13 
SAS1  Accounting policy on Turnover should be disclosed                                            R14 
SAS1  Accounting policy on Contracts in progress should be disclosed                   R15 
SAS1  Accounting policy on Long-term contracts should be disclosed                   R16 
SAS1  Accounting policy on Foreign currencies conversion should be disclosed       R17 
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SAS2/ IAS5 Information to be disclose in financial statements 
11 The financial statements of an enterprise should state:  
 a. the name of the enterprise       R19 
 b. the period of time covered        R20 
 c. a brief description of its activities      R21 
 d. its legal form        R22 
 e. its relationship with its significant local and overseas suppliers including the immediate 
and ultimate parent, associated and affiliated company    R23 
12 Financial statements should include the following:  
 a. statement of accounting policies      R24 
 b. balance sheet        R25 
 c. profit and loss account or income statement    R26 
 d. notes to the accounts       R27 
 e. statement of source and application of funds    R28 
 f. value added statement       R29 
 g. five year financial summary      R30 
13 Financial implication of inter-company transfer and technical management agreements 
between the enterprise and its significant local and overseas suppliers including its immediate 
and/or ultimate associated, affiliated company should be disclosed.   R31 
14 Financial statements should show corresponding figures for the preceding period 
           R32 
15-21 Balance sheet specific disclosures: the balance sheet or related notes should disclose the 
following information  
15 Assets 
Fixed asset- property, plant and equipment  
 a. land: freehold and leasehold      R33 
 b. buildings         R34 
 c. plant and equipment       R35 
 d. other categories of assets, suitably classified    R36 
 e. accumulated depreciation for each category    R37 
 f. separate disclosure in a note form should be made for assets on lease and assets 
acquired on instalment purchase plan       R38 
 g. items on lease and assets acquired on instalment plan should disclose the type of assets 
involved, their amounts and period covered.      R39 
 h. items on lease and assets acquired on instalment plan should disclose their amounts 
           R40 
 i. items on lease and assets acquired on instalment plan should disclose the period 
covered.          R41 
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16 Other long-term assets  
 a. long-term investments (quoted and unquoted) distinguishing between:  
i. investment in subsidiary        R42 
 ii. investment in associated company      R43 
 iii. other investment        R44 
 b. all long-term debts including their tenure     R45 
 c. intangible assets: 
i. goodwill          R46 
 ii. patents, trademarks and similar assets     R47 
 iii. deferred charges such as: pre-incorporation expenses; 
pre-production expenses and re-organisation expenses    R48 
 d. write-offs during the period on investment should be disclosed  R49 
 e. the market value of investments should be disclosed   R50 
17 Current assets  
 a. stocks and spare parts       R51 
 b. current portion of long-term debts      R52 
 c. trade debts         R53 
 d. prepayment and sundry debtors      R54 
 e. directors’ debit balances       R55 
 f. subsidiary and associated companies’ debt balances   R56 
 g. short-term investments (including treasury bills, certificates of deposit and commercial 
notes)           R57 
 h. deposits with Central Bank against imports    R58 
 i. amount awaiting remittance to overseas creditors    R59 
 j. cash and bank balances       R60 
18 Capital and Reserves-  
a. the variety of ownership interests such as ordinary and preference shares R61 
 i. number, nominal value and amounts of shares authorised and issued R62 
 ii. the rights, preferences and restrictions with respect to the distribution of dividends and 
to the repayment of capital        R63 
 iii. cumulative preference dividends in arrears    R64 
 iv. shares reserved for future issue under options, sales contracts and options for 
conversion of loans and debentures into shares, including the terms and amounts R65 
 v. movement in the Share Capital Accounts during the period  R66 
 b. other shareholders’ interest, indicating movement during the period and any 
restrictions on their capitalisation by way of bonus shares    R67 
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 i. share premium or discount       R68 
 ii. revaluation surplus        R69 
 iii. revenue and capital reserves      R70 
 iv. retained earnings        R71 
19 Long-term Liabilities  
 a. secured loan        R72 
 b. unsecured loan        R73 
 c. loans from holding, subsidiary and associated companies   R74 
 d. details of applicable interest rates, repayment terms, covenants, subordinations, etc. 
should be disclosed.         R75 
20 Current liabilities  
 a. amount due to holding, subsidiary and associated companies  R76 
 b. trade creditors        R77 
 c. other creditors and accrued expenses     R78 
 d. dividends payable        R79 
 e. current taxation        R80 
 f. current portion of long-term liabilities     R81 
 g. bank loans and overdrafts       R82 
21 General  
 a. restrictions on the titles to assets      R83 
 b. restrictions on the distribution of dividends    R84 
 c. securities given in respect of liabilities     R85 
 d (i). the method of providing for pension and retirement scheme  R86 
 d(ii). disclosure indicating whether the scheme is funded or unfunded R87 
 e. contingent assets and contingent liabilities     R88 
 f. amounts approved or committed for future capital expenditure  R89 
 g. events that have occurred after the balance sheet date but before the financial 
statements are approved by the Board      R90 
22 Profit and Loss Account (Income Statement) the following information should be 
disclosed  
 a. turnover/sales and other operating revenue    R91 
 b. other earnings: distinguishing between interest income, income from investments and 
other sources          R92 
 c. interest charges        R93 
 d. Taxes on income        R94 
 e. Unusual charges        R95 
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 f. unusual credits        R96 
 g. depreciation        R97 
 h. auditor’s remuneration       R98 
 i. director’s emoluments       R99 
 j. net income         R100 
23 Source and application of funds (No longer relevant)  
24 Value Added Statement -the statement should show separately the following  
 a. sales to outsiders        R101 
 b. purchases- distinguishing between imported and local items  
 c. benefits to various groups such as: 
i. employees          R102 
 ii. owners and other suppliers of capital     R103 
 iii. government        R104 
 iv. money retained for maintenance and expansion of the enterprise R105 
 
SAS3/ IAS16  Accounting for Property, Plant and equipment   (PPE)  
45a the basis for determining the book value of PPE should be disclosed R106 
45b Where more than one basis for determine the value of PPE is used the book value 
determined under each basis in each category of PPE should be disclosed  R107 
45c where PPE are stated at revalue amounts, the methods adopted to compute these amounts 
should be disclosed         R108 
45c upon valuation of PPE policy with regard to frequent valuations should be disclosed
           R109 
45c upon valuation of PPE the nature of indices used should be disclosed R110 
45c upon valuation of PPE whether external valuers are involved should be disclosed 
           R111 
45d financial statements should disclose movement in each category of PPE  
(i.e. additions and disposals) during the year      R112 
45e financial statement should disclose contingent capital gains tax and  deferred tax liability 
attributable to any revaluation surplus incorporated  
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SAS21 /IAS33 Earnings per share   
53 An enterprise should present basic and diluted earnings per share on the face of the 
income statement, and the historical financial summary with equal prominence R114 
54 An enterprise should present basic and diluted earnings per share, even if the amounts 
disclosed are negative (a loss per share)      R115 
55 An enterprise should present basic and diluted earnings per share statistics for earnings 
per share before extraordinary items       R116 
56a An enterprise should disclose the amounts used as numerators in calculating basic and 
diluted earnings per share, and the reconciliation of those amounts to the net profit or loss for the 
period           R117 
56b An enterprise should disclose any changes in the number of shares used to compute 
earnings per share         R118 
56c An enterprise should disclose the financial effect on diluted earnings per share of any 
adjustments resulting from changes in accounting policy applied in preparing and presenting the 
financial report         R119 
57 An enterprise should disclose by way of notes, ordinary share or potential ordinary share 
transactions that occur after the balance sheet date when they are of such importance that non-
disclosure would affect the ability of users of the financial statements to make proper evaluations 
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Appendix4. Template for disclosure index on selected International Financial Reporting 
Standards  
IAS1: Presentation of Financial Statements  
Statement of Financial Position       R1 
Comprehensive Income         R2 
Statement of Changes in Equity       R3 
Statement of Cash flow        R4 
Notes of significant accounting policies and explanatory    R5 
Comparable financial Statement       R6 
Equal Prominence presentation       R7 
Related notes for each statements       R8 
Explicit Statement of compliance with IFRS      R9 
Departure from IFRS with explanation      R10 
Prominently display name of reporting entity and any change in name  R11 
Display whether statements are group or individual     R12 
Display Information about reporting period      R13 
Display Reporting Currency        R14 
Displayed Rounding e.g. thousand, millions      R15 
Display reason for changed accounting period     R16 
Separate current and non-current assets      R17 
Separate current and non-current liabilities      R18 
Minimum Line items on face of Balance sheet  
Balsheet property plant and equipment      R19 
Balsheet Investment property        R20 
Balsheet Intangible         R21 
Balsheet financial assets        R22 
Balsheet investment equity method       R23 
Balsheet biological assets        R24 
Balsheet inventories         R25 
Balsheet trade and other receivables       R26 
Balsheet cash and equivalent        R27 
Balsheet asset for sale         R28 
Balsheet trade and other payable       R29 
Balsheet provision         R30 
Balsheet financial liabilities        R31 
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Balsheet current tax liabilities       R32 
Balsheet current tax asset        R33 
Balsheet defer tax liabilities        R34 
Balsheet defer tax asset        R35 
Liabilities included in disposal       R36 
Non-controlling interest        R37 
Capital attributable to owners        R38 
Reserve attributable to owners       R39 
Required disclosure for Share capital and reserves 
Share number authorised        R40 
Share number issued and fully paid       R41 
Share par value or nominal par value       R42 
Begin and end period share number reconciled     R43 
Description of rights and restrictions       R44 
Disclose share held by sub and associates      R45 
Share reserve for options and contracts      R46 
Nature and purpose of reserve share       R47 
Comprehensive Income   
Profit or loss          R48 
Total of other comprehensive income      R49 
Comprehensive income for the period      R50 
Profit or loss allocated between owners and non-controlling    R51 
Profit or Loss statement  
Revenue          R52 
Gains and loss from fin assets derecognise      R53 
Finance costs          R54 
Share of associate profit or loss       R55 
Reclassified fin asset gain or loss       R56 
Tax expense          R57 
Total amount of discontinue items       R58 
Depreciation or amortisation        R59 
Employee benefits         R60 
Changes in Equity  
Present separate changes inequity       R61 
Reconcile begin and end equity components      R62 
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Show contribution by owner        R63 
Show distribution to owner        R64 
Show changes in owner interest in subsidiary     R65 
Analyse other comprehensive income by items     R66 
Dividends information to be disclosed in notes  
Amount div proposed         R67 
Div per share          R68 
Notes presented in the following order  
Statement of IFRS compliance       R69 
Summary sig acctg policies        R70 
Supporting info for fin statement items      R71 
Contingent liabilities         R72 
Entity risk management obj        R73 
Entity risk management policies       R74 
Significant accounting policies       R75 
Judgement notes in applying acctg policy      R76 
Key assumption about the future       R77 
Period sources of estimation uncertainty      R78 
Capital Disclosure  
Entity objectives for managing capital      R79 
Entity policy for managing capital       R80 
Describe capital it manage        R81 
Nature of external capital requirements      R82 
How its meeting its objectives       R83 
Quantitative data about entity capital       R84 
Period to period changes in capital       R85 
Compliance with external capital requirements     R86 
Consequence of noncompliance with ext cap reqrmts    R87 
Other information  
Entity domicile and legal form       R88 
Country of incorporation        R89 
Address registered office        R90 
Principal activities         R91 
Name of parent if part of group       R92 
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IAS16: Property, Plant and Equipment  
Ppe basis or measuring carrying amt       R93 
Ppe depreciation methods        R94 
Ppe useful lives or dep rates        R95 
Ppe gross carrying amt        R96 
Ppe accumu dep         R97 
Ppe additions          R98 
Ppe disposals          R99 
Ppe acquisitions         R100 
Ppe revaluation increase or decrease       R101 
Ppe impairment or losses        R102 
Restriction on asset title        R103 
Revaluation date         R104 
Independent valuer involved        R105 
Cost value compared with revalued amt      R106 
Revaluation surplus         R107 
Fairvalue ppe revalued        R108 
 
IAS 33: Earnings Per Share  
Eps basic          R109 
Eps diluted          R110 
Eps basic numerator         R111 
Eps diluted numerator         R112 
Eps basic and diluted reconciled       R113 
Basic weighted avg numb of share       R114 
Diluted weighted avg numb of share       R115 
Post bal sheet ord share transact       R116 
Adjust tbasic eps due to errors or changed policy     R117 
Adjust diluted eps due to errors       R118 
Adjust basic eps due to cap bonus split      R119 
Adjust dilute eps due to cap bonus split      R120 
 
 
